<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784</id><updated>2011-07-28T10:30:10.761-07:00</updated><title type='text'>HR Kashmir</title><subtitle type='html'></subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>17</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-4581233914057785517</id><published>2007-10-01T09:35:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-10-01T09:35:07.144-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Geneva Convention adopts a working paper on Kashmir</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;Geneva Convention adopts a working paper on Kashmir&lt;br&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showexclusives.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1190929019&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=15&amp;amp;var1news=value1news"&gt;http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showexclusives.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1190929019&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=15&amp;amp;var1news=value1news&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic3Gen.JPG" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;Geneva (Palais des Nations)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;, September 27: History was made at the extraordinary two day successful "Geneva Convention on Kashmir: The Making of Peace in Kashmir – Analysing Promotion&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;and Protection of Human Rights and Right to Self-Determination" held at the Palais des Nations, &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Geneva&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;. The last day of this two day convention concluded with the adoption of "Geneva Convention on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; – Working Paper" voted on by the delegates from around the world. These included politicians, academics, scholars, Jurists, human rights activists, humanitarian organizations, think tanks, and other NGOs. &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic0Gen.jpg" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;In the opening plenary, Barrister Majid Tramboo, Chair &amp;amp; Executive Director, ICHR Kashmir Centre.EU, in his opening remarks offered inspirational words of welcome and encouragement. He outlined the role of the United Nations in contentious issues such as the &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; issue. He asserted that – " The biggest challenge that is haunting the "peace process" is huge military presence in &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;. According to various estimates, there are more than 700,000 gun-toting army and paramilitary forces in the streets, outside houses, hospitals, schools, religious places, in the fields and mountains. The men in uniform are ubiquitous and seen everywhere. There is roughly one army man for every ten Kashmiris. One can only imagine the life under such a heavy presence of the army and their paraphernalia. The situation on the ground makes a common Kashmiri skeptical about the peace as reminds them of their uncertain present and bleak future as the politics remains in continous flux.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;The huge army presence has given rise to their unwanted contact with the resenting civilians. This leads to continous gross human rights violations. Thus an unending cycle of violence is born and sustained. The massive army has also stifled growth of local agriculture, education and strained the natural resources beyond limit as the army has occupied huge tracts of agricultural land, educational institutions and government buildings. This has also put a massive pressure on the local environment."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;H.E. Ambassador Masood &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;Khan&lt;/st1:city&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;Mission&lt;/st1:city&gt; to the United Nations, &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Geneva&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt; said that – "The UN Charter established the right to self-determination. The two international covenants affirmed the right to self-determination of all peoples by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural rights. &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The people of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; have not yet exercised this right. The lodestar for the Kashmiris are several UN Security Council Resolutions that promised them a fair and impartial plebiscite to ascertain their political will. That promise has not been fulfilled. Meeting on the sidelines of the Human Rights Council, we can look at three dimensions: (a) the state of human rights; (B) the ongoing Pak-India composite dialogue and Confidence Building Measures involving Kashmiris; and (C) the quest for a long solution of the &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; dispute.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;This Convention being held in &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Geneva&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt; should call for an immediate end to the human rights abuses in IOK. Dialogue is the crucible for solutions. So far, &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; have held three rounds of composite dialogue and they are into the fourth round. The result is mixed. The dialogue, however, has not moved forward on the resolution of the &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; dispute, though a willingness to address the issue has been expressed.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;We need to step up efforts to find a solution of the dispute that is acceptable to &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and the people of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;. For durable solutions, we need statesmanship, courage and flexibility."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Bilal A. Lone, Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir People's Conference and a leader of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) said that it is regrettable that the government of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; has stalled talks with APHC and that currently there are no negotiation going on between APHC and the Indian government. He hoped that the "Peace Process" between the governments of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; shall remain on course and that these initiatives will have direct impact on the ground situation in &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; particularly with regards to human rights conditions there.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic1Gen.JPG" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Farooq Siddiqi, Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), analyzing the democratic values of the governments of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; said – "The claimant of largest democracy in the world holds civilian people under siege with 800 hundred thousand army presence within its streets, villages and hamlets. You will find how the claimant of responsible democratic country uses inhuman laws and methods to stifle the voice of freedom. You will find how under the garb of fighting terrorism it uses its acquired military might to unleash&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;terror in the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:placetype w:st="on"&gt;Valley&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of &lt;st1:placename w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:placename&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt; upon civilian people in order to negate the basic unalienable right to decide their future as guaranteed by the international community. You will find how fully it shut its eyes to daily killings of men, women and children as a matter of routine governance in &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Democracy do not function in the absence of freedom, it has no relevance when people are besieged. If democracies commit human rights abuse like in &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;, such democracies are not defined by moral power of people, but the powerful define democracy, thereby undermining its purpose of governance."&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Advocate Nazir Ahmed Ronga, President of the &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt; and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, insisted upon the Kashmir Centric CBM providing some kind of relief to the Kashmiri people. He appealed to the governments of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; to give peace a chance and to avoid confrontation.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;He particularly emphasized for the repeal of all draconian laws.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Dr. Z.U. Khan, Special Advisor to the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir &amp;amp; Vice-Chancellor of the AJK University said that– "With Track 2 diplomacy and President Musharraf's four points formula of demilitarization, self-governance, irrelevant borders and joint control which seems to be most realistic, is expected to bring peace and prosperity without compromising anyone's belief or the spirit of the International agreement – UN Resolutions."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic2Gen.JPG" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Per Gahrton (Director of the Swedish Green Think Tank COGITO and a former Member of the European Parliament), P.J. Mir (Professional Journalist and the Head of the ARYONE World TV), Bashir Ahmed (Advocate and the Joint-Secretary of the Jammu Kashmir High Court Bar Association), Marjan Lucas (Senior Programme Officer on Kashmir on Kashmir at IKV), Ali Raza Syed (President of the Advisory Council to the Kashmir Centre.EU), Prof. Nazir Shawl (Executive Director of Justice Foundation Kashmir Centre), Syed Yousuf Naseem (Convenor of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, AJK &amp;amp; Pakistan Chapter), Mir Tahir Masood (Representative of the Jammu and Kashmir Ittihadul Muslimeen in APHC, AJK &amp;amp; Pakistan Chapter), Masroor Abbas Ansari (President of the Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir Ittihadul Muslimeen and an Executive Member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference),&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Mariana Baabar (Professional Journalist and the Diplomatic Editor of the Islamabad based newspaper "The News"), Khalid Farooqi (Professional Journalist and the Information Analyst and Consultant for GEO TV), Murtaza Shibli (Professional Journalist and the Editor of the Kashmir Affairs Journal), Ismail Khan (Elected Member of the Board of Director of the Mountain Forum and an Op-ed Columnist/Analyst of the Islamabad-based newspaper "The News"), Sheikh Tajammul Islam (Professional Journalist and the Director General of the Kashmir Media Service), Prof. Noor Ahmed Baba (Head of the Political Science Department at the Kashmir University) together with other European jurists and scholars urged the two governments to uplift the peace process and to involve the people of Jammu and Kashmir in the process.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;At the closing plenary, the remarks of IHRAAM's chair Dr. Y.N. Kly were recorded in which he wishes the delegates to note that IHRAAM has a global interest in protecting and promoting the right of people to self-determination as a fundamental human rights foundation on which the charter of the UN also finds its niche.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Dr. G.N. Fai, Executive Director of the Kashmir Centre &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Washington&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; in his written message. He said that -&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;"The Kashmir conflict has been won. The question is no longer if &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;'s right to self-determination will be honored, but when.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;It may come five years hence, or it could take ten years of more unwearied resolution.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;But it will come.&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;India will ultimately come to recognize that it has lost the struggle to choke freedom in Kashmir, as Great Britain did in Ireland after more than a century of recurring rebellions and as the United States did in withdrawing from South Vietnam after thrashing the Ho Chi Minh Trail with more bombs than had been dropped in all of World War II." The Convention wishes him well and hoped for his speedy recovery.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Following two days of intensive presentations, discussions and debates that took place over five sessions, the following working paper was adopted at the convention:&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;font color="#000000"&gt;"Geneva Convention on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; – Working Paper"&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;font color="#3333ff"&gt;BACKGROUND&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;For decades, India-Pakistan relation, in particular regarding the Kashmir Issue, have dominated &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;South Asia&lt;/st1:place&gt;'s political and economic development, calendar.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic4Gen.JPG" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Kashmir&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt; is a regional issue with international implications. Therefore, the initiatives on establishing peace process by the governments of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; are underway and the people of Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir support the process.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;There is a need to improve existing condition so that the peace process can eventually address and find a peaceful and acceptable solution to the Kashmir Conflict. However, may questions and pitfalls remain as to how the current initiatives can translate into concrete steps so that a meaningful process to the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; conflict can begin.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Most importantly, the leaders of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; have to demonstrate courage and vision to undertake a brave and genuine peace process on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;. Without serious political will, nothing will be achieved. Not least of all, Kashmiris and the international community will need to convince the leadership of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; to recognize the need to involve Kashmiris in the peace process and to workout concrete mechanism for Kashmiris participation in the process format. No solution on Kashmir will be durable unless it is legitimate in the eyes of the people of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The Geneva Convention on Kashmir reiterates the position taken by the ad hoc Delegation on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; of the European Parliament, which is summarized as follows:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;"… that there are three parties with a legitimate interest in being involved in finding a solution – the Indian government, the Pakistan government and the Kashmiri people through their representatives, who should be freely chosen, coming from both parts of Kashmir".&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;It is fundamental to recognize that the &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:state&gt; issue should not be viewed as an exclusively bilateral issue between &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;, the current status quo of the Cease Fire line (CFL) or Line of control (LOC) cannot be maintained indefinitely or its conversion into a permanent border is not acceptable to the people of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"&gt;&lt;font size="4"&gt;&lt;font color="#3333ff"&gt;PROPOSALS&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Following the Convention deliberations, the following key proposals are suggested:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic5Gen.JPG" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proposal No. I&lt;/strong&gt;: It is firmly believed that effective demilitarization will bring a increased sense of security, cessation of all violence and flexibility and tolerance.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;With approximately, one soldier to every 10 inhabitants in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir (on the Indian side), the huge military presence is never far away. Therefore, it is extremely important that Kashmiris must, once again, feel safe and secure in their own land and homes. For this purpose a methodology needs to be devised by the governments of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; to ultimately make the State of Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir "Military free Zone" area. There are two possible ways to achieve this that are as follows:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;·&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;With regard to Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir (on the Indian side), where there is an extremely strong military and paramilitary presence, it is vital that those should be withdrawn to barracks from towns, cities and all inhabited and populous areas; and&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;·&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Once ceasefire between the Government of India and the Kashmiri resistance forces is attained, the two governments in consultation with Kashmiri political &amp;amp; resistance leadership must devise a practicable plan to demilitarise the State of Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;In addition, the demilitarization is vital for protection of environmental assets of global significance e.g. glaciers, waterbodies and forests.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proposal No. II&lt;/strong&gt;: It is strongly recommended that international organizations such as the European Union, or the United Nations to appeal to the Kashmiri resistant militant groups to declare ceasefire.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;"The Geneva Convention on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;" urges resistance groups and all those in a position to do so to establish the circumstances, which would create an environment conclusive to breaking the cycle of violence and human rights abuses. For the peace process to succeed leading to definitive solution of the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; dispute and sustainable peace, what is needed is an atmosphere free of intimidation and terrorism in whatever form.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The unilateral cease fire announced by then Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Zafarullah Khan Jamali on 26 November 2003 has largely held on the Cease fire Line (CFL) or Line of Control (LOC) and has increased a sense of security and safety to all those Kashmiri's living on both sides.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;In order to make the entire &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:placetype w:st="on"&gt;territory&lt;/st1:placetype&gt; of &lt;st1:placename w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:placename&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;, violence free it is crucial to convince the Kashmiri resistance groups to hold fire.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proposal No. III&lt;/strong&gt;: The effective remedies be made available to protect and promote Human Rights in &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt; in accordance with the Geneva Convention.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;It is important to consider the prerequisites required to establish a socio-political and economic environment confidence building, reconciliation and goodwill negotiations. In this case, it is suggested that the starting point should substantially increase accountability for human rights abuses, for the provision adequate and effective remedies for victims of human rights violations, which may be as stated below:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;·&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Victims be assured of the cessation of continuing violations, and there should be public disclosure of the truth behind the violations, accompanied by an official declaration of responsibilities and/ or apologisies, public acknowledgement of violations, as well as judicial and administrative sanctions against the perpetrators.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;·&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;These remedies and reparations include such things as&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;restitution, rehabilitation, or compensation (this relates to compensating a victim for any pecuniary and non pecuniary assessable damage resulting from a violation, including physical or mental harm, emotional distress, lost educational opportunities, lost marital opportunities, loss of earnings, legal and/or medical costs);&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;·&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Given the large number of Kashmiri's currently in prisons and detention centres, it is crucial that their names be provided to their families, Human Rights organizations, legal aid agencies etc.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Further it is recommended to abrogate all such provisions, which violate international covenants and conventions.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The Geneva Convention on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; strongly urges free access to respected independent NGOs and agencies to monitoring protection of human rights and to counseling for those who have been traumatized by terrorism.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;A profound review of the legal framework to ensure that the dispensation of justice is duly provided for (right to a fair trail by an Independent Judicial body).&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proposal no. IV&lt;/strong&gt;: Provision of enhanced and improved communication and free movement, between the different parts of the former state of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;To reinforce the involvement of Kashmiris and with goodwill on the part of both &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;, it is essential that communication between two parts of &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; should be enhanced and improved. Kashmiris are encouraged with the opening of Chakoti bridge crossing across the CFL or LOC. However, there are considerable administrative bottle necks hindering free movement which need to be addressed.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Trade, Commerce and Tourism be encouraged for the dwindling revitalization of the economy on both sides. Active cooperation on the preservation and good management of Kashmiri's natural resources (water, forests, minerals etc.) would benefit the whole of Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;This will further reinforce the involvement of Kashmiris in controlling their own destiny.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Proposal No. V&lt;/strong&gt;: Formation of European Kashmir Think Tank Group.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;It is indeed, crucial to monitor and assess the "peace process" of &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;, particularly with reference to the interests of people of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:state&gt;. The Geneva Convention on &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; to form a think tank – "Kashmir European Strategic Group (KESG)".&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;KESG may from time to time, as this matters may progress, engage in providing fresh, new and creative ideas to continuously encourage the two governments (&lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;) and the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; leadership to strike a balance in order to solve the Kashmiri conflict that can lead to establish peace and encourage prosperity in the region. KESG intends to encourage the two governments to remain on the path of dialogue and negotiations. The key proposals set-out in this working paper will further be analysed by KESG with the purpose to strengthening the peace process and addressing the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; conflict.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;img alt="" src="http://kashmirwatch.com/postnews/data/upimages/pic7Gen.jpg" align="none" border="0"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; background: white none repeat scroll 0% 50%; -moz-background-clip: -moz-initial; -moz-background-origin: -moz-initial; -moz-background-inline-policy: -moz-initial;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;font color="#ff0000"&gt;Photo: Kashmir Watch&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;Be smarter than spam. See how smart SpamGuard is at giving junk email the boot with the &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All-new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-4581233914057785517?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/4581233914057785517/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=4581233914057785517' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/4581233914057785517'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/4581233914057785517'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/10/geneva-convention-adopts-working-paper.html' title='Geneva Convention adopts a working paper on Kashmir'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-1054722742626701367</id><published>2007-09-15T16:57:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-09-15T16:57:58.853-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Rape of Kashmiri women and the South Asia</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;Rape of Kashmiri women and the South Asia &lt;br&gt; Peace process&lt;div&gt;&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.themuslimweekly.com/fullstoryview.aspx?NewsID=470A588D068EA5DF459E574F&amp;amp;MENUID=REFLECTION&amp;amp;DESCRIPTION=Reflections"&gt;http://www.themuslimweekly.com/fullstoryview.aspx?NewsID=470A588D068EA5DF459E574F&amp;amp;MENUID=REFLECTION&amp;amp;DESCRIPTION=Reflections&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;span class="NewsDetails02"&gt;By Farhat Jabeen&lt;/span&gt;  									 								 							 							 								 									 										&lt;img src="http://www.themuslimweekly.com/newsimages1/Week199/TW00008847L.jpg" align="left" hspace="10" vspace="3"&gt; 									 									&lt;p class="NewsDetails02"&gt;Presently, the situation in Kashmir, according to international organiasations &amp;amp; global media has not changed yet very much. It is still alarming and sparking flames in South Asia, that more then seven hundred thousand Indian army deployed in a small 40 -80 square miles area is the heaviest concentration in human history, and its all without any moral, political and legal code. 92 thousand Kashmiris have been killed by the Indian army in 17 years. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Since January 1989 to April 30, 2007:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Total killing.	91,865 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Custodial Killing	6,899&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Women gang raped &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; &amp;amp; Molested	9,708&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Civilian arrested	113,798&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Structures arsoned /&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt;  Destroyed	105,353&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Children orphaned	106,930&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Women widowed	 22,530&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; The International NGO's Amnesty International, Human rights watch, Asia watch, Red Cross, Medicine sans frontier and others are not allowed to visit Kashmir. Torture is widespread, particularly in the temporary detention centres; methods of torture include electric shock, prolonged beatings and sexual molestation of innocent women.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Kashmir is a disputed territory. Presently, the ceasefire line between the forces of India and Pakistan has divided Kashmir into two parts. One part is under Indian occupation: this comprises 63% of the whole territory and includes the Vale; it has a population 7.5 million. The other part, with approximately 3 million people, includes Azad Kashmir and the Northern region of Gilgit and Baltistan and is administered by Pakistan. About 1.5 million Kashmiris are refugees in Pakistan, some 400,000 live in Britain, and about 250,000 are scattered around the world. The present arbitrary bifurcation of Kashmir has resulted in the division of thousands of Kashmiri families.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Kashmiris living there have no life safety and human honour. Women are degraded and humiliated, almost 10 thousands women are raped; not only adult women but even eight year old girls are victimised. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Since the Indian government crackdown against Kashmiris in the disputed territory of Kashmir began in earnest in January 1990, security forces and Indian army have used rape as a weapon: to punish, intimidate, coerce, humiliate and degrade. Rape by Indian security forces most often occurs during crackdowns, cordon-and-search operations during which men are held for identification in parks or schoolyards while security forces search their homes. In these situations, the security forces frequently engage in collective punishment against the civilian population by assaulting residents and burning their homes. Rape is used as a means of targeting women to punish and humiliate the entire community. Rape has also occurred frequently during reprisal attacks on civilians. In many of these attacks, the selection of victims is seemingly arbitrary and the women, like other civilians assaulted or killed, are targeted simply because they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Women who are the victims of rape are often stigmatised, and their testimony and integrity impugned. Social attitudes which cast the woman, and not her attacker, as the guilty party pervade the judiciary, making rape cases difficult to prosecute and leaving women unwilling to press charges. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Government authorities have failed to bring the culprits on record. The normal trend of the Government during these years is to hide the atrocities committed by the Indian armed and paramilitary forces in order to dodge the Amnesty International and the world Human Rights Organization.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Various NGOs and human rights organisations are working for feminism and other civil &amp;amp; social rights, but in my opinion no satisfied work regarding Kashmiri women's safety and modesty. Women and Children are the victim of the worst human rights violations in this area of armed conflicts and ethnic war. It is crystal clear that sexual violence, which was used to subjugate and destroy a people as a form of ethnic cleansing, was an abhorrent and heinous war crime. These persistent and gross abuses, flagrant denials of the human rights of women and their right to life itself, demanded an urgent response from international human rights bodies. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; According to data maintained by a media portal of United Kingdom (UK) on reported cases of rape and molestation in which security forces were allegedly involved, nearly 500 women were raped in various parts of Jammu and Kashmir between1990-1994. Media portal maintains that it has compiled the reports from what was reported by state media. The portal maintains that non-governmental organisations (NGO) hardly took interest in documenting the plight of these silent sufferers of Jammu and Kashmir. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; According to a 1994 United Nations publication from 1990 to 1996, 882 women were reportedly gang-raped by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. But Social Stigma associated with word "Rape" has made work of human rights and women NGOs cumbersome. They say that women are reluctant to come forward. Extra Judicial killings, rapes, custodial killings, kidnappings, burning of houses by Indian security forces within IHK remain a common practice. The whole IHK has risen against the Indian Army and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act AFSPA and POTA that enables the Indian Army to arrest and kill anyone, anytime, anywhere, in a bid to suppress the ongoing Kashmir liberation movement, the Indian authorities have laid a network of torture cells to practice human rights violations. In these torture cells, the worst repressive means such as electric shocks, ironing of sensitive parts of body, are practised against the innocent Kashmiris without caring for the age and health conditions. Besides, the female folk are also taken to these centres where they are reportedly gang-raped for protesting against the Indian brutalities or filing complaints against terrorising of their near and dear ones.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; This poverty struck women have nothing to feed their children. Their husbands went missing and they could not even wail over their missing husbands.1000 widows, whose husbands have disappeared but not been proven dead. Their children were killed in front of their eyes and yet they are doing rounds of the government offices to prove that their children were killed in cold blood. The dreaded attack by soldiers and an assault on their honour and body remains in the minds of every woman in Kashmir. The young widows and teenaged orphan girls are facing more problems due to their youth as they are always at danger of getting molested or raped. It is matter of concern that most of the married women face the problem of miscarriages, which is one of the fastest growing problem in the rural and border areas of Kashmir. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; These happenings are not confined to Muslims. In the last 16 years the women of Kashmir have had to bear male vengeance in silence and they have been unable to find spare to transcend that. Estimates given by various organisations place widowS between 30 000 to 40 000 and Orphans between 50 000 to 80 000.the raped women are doubly victimised and have to live the rest of their carrying to stamp of stigma in silence." &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; The peace process began three years ago between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, and there has been dozens of talks for 60 years, three wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971, thousands of innocent peoples from both sides have been killed. But the end is no where in sight. The United Nations had 6 resolutions passed time to time but justice, and implementation of these resolutions have been delayed. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; It is imperative that the United Nations, European Union and Organisation of Islamic Conference and other powers to start the negotiation and mediation with Kashmiri leadership and influential organisations from both sides of Kashmir. Because both countries Pakistan and India have got nuclear capacity because of Kashmir. Political pundits predict cloud of nuclear war is seeing on sky of South Asia clearly. In these difficult circumstances, this dress code edict is simply misplaced, if not a deliberately planted red herring. More pain for the Kashmiri women, thousands of whom have already lost their husbands, sons and loved ones to the bullets and atrocities of the marauding Indian soldiers and many of whom have also fallen victim to sexual defilement. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; The European parliament has adopted MEP Emma Nicholson report titled "Kashmir; Present situation and future prospects" on May 25, 2007, by an overwhelming 522 votes in favour to 19 votes against. The report recognised Kashmiris right to self-determination, deploring massive human rights abuses in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir, encouraging the Peace process between India and Pakistan and emphasising inclusion of Kashmiris in the Peace process. The Amnesty International released a latest Global report 2007 said in that there is many violence, torture, custodial deaths enforced disappearances and extra-judicial executions continued in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir in the year 2006. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Rape in war is not merely a matter of chance nor is it a question of sex. It is rather a question of power and control which is `structured by male soldiers' notions of their masculine privilege. Kashmir is rising flame, which is increasing speedily. If United Nations, European Union and other world wide NGO's do not succeeded in finding an acceptable solution with the participation of kashmiris, it will cause disaster for this part of South Asia. World powers and Global Institutions need to understand this burning issue. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; The people of Kashmir demand an end to the military occupation of their land. Because they demand what they have been pledged by both India and Pakistan and guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council with the unequivocal endorsement of the United States, demilitrisation of Kashmir and a free plebiscite vote organised impartially. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Every Kashmiri is waiting anxiously for somebody to help attain freedom for them. I am a women so I understand feelings and emotions, inner voice of every Kashmiri woman.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br&gt; Farhat Jabeen is Student of PhD&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;&lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;hr size=1&gt;Get news delivered. Enjoy RSS feeds right on your Mail page.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-1054722742626701367?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/1054722742626701367/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=1054722742626701367' title='11 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1054722742626701367'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1054722742626701367'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/09/rape-of-kashmiri-women-and-south-asia.html' title='Rape of Kashmiri women and the South Asia'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>11</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-8216576988336443492</id><published>2007-09-15T16:56:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-09-15T16:56:42.576-07:00</updated><title type='text'>India legalises State sponsored terror in Kashmir</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;India legalises State sponsored terror in Kashmir&lt;br&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showheadlines.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1189880485&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=1&amp;amp;var0news=value0news"&gt;http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showheadlines.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1189880485&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=1&amp;amp;var0news=value0news&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 9.5pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;THE Indian Government has invoked black and draconian laws in held &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; to subjugate the people despite its tall but hollow claims of largest democracy. International human rights groups have continued to highlight a very important component of the Kashmir dispute, the human rights violations in occupied &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt; by Indian security forces, including the use of rape as a weapon of war. &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 9.5pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 9.5pt; font-family: Arial;"&gt;Different types of laws have been put in force while Indian forces and intelligence agencies have been given unlimited powers and impunity to frisk, arrest, torture, detain, kill, rape and molest the Kashmiri men and women. What is shocking and annoying is that nobody is raising voice against the atrocities being perpetrated by the occupation forces. A US State Department Human Rights report published last year said Indian troops continue to use extra judicial killings as a method to suppress the Kashmiris but except that Washington is keeping a deaf ear. Even on Thursday during meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte President Pervez Musharraf emphasized the solution of Kashmir issue and said &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; wanted a movement on it but the &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;US&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; official just restricted himself to listening the views of the Pakistani leader. The Kashmir dispute, as recorded in the UN documents involves the principle of right of self-determination and it is recognized that the dispute basically involves three parties — &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;Pakistan&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;, &lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:country-region&gt; and the Kashmiris. The excesses being committed against the Kasmiris are aimed at silencing their voice so that there is no third party in the dispute and thus complete the Indian strangulation of &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;. The Kashmiri people have sacrificed ninety thousand of their dear ones in addition to several thousand others who have gone missing. They would continue to offer sacrifices till the achievement of their inalienable right of self-determination to ensure a better future for their coming generations.[Editorial note-Pakistan Observer]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;Be smarter than spam. See how smart SpamGuard is at giving junk email the boot with the &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All-new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-8216576988336443492?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/8216576988336443492/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=8216576988336443492' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/8216576988336443492'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/8216576988336443492'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/09/india-legalises-state-sponsored-terror.html' title='India legalises State sponsored terror in Kashmir'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-950683050148802881</id><published>2007-09-14T07:53:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-09-14T07:53:16.600-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Shawl condemns cold-blooded murder</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Shawl condemns cold-blooded murder &lt;br&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/13/News130907-03.htm"&gt;http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/13/News130907-03.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;font face="Verdana" size="2"&gt;London, September 13 (KMS): In London, the Executive Director of Kashmir Centre Professor Nazir Ahmed Shawl has condemned in strong terms the cold-blooded murder of a college student by Indian troops at Handwara in occupied Kashmir.&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; In a statement, Shawl said that the recent killing of an innocent student Muhammad Ramzan Shah is an eye-opener to the world human rights groups. He said this is not the first case of human rights abuse by Indian army, which he added, has been using Kashmiri youth as human shields since 1989. He said such gross human rights violations would only stop if India demilitarises Jammu and Kashmir immediately.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; Shawl appealed the international community and world human rights organizations to take serious notice of such a gruesome murder. The appalling human rights scenario in occupied Kashmir suggests that India is not interested in a conclusive dialogue.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; The Kashmiri leader stressed that any forward movement on addressing the Kashmir dispute through the means of the ongoing Pak-India dialogue process, could only be made with the inclusion of Kashmiris in the negotiation process.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt;               Shawl also paid glowing tributes to the martyred student and expressed sympathies with the bereaved family. &lt;/font&gt; &lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;&lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;hr size=1&gt;Get news delivered. Enjoy RSS feeds right on your Mail page.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-950683050148802881?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/950683050148802881/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=950683050148802881' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/950683050148802881'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/950683050148802881'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/09/shawl-condemns-cold-blooded-murder.html' title='Shawl condemns cold-blooded murder'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-6749136700385080843</id><published>2007-09-14T07:51:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-09-14T07:51:52.824-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Human rights violation highest in NE, J&amp;K: Dr Sandeep Pandey</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%"&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class="datetime"&gt;&lt;span class="articleheadline"&gt; 							Human rights violation highest in NE, J&amp;amp;K: Dr Sandeep Pandey 						&lt;/span&gt; 						 					&lt;/td&gt; 				&lt;/tr&gt; 				&lt;tr&gt; 					&lt;td align="left" valign="top" width="71%"&gt; 						&lt;span class="authorname"&gt; 							 								 									Luit Neil Don 								 							 						&lt;/span&gt; 					&lt;/td&gt; 				&lt;/tr&gt; 				&lt;tr&gt; 					&lt;td align="left" valign="top"&gt; 						&lt;span class="authorname"&gt; 							13 September 2007, Thursday&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;"The human rights violation in North East and Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir is worst in the country. These areas have suffered a lot from time immemorial and people of these areas are facing an identity issues. It is a pity that after the 60 years of democracy, Assam cannot become a part of true democratic set-up in the largest democracy in the world," said Ramon Magsaysay Award winner Dr Sandeep Pandey, in Guwahati, on Wednesday.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;For his years of dedicated service and leadership Dr Pandey was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 2002, often considered the Asian equivalent of the Nobel Prize. He was selected in the Emergent Leadership Category, and is among five others to have won the coveted award. At 37, he is also the youngest Indian to have been conferred the award.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;Dr Pandey, who was in Guwahati, on way to Imphal, the capital of Manipur, to take part at a three-day solidarity fast to support Irom Sharmila's campaign against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in Manipur, said: "It is not only the Northeast region but the human rights violations are going on in almost every place of India. Uttar Pradesh has the highest number of encounter killings in the country, but there is no draconian law like the AFSPA there. The Government of India is biased against Northeast and J&amp;amp;K in this issue."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;Talking about the separatist movement in the northeastern region, Dr Pandey said: "Continuous presence of military in this region will have a severe impact on the people. If this process goes on, the Northeast will soon become militarized state. Whatever form of Naxalism, separatism and terrorism exists, the only way to solve is by political solution."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;When asked about the armed conflict in Northeast, he said: "It is up to the people of the region to find out an amicable solution. What the local people want, should be respected. The Government will facilitate talks. I think dialogue is the only way to solve the insurgency. Militarisation will never solve the issue."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;Coming down heavily against the uranium mining in Meghalaya, Dr Pandey said: "Uranium is radioactive and creates health hazards. Till now world has not find out any solution to the radioactive effects. At a time when many countries have given up the nuclear programmes, it is really shocking to see the Indian Government is planning uranium mining in Meghalaya."&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;Mentionably, hundreds of human rights activists from all over the country as well as from neighbouring Asian nations will assemble in Imphal today (13 September).&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;         &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"&gt;&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;Sharmila had gone on hunger strike on November 2, 2000 demanding the repeal of the AFSPA, after soldiers of the Assam Rifles allegedly killed ten young Meitei men in Malom. Three days later, police arrested Sharmila on charges of 'attempted suicide', because suicide or attempted suicide is a criminal offence under Indian law. She was later remanded to judicial custody. To keep her alive, she was forcefully fed a cocktail of vitamins, minerals, laxatives, protein supplements and lentil soup through the nose with a rubber pipe. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt; &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All new Yahoo! Mail - &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;hr size=1&gt;Get a sneak peak at messages with a handy reading pane.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-6749136700385080843?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/6749136700385080843/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=6749136700385080843' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/6749136700385080843'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/6749136700385080843'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/09/human-rights-violation-highest-in-ne-j.html' title='Human rights violation highest in NE, J&amp;K: Dr Sandeep Pandey'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-7764979345597931162</id><published>2007-08-02T16:13:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-08-02T16:13:33.484-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Human Rights abuse: From Punjab to Kashmir</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;Human Rights abuse: From Punjab to Kashmir&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showhumanrights.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1186078345&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=2&amp;amp;var0news=value0news"&gt;http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showhumanrights.php?subaction=showfull&amp;amp;id=1186078345&amp;amp;archive=&amp;amp;start_from=&amp;amp;ucat=2&amp;amp;var0news=value0news&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;From Nagaland to Punjab and from Andhra Pradesh to Kashmir, from the early 1950s to the year 2003, spanning almost the entire time and space comprising independent India, there have been reports of the security forces, including the army, forcing local people to act as shields and to actively participate in anti-terrorist operations. These reports have been consistently denied by the authorities who have routinely give out other reasons, such as 'caught in the cross-fire', 'aiding/ abetting terrorists', etc, to explain away civilian casualties. This is an account of two such cases, one from Kashmir and the other from &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt;. In both cases, the army and the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt; police, respectively, categorically denied the allegation against them, claiming that the villagers were killed in the cross-fire between the terrorists and the security forces. Since neither incident was the object of an authoritative fact finding, the truth will never be known. However, the following accounts give us a glimpse of the truth. Both accounts are based upon the eyewitness testimony of those who survived the operation itself, being similarly press-ganged into service by the troops involved and/ or surviving family members and villagers who witnessed the entire operation.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;u&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;Case-1&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;(Report by Ashok Agarwal, advocate and human rights activist)&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;On the 5th of March 2003 there was an encounter at village Kaw-chak, PS, Kreeri, Tehsil Pattan, District Baramulla, J&amp;amp;K. Three militants were stated to have been killed. Some soldiers are also said to have lost their lives. In addition, two villagers were killed and several wounded. The Army/ RR claimed that these "civilian casualties happened in the "cross-fire" between them and the terrorists.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The encounter started early in the morning of the 5th. Villagers were pressed into servicing the Army's needs from the inception. Teams of soldiers also scoured the surrounding area for more "volunteers". At about 10 a.m three army vehicles (trucks) came from the direction of Kreeri. Ashiq Hussain Malik was sitting in his shop, by the side of the road. Mohamad Arif Mir s/o Abdul Gafar Mir and his brother Ghulam Mohamad Mir residents of Dolipora were walking on the road from Dolipura, towards Kreeri. Ghulam Mohiuddin, who had just returned from Pattan where he had spent the night, had stopped near a house opposite the shops by the road on hearing about the crackdown/ encounter in his village. The trucks stopped near the shops. Two officers, one in sunglasses and another, jumped out of the vehicles. The officer in sunglasses grabbed Ghulam Mohiuddin from behind and dragged him towards the vehicles. They ordered Ashiq Hussain Malik to close his shop and come with them. The Mir brothers, who had by then reached where the army vehicles were parked, were ordered to get into the army vehicles. However, Ghulam Mohamad Mir, a government employee, was let off when he pleaded that he had to report for duty.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Inside the truck there were four other people, residents of village Watargam, who had similarly been picked up by the Army. They were all brought to the site of the encounter, in village Kaw-chak, in the truck.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;At the encounter site they were pulled out, ordered to remove their upper garments and their backs were marked with a rubber stamp, presumably in order to fix their identity. They were divided into pairs. Each pair was given some explosives – that looked like a car battery in shape and weighed about 15 – 20 kilos – and were ordered to carry these into the house in which the militants were holed up and to place the devices against the walls inside the ground floor of the building. The militants were on the upper floors.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;On showing hesitation to do the army's bidding all the villagers were beaten and threatened with death. Each explosive devise (called a "mine") was picked up by two persons and carried inside the house. Meanwhile the exchange of fire with the militants was going on. The militants were also calling out to the villagers, warning them not to cooperate with the army. Frightened by the firing and the shouts of the militants the villagers were placing the mines against the outside wall of the house. After some mines were in place they were made to carry large stones and pile them against the mines so as to cover them. Eight villagers were doing this work, which went on till two pm.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Around 2 pm, as they were coming out of the house after placing some stones, Ghulam Mohiuddin and Arif were injured. Ghulam Mohiuddin received three bullets in his left arm. Arif was hit by two bullets in his right upper arm, near the shoulder. Both fell down, unconscious. The others dragged them to safety. They were then taken in a matador that had been commandeered by the army and brought to the Bone and &lt;st1:placename w:st="on"&gt;Joints&lt;/st1:placename&gt; &lt;st1:placetype w:st="on"&gt;Hospital&lt;/st1:placetype&gt;, Barzalla, &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Srinagar&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt;. Ghulam Mohiuddin stayed in the hospital for 15 days. The bones in his arm having been shattered, after two surgeries the doctors told him that he would require at least one more, with no guarantee that he will recover the use of his arm.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Several villagers who houses are close to the site of the encounter had fled to another part of the village (called Harnau) to escape being forced into military service. Sometime that afternoon, some army jawans came to this part and selected four people. These were: Abdul Rashid, aged 42, Ghulam Mohd. Mir, aged 40, Abdul Hamid Bhat, aged 25 and Bashiruddin aged 30.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;At the encounter site three of them were taken towards an army truck loaded with boxes. Each of them was given four bottles filled with petrol with cotton wicks stuffed in the neck (Molotov cocktails) and made to sit behind the house of one Mohd. Akbar Bhat, opposite the house of Ali Mohd. Bhat where the militants were holed up.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Ashiq Hussain Malik was sitting already present behind Mohd. Akbar's house when they reached there. The soldiers were very angry with Ashiq Hussain as they felt that he had spoilt/ damaged one of mines entrusted to him. They claimed that but for this they would have destroyed the house and killed the militants holed up inside, much earlier. Due to this delay, they claimed, one of their comrades had died. They were threatening him with dire consequences while Ashiq was repeatedly pleading his innocence.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The soldiers took the Molotov cocktails from the villagers and carried them inside Mohd. Akbar's house. The officer with sunglasses (called 'captain' by the villagers), asked for more Molotov cocktails. Two of the villagers, Bashiruddin and Abdul Hamid Bhat, were ordered to get some more from the truck. When they returned, Ashiq and Abdul Rashid were not present at the back of the house. They were made to sit down again. No talking was permitted between the villagers but Bashiruddin and Abdul Bhat heard the soldiers shouting – 'Bhaag gaye saale' accompanied by heavy firing. They kept sitting there, thinking the soldiers were referring to the militants.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Shortly thereafter, there was a call– 'Aur civilians ko bhej do'. Bashiruddin and Abdul Bhat were sent inside the house. They were forced to remove their upper garments and their backs were marked with a stamp. Bashiruddin was handed a mine and Abdul Hamid was made to pick up a couple of stones. We were pointed out the spot, near a window, where we were to place the mine. Immediately after they returned the mine they had placed blew up and the house in which the militants had holed up, collapsed.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Thereafter, the villagers were ordered to go and pull out the bodies of the militants from the rubble. Initially, they could not find any bodies. The soldiers then ordered them to blow up a cattle shed adjoining the collapsed house. Just after that they heard a cry for help from the rubble. On the soldiers' orders the villagers placed an explosive device with wires near that spot, which was then exploded. The cries for help persisted.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Some other villagers were brought to the site all were put to the task of removing the rubble. The newcomers were: Maksood Ahmed Din, Bashiruddin's brother, Ali Mohd. Bhat and his younger brother, Abdul Hamid Bhat and Ghulam Nabi Waza. The rubble was very hot. Fires were burning in some places. Their hands and feet were singed by the burning heat. Finally, they pulled out the militant who had been calling out for help. He was still alive. He was asking for water. The officer with sunglasses refused saying— 'we gave him so many opportunities to surrender'.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The officer and his men interrogated the captured militant. His name was Shabir. He was from Kachua Mukam (Kandi area), Tehsil and district Baramulla. Then they took him away somewhere. The villagers were ordered to continue their search beneath the rubble. They found two fully clothed bodies. At first they did not recognize them and thought they were dead militants. The soldiers asked them to search their pockets. From one pocket they recovered a purse and from the other a bunch of keys and an identity card. On seeing the identity card they realized that the bodies were of two villagers, both of whom had been pressed into service by the Army. The man with the purse was Abdul Rashid Mir, a teacher by profession and the man with the keys and the identity card was Ashiq Hussain Malik. The keys were to his shop. Half of Abdul Rashid's face had been torn apart by a burst of bullets. Ashiq had a similar burst of bullets on his back around the waist.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The villagers were ordered by the officers to keep quiet about the fact that two civilians, villagers, had been killed in the encounter and made to continue the task of removing/ searching through the rubble. The rubble was very hot – their hands and feet were getting blistered and burnt. However, the officers refused to allow us to pour water on the rubble to cool it.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Around sunset the Army/RR commandeered some more villagers. They were asked to pick up the bodies. Eight villagers picked up the two bodies and carried them to the army vehicle by the road. Then they were asked to bring a third body. This turned out to be of the militant whom they had pulled out of the rubble, alive.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;After this, they requested an officer – addressed as 'CO. Saab' – that they be allowed to go as they were exhausted. Four of them were allowed to go. They were: Bashiruddin, Ghulam Mohd. Mir, Ishtiaq Ahmed Ganai and Abdul Hamid Bhat. Others continued to work at the Army's orders, searching the rubble. Bashiruddin's brother, Maksood was one of them. Maksood and about 30 other villagers were forced to continue removing rubble till 11 AM the next morning. Most of them were from village Dolipura. About eight or ten people were from village Kaw-chak.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;These people recovered one body around 9 pm on the …... It was fully burnt. Another body was recovered around 10 AM the next day. They also recovered two guns and empty magazines. Around 11 AM a procession of protestors from Dolipura arrived at the site. The Army fired in the air to disperse them. Frightened by the firing the protesters ran helter skelter. Shortly thereafter, thinking the situation might deteriorate, the Army ran away.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The bodies taken by the Army to Hambray. Ashiq Hussain's brother, Tariq Ahmed, who had reached the site in search of his brother, was also forced by the Army to clear the rubble of the demolished house. Even though by that time his body was already in Army custody, they told Tariq that Ashiq's body was lying beneath the rubble. The bodies were handed over to the police at P.S. Kreeri. Ashiq's parents were away on the Haj pilgrimage when he was killed. Minister Ghulam Hasan Mir, Minister Sharifuddin Niazi and a Corp Commander (a Sikh) from the army came for Taziat (the shared mourning after a death). One of the officers wounded in this encounter, a Major, also came. The Corp Commander expressed regrets for the civilian deaths. 'However', he said, 'the casualties cannot be helped as we cannot do our job effectively without civilian help'.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The Ministers promised to take up the issue of the Army using civilians in this manner. They also promised relief to those killed and injured. The Major expressed regrets and said that had he not been injured, he would not have allowed this mishap to occur.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Both families lodged a report with the police but till the time of this investigation, about a month and a half later, they had not been given a copy of the FIR.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The visiting Ministers had ordered that inquiry into the incident and directed that it should be completed within 15 days. They also ordered payment of ex gratia compensation and compassionate appointment to next of kin under SRO 43. According to Ashiq Hussain's family they had been paid an ex gratia of Rs. 1 lakh but the compassionate appointment had not yet been given.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The Inquiry against the Army had made no progress. The families of those killed were afraid to press for the inquiry though they wish that justice is done with the guilty officers being identified and punished. The villagers asked the CO of the unit concerned, who had come to condole, to produce the guilty officer. He merely echoed the Corp Commander and said 'We need the civilians. What happened will happen again. This cannot be helped'.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Publicly, the Army took the stand that the two villagers, Ashiq Hussain and Abdul Rashid Mir were killed in 'cross-firing' during the encounter. However, the truth of the matter was reported extensively by the press who visited the village on the very next day, the 6th of March 2003.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;On being asked whether their were any circumstances in which they would willingly provide assistance (of the non-dangerous kind) to the security forces in their battle against the terrorists/ militants the response of the villagers was a uniform and vehement no. The villagers also informed the investigation team that some days later, even as the ministers were promising that they would ensure that such incidents are not repeated, the Army conducted a similar operation at Tilgram, using the local villagers as human shields and for menial tasks that thrust them into the midst of the firefight and put their lives at extreme risk. However, fortunately no civilians were killed in that operation. There was only one militant involved in that encounter. &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;b style=""&gt;&lt;u&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Case-2&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;br style=""&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Report by Ram Narayan Kumar and Amrik Singh, human rights activists[1]&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;Police version&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Based upon the affidavit filed before the NHRC by Ashok Bath, Superintendent of Police (Detective), Tarn Taran.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;br&gt;On 8.6.92 the police received information that Surjit Singh Behla s/o Tarlok Singh Jat, r/o Behla and Madan Singh @ Maddi @ Sukhdev Singh @ Chota Behla s/o Santokh Singh r/o Behla, self-styled Deputy Chief and Lieutenant General of Bhindranwala Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK), a sikh militant outfit was holding a meeting with other terrorists and planning to commit a major terrorist crime. A police party with officers of 91/Bn and 102 Bn CRPF cordoned the village Behla. When the police were searching the first floor of the house of Manjinder Singh Behla the terrorists, who were hiding inside the house, opened fire and killed HC Jarnail Singh and LC Harjit Singh 4160/TT. Constables Pargat Singh &amp;amp; Som Datt and L/K (?) Kalash Chander were injured. The terrorists "cordoned" (?) the police party who had gone inside the house to conduct their search. The army was deployed to tighten security arrangements for the night. The next morning the police officers who were trapped inside the house were freed with the army's help. The cross-firing continued till the next day. Two jawans of the Punjab Police were killed and one constable and 3 jawans of the CRPF were injured in the encounter. After the firing ceased, the police recovered 9 bullet ridden, dead bodies of terrorists. Four of the bodies were identified on the spot and the remaining five bodies were identified later on.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;(Note: The affidavit provides the identities of only 8 of the 9 bodies: Harbans Singh, Ajit Singh, Lakhwinder Singh, Paramjit Singh @ Shingara Singh, Sakkattar Singh @ Mangga Singh, Naranjan Singh, Madan Singh @ Maddi @ Sukhdev Singh @ Chota Behla, and Jagtar Singh @ Varpal. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was recovered from the site (house) of the encounter.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The investigation by the CCDP&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Based upon interviews conducted with the families of the deceased and other eyewitnesses.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Nine persons were killed at village Behla in the course of an encounter on 8-10 June 1992. Out of these nine, three were militants and six were villagers unconnected with the militancy who the security forces used as human shields to storm the house in which the three militants were hiding. The body of one person killed in the encounter remains unaccounted for. The CCDP's (Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt;) investigation took it to the homes/ families of 8 of these 9 persons and other eye-witnesses in the village.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;On 8 June 1992 morning, a large mixed force, comprised of the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt; police led by SSP Ajit Singh Sandhu and Khubi Ram, SP (Operations), and units of the army and paramilitary, surrounded the old and abandoned house of Manjinder Singh, a former member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, in village Behla. Apparently, the house was being used as a hideout by militants associated with Surjit Singh, s/o Tarlok Singh from Behla village. One of his associates, 18 year old Sukhdev Singh, alias Maddi, son of Santokh Singh, was also from Behla. After completing his matriculation, he had started working in a Sugar Mill at Sheron. The police often illegally detained and tortured his elder brother Kulbir Singh for information because of their suspicions of his having militant connections. Sukhdev Singh was unable to tolerate this injustice done to his brother and decided to become a militant himself. Later on, his father Santokh Singh was abducted and disappeared by the police. The third associate of Surjit Singh Behla was Harbans Singh, s/o Mehr Singh from Sarhalli in Tarn Taran subdivision of &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Amritsar&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt; district.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Before storming the house, the police officers decided to round up seven or eight villagers to walk in front of the police force and to act as human shields. The following are the names of the six of those who got killed in the course of the operation that followed: [1] Kartar Singh, s/o Aasa Singh, [2] Niranjan Singh, s/o Boor Singh, [3] Sakatter Singh, s/o Niranjan Singh, [4] Lakhwinder Singh, s/o Channan Singh, [5] Gurmej Singh and [6] Ajit Singh, s/o Mangal Singh.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The police randomly selected these people, and this had nothing to do with suspicions of their possible involvement in the militancy. For example:&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Ajit Singh, from Behla village in Tarn Taran, was a 60 year old man married to Preetam Kaur with seven children. He owned a horse driven cart and was employed by a brick kiln owner to transport bricks to his clients.He had no political or militant association, no criminal background and no enmity with anyone in his village.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Ajit Singh had that morning carried a cartload of bricks to the house of Niranjan Singh when the police came and forced him along with Niranjan Singh and his sons to be part of the front column.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Niranjan Singh, a 55 year old farmer, was married to Balwinder Kaur and had three sons and a daughter. He was a devout Sikh unconnected with any political or militant organization and took care of his family by cultivating three acres of land and selling milk from his buffalos.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Twenty-five year old Sakatter Singh was Niranjan Singh's son. He used to help his father with the agricultural work and was married to Sharanjit Kaur with two daughters who are now barely teenagers. He had never been arrested before and had no political or militant connections.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Sakatter Singh died in the police operation. His younger brother Sukhchain Singh, also included in the front column, managed to escape after getting seriously wounded.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Twenty year old Lakhwinder Singh, the youngest son of Channan Singh and Gurmej Kaur, had no political or militant associations or record. He was watering his fields when the forces picked him up and compelled him to walk in front of them as a human shield.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Kartar Singh, a 62 year old farmer, was married to Iqbal Kaur with four adult children. He also had no record of a political or criminal past.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;After entering the house, the security forces discovered that it had a basement but no door to enter it from inside. They started demolishing the floor that was also the celler's roof. When the militants holed up inside opened fire, the police pushed these six villagers to the front, and using them for cover, fired back. All of the six persons who have been named died in this situation. Two others got seriously injured. The encounter lasted around 30 hours.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Three militants, holed up in the cellar who also got killed, are: [1] Surjit Singh Behla, s/o Tarlok Singh, [2] Sukhdev Singh Maddi, s/o Santokh Singh. Both were from Behla village. [3] Harbans Singh, the third militant killed in the action, was a resident of Sarhalli Kalan .&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;In the evening of 9th June, the police extricated the bodies of all the people who had been killed in the action without bothering to distinguish the militants from the others who the police had used as human shields.The next morning, the police told the press that they had killed nine militants in the action. In the aftermath, several newspapers published stories questioning the police claims and explaining how the six unconnected villagers had been pushed into the jaws of death. Two others, wounded in the course of the operation, had been abandoned by the police to their own resources to obtain medical help. Embarrassed by the publicity, the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt; government later announced an inquiry, which was, however, never carried out.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;The police cremated all the bodies at Tarn Taran on 9 June 1992, labeling them as "unidentified/ unclaimed", though the family of Ajit Singh attended the cremation. Other families were not allowed to attend.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Subsequently, in 1995-96, on orders from the Supreme Court the CBI carried out an investigation into the illegal cremation of thousands of bodies by the &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt; police between 1984 and 1994. Its December 1996 report to the Court divided the 2097 such cremations by the police in three cremation grounds in &lt;st1:city w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Amritsar&lt;/st1:place&gt;&lt;/st1:city&gt; district of Punjab into three categories: "identified", "partially identified", and "unidentified". The CBI's placed the cremations of Ajit Singh, Lakhwinder Singh and Harbans Singh, a militant and an associate of Surjit Singh Behla, in the "identified" list. Five others, [1] Surjit Singh, r/o Behala, [2] Sikkatar Singh, r/o Behala, [3] Niranjan Singh, r/o Behala, [4] Madan Singh, alias Maddi, [5] Kartar Singh, r/o Behala, were placed in the "partially identified" list. According to the CBI, SHO Gurbachan Singh of Tarn Taran city police station carried out these cremations in the same case of encounter under FIR No. 57/92. Out of these, Surjit Singh and Madan Singh, alias Maddi, (who must be Sukhdev Singh Maddi) were the militants. The other three, Sikkatar Singh, Niranjan Singh and Kartar Singh had been picked up to serve as human shields.[2]&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;These cremations from the identified and partially identified lists of the CBI do not account for the body of Gurmej Singh, one of the six villagers forced to become a human shield and killed. The CBI's list of unidentified cremations does not show any cremation on 9 June 1992.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;End Notes&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;[1] Reported in Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Punjab&lt;/st1:place&gt; pp 293 &amp;amp; 496, Pub. South Asia Forum for Human Rights, &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kathmandu&lt;/st1:place&gt;, May 2003&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;[2] Curiously, the CBI duplicated the record of Niranjan Singh's cremation under Sl. No. 121/392 of its "identified" list. Here, it recorded Niranjan Singh's cremation as having occurred on 18 April 1991,over a year earlier than its actual date. Further, the information to identify all was not only available to the police but had also been published in newspaper reports. Hence, it is not clear why the CBI decided to place some of them in the list of partially identified bodies.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;/span&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;[Source: Kashmir Times]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;span style="color: red;"&gt;Note&lt;/span&gt;:&amp;nbsp; &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Kashmir &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;Since&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;1988, the disputed state of &lt;st1:state w:st="on"&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;/st1:state&gt; has been hit by confrontation between armed Kashmiri Guerrillas&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;and the Armed Forces of &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;&lt;st1:country-region w:st="on"&gt;India&lt;/st1:country-region&gt;&lt;/st1:place&gt;, which has resulted in more than One hundred&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;thousand of deaths.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;o:p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/o:p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;Armed Forces&lt;span style=""&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Special Powers Act contains no guidelines for ensuring effective control of the armed forces by the civil authorities. Under the act the Indian armed forces have the power to shoot, arrest, search, seize and even kill when they deem it necessary.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;i style=""&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: 8.5pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt; &lt;p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;em&gt;International human rights groups have called for an end to "fake encounters" in &lt;st1:place w:st="on"&gt;Kashmir&lt;/st1:place&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;Be smarter than spam. See how smart SpamGuard is at giving junk email the boot with the &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All-new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-7764979345597931162?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/7764979345597931162/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=7764979345597931162' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7764979345597931162'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7764979345597931162'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/08/human-rights-abuse-from-punjab-to.html' title='Human Rights abuse: From Punjab to Kashmir'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-1506450654220279683</id><published>2007-06-19T19:31:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-06-19T19:31:47.959-07:00</updated><title type='text'>KT exposes Indian policy to perpetrate HR violations</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;h2&gt;KT exposes Indian policy to perpetrate HR violations&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/19/News190607-04.htm"&gt;http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/19/News190607-04.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;font face="Verdana" size="2"&gt;Jammu, June 19 (KMS): In occupied Kashmir, Jammu-based leading Kashmiri English daily, Kashmir Times (KT), in its editorial, today, unveiled Indian troops yet another fake encounter unearthed in Chankipoa-Nowgam near Srinagar.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; The KT editorial defied Indian police's version that the personnel of Special Operations Group had killed two militants in an encounter. Quoting the residents of the area where the incident occurred, the editorial said that the two innocent Kashmiris "were first dragged to the fields and then killed after staging a fake encounter."&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; The KT editorial said, "it seems to be a repetition of the innumerable stories already unsuccessfully churned out by the security forces that militants were first arrested, taken for recovery, where they managed to lay their hands on the guns and were finally killed in an encounter. Such cock and bull stories impress no one." The editorial added, "fair and independent probes are elusive in this part of the world where allegations of atrocities, custodial killings, missing persons and fake encounters, all of which seem to be inter-related, are the order of the day."&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; The editorial suggested that it was a systematic Indian policy to arrest innocent youth, kill them and project the events as 'encounters' and 'victims' as 'foreign militants' on suicide mission. The editorial said that the so-called Indian slogan of "zero tolerance" was only an effort aimed at the face-saving on international front as Indian and its puppet regime had never been "able to rein in the forces in resorting to gross violations of human rights abuse, nor has it been able to live up to the promise of fair probes."&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; Coming hard on the draconian laws imposed in occupied Kashmir, the KT said, "As long as the central security forces continue to enjoy immunity under draconian laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which by virtue of clauses that empower any personnel to shoot and kill anyone on mere suspicion, forbid anyone to question the errors of the security force personnel, there can be no question of transparency." Referring to the use of brute force by the SOG of Indian Police, the editorial said that their personnel continue to evade prosecution, under the political and official patronage they enjoy for indulging in abuse of human rights. The editorial also highlighted Indian policy about Indian troops, which "are also known to resort to killings of civilians in lieu of promotions and awards; performance in the official circles is sadly counted only on the basis of head count of the dead, which is nothing short of barbarism."&lt;/font&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;       &lt;hr size=1&gt;Be smarter than spam. See how smart SpamGuard is at giving junk email the boot with the &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All-new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-1506450654220279683?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/1506450654220279683/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=1506450654220279683' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1506450654220279683'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1506450654220279683'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/06/kt-exposes-indian-policy-to-perpetrate.html' title='KT exposes Indian policy to perpetrate HR violations'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-7969922616766945383</id><published>2007-04-05T14:07:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-04-05T14:07:28.204-07:00</updated><title type='text'>In conflict area police has to understand the whole statecraft, comments Naseer A Ganai</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt; &lt;DIV&gt;&lt;SPAN class=main_titel&gt;&lt;A href="http://www.greaterkashmir.com/Home/Newsdetails.asp?newsid=5839&amp;amp;Issueid=201&amp;amp;Arch"&gt;http://www.greaterkashmir.com/Home/Newsdetails.asp?newsid=5839&amp;amp;Issueid=201&amp;amp;Arch&lt;/A&gt;=&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt; &lt;DIV&gt;&lt;SPAN class=main_titel&gt;In conflict area police has to understand the whole statecraft, comments Naseer A Ganai &lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;SPAN class=news_text align="justifyed"&gt;"2500 writ petitions are pending in the Punjab High Court against the police officers who wiped terrorism there. Same is happening in Kashmir," said a police officer in a recent debate on human rights in a one-day workshop here in Srinagar. (Greater Kashmir March 21). &lt;BR&gt;The title of the debate was also interesting. That "there should be equal condemnation of human rights violations by security forces and terrorists." There seems to be confusion among some police officers here about perception of the police and its powers. In such situation it is indispensable for the police officers particularly local police officers and the constables to understand their role in a conflict like that of Kashmir. &lt;BR&gt;To begin with, in conflict areas the State gives enormous powers to the armed forces and police. Powers to  kill, crush, raid, arrest and then there are laws enough to protect interests of the State and those who execute its orders. In disturbed area any police person from a constable to SSP, wield powers that give impression that he is State unto itself and could do anything.&lt;BR&gt;But the day the officer or a constable really starts thinking that he is State unto himself, things could go wrong. He might abuse his powers and the State is there to pat him as long as it suits interests of the State. "Yes armed forces are doing commendable job," the Chief Minister might say. And other Ministers will have also same comments about the armed forces. &lt;BR&gt;New Delhi will be much more enthusiastic in its response. "We are not occupational forces," Prime Minister will say. And when you have such kind of the backing, you might consider it an easy job to overrun anyone, whether the law permits it or not. But situations don't remain same. Iraq was yesterday battle of Ideas for Americans and the  world, but today it is pure occupation for all including Americans. Taliban was anathema for the Western world but now in the same West there are countries who are for negotiation with Talibs. Yesterday troop deployment and draconian laws were no issues in Kashmir. Today they are major issues.&lt;BR&gt;So once the State feels that it wants "demilitarization" it has to give some excuses to people why it wants demilitarization. The State will not say that the massive troop deployment was hurting its interests. That it is in the interest of the State to withdraw troops. Because, to sell such an argument will be counter-productive. That too to the peoples of India whom so far it has described Kashmir as an 'ideological battle" where India is fighting war against "Islamic terrorism." &lt;BR&gt;Thus it has to construct some other arguments but this time genuine ones. The arguments like all encounters are not genuine in Kashmir. That there are fake-encounters in the Kashmir. Now don't remain  under this impression that the State will take responsibility of these fake encounters. It won't. Never on earth, it will condemn itself for the crimes committed by it through different agencies. If does so, in such case it will present itself as perpetuator of crimes against people. Thus, it won't commit any such folly.&lt;BR&gt;So it adopts different modus-operndi. That is, it arrests some constables (not all constables) some SPs (not all SPs) who in their tenure had acted as if they were the State and will project them as mere constables or SPs. And will weave situation in such a way that everyone will get impression that only few constables and SPs were responsible for the crimes and the State has nothing to do with it. &lt;BR&gt;And then the State will go on and will take actions against the "now erring constables and police officers" who few days ago "were getting rewards from the same State for those very deeds." And the State will brazenly say whatever 'now erring cops or  officers have done" they have done that in their personal capacities. It will argue that how the State was tough against those who commit human rights violations and in the same breath will say situation has apparently changed. So there is need of demilitarization. &lt;BR&gt;The statecraft is such that journalists, columnists, thinkers, general people, academics all will curse the individuals responsible for the war crimes and forget the State. Then the same State arrests them, charge sheets them, engages best of lawyers ostensibly to book them and police officials feel that they have been wronged. &lt;BR&gt;Those police officers, who feel they have been wronged or back stabbed by the State, should understand that the State could sacrifice over a dozen SPs and over 100 constables if it has to save its skin. If Azad Sahib is threatening National Conference or the Peoples Democratic Party of exposing them or "bringing out cupboards" he will not expose the State but some police officers  and thus exonerate the State which gives police and armed forces powers to do anything in the disturbed areas. &lt;BR&gt;Moreover, if tomorrow, if for argument's sake, Truth and Reconciliation Commission is established in Jammu and Kashmir, as has been demanded by Omer Abdullah, who will face the brunt? Only those officers who are the State subjects. &lt;BR&gt;Unlike Punjab Kashmir is different, here alienation is so complete that those who swear by the constitution of India even accuse India of perpetuating genocide in Jammu and Kashmir. "You are committing genocide in Kashmir," shouted MLA and former Home Minister Ali Muhammad Sagar in the State legislative Assembly recently. Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, the former chief minister in his tenure has never uttered a word against militants or Pakistan. Omer Abdullah describes Mushraff as straightforward who does not beat around the bush. He condemned arrest of Kashmiri youth in Delhi and described recovery of RDX from them as concocted  stories of Delhi police.&lt;BR&gt;This is the pro-India element in Kashmir. Imagine what might be the mental set-up of the masses. In such a situation if tomorrow truth and reconciliation commission sits here and indicts police officers of "crimes like faking encounters" what will be their position in the society, about which MJ Akbar writes that in 1990 they (Kashmiri people) were so sure of Azadi that they thought it is round the corner. The local police personnel or officers will face ostriacization, they will be looked down. &lt;BR&gt;In Punjab only one police officer committed suicide. Only one. There are writ petitions in the Courts but they have been filed by the Human Rights Groups. In Kashmir when fake encounter killing surfaced, hundreds of people came out seeking whereabouts of their kith and kin. Knowing well what will be its consequences, they still came out. Imagine what will be situation when things will change and people will be asked by the same State (for arguments  sake) to name those who have committed crimes or who have exceeded their brief.&lt;BR&gt;So the moral of story is that police officers particularly local officers should act as police officers not as State. Because State is different concept and it can give an individual a feeling that you are State for some time but the day it feels that for the reputation of the State it is necessary to sacrifice few police officers or policemen, it will in a jiffy turn them mere police officers and policemen. This U-turn of the State might be surprising for the officers and they will shout! "2500 writ petitions are pending in the Punjab High Court against the police officers who wiped terrorism there. Same is happening in Kashmir." &lt;BR&gt;Now the topic of the debate that "There should be equal condemnation of human rights violations committed by security forces and terrorists." &lt;BR&gt;If you plead this argument then you are seeking platform with those people whom you describe "terrorists."  According to Oxford Advanced Learning Dictionary "terrorist" is a person who takes part in terrorism. So terrorist has no rights, he is not abide by any law or international convention like security forces. In contrast security forces are law-abiding and whatever they are doing, they are doing it under the ambit of law. So why should then there be equal condemnation. Or what will you do in case some people will argue that "terrorists" are doing commendable job somewhere, should they be described as security forces? The questions need answer.&amp;nbsp;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;/SPAN&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/DIV&gt;Dr. Sudip Minhas&lt;BR&gt;Executive Director&lt;BR&gt;Voices For Freedom&lt;BR&gt;www.voicesforfreedom.org&lt;BR&gt;info@voicesforfreedom.org &lt;DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt; 	   	 		&lt;hr size=1&gt;Make free worldwide PC-to-PC calls. Try the new &lt;a href="http://ca.messenger.yahoo.com/"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Yahoo! Canada Messenger with Voice&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-7969922616766945383?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/7969922616766945383/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=7969922616766945383' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7969922616766945383'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7969922616766945383'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/04/in-conflict-area-police-has-to.html' title='In conflict area police has to understand the whole statecraft, comments Naseer A Ganai'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-1121650503024264402</id><published>2007-03-29T06:35:00.001-07:00</published><updated>2007-03-29T06:35:02.805-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Human rights abuses alarming in IHK, says us HR body</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/28/News280307-05.htm"&gt;http://www.kmsnews.org/Kashmir%20News%20Archive/28/News280307-05.htm&lt;/a&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="625"&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td height="28"&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Human rights abuses alarming in IHK, says us HR body&lt;/h2&gt;               &lt;/td&gt;             &lt;/tr&gt;             &lt;tr&gt;               &lt;td style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana;"&gt;               &lt;font face="Verdana" size="2"&gt;Geneva, March 28 (KMS): International Human Rights Association of American Minorities has said that in Indian–held Kashmir, Indian forces routinely abuse the rights of innocent Kashmiris including jail without trial and illegal and arbitrary detentions.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; Tahira Jaleen Khan of the Association, while speaking at the session of the United Nations Human Rights Council here, said that the absence of internal checks and the silence of the international conscience had only served to worsen the agony of the Kashmiris.&amp;nbsp;&lt;br&gt;               &lt;br&gt; Tahira noted that the curse had reached to the levels where even the Indian national media had to report on the severity of the situation. The Association called on the UN HR Council to allow a Special Rapporteur to visit Indian held Kashmir to examine the situation.&lt;/font&gt;               &lt;/td&gt;             &lt;/tr&gt;             &lt;tr&gt;               &lt;td height="54" valign="baseline"&gt;&lt;font face="Times New Roman"&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.kmsnews.org/IMAGES/emptyW.GIF" align="bottom" border="0" height="50" width="500"&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt; 		&lt;hr size=1&gt;&lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All new Yahoo! Mail &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;hr size=1&gt;Get news delivered. Enjoy RSS feeds right on your Mail page.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-1121650503024264402?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/1121650503024264402/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=1121650503024264402' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1121650503024264402'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/1121650503024264402'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/03/human-rights-abuses-alarming-in-ihk.html' title='Human rights abuses alarming in IHK, says us HR body'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-7957769935882992520</id><published>2007-02-22T13:03:00.001-08:00</published><updated>2007-02-22T13:03:54.837-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Kashmiri was civilian - DNA tests</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Kashmiri was civilian - DNA tests&lt;br&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;a target="_blank" href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6386141.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6386141.stm&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br&gt;DNA tests have confirmed that a man killed by security forces in a staged gun battle in Indian-administered Kashmir was a civilian, police say.&lt;/b&gt; &lt;/font&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;The body of Abdul Rehman Paddar, a carpenter, was exhumed three weeks ago from a grave in Sumbal near Srinagar. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;He had been buried as a Pakistani militant, but protesters said that he was killed in a "fake encounter". &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Deputy Inspector General of Police Farooq Ahmed told the BBC that charges against his killers will be filed soon. &lt;!-- E SF --&gt; &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;b&gt;'Harsh punishments' &lt;/b&gt; &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;"The DNA samples taken from a body have matched with those of the carpenter's relatives, proving beyond doubt that he was killed in custody and later declared a militant," a police spokesman told the AFP news agency. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;!-- S IIMA --&gt;&lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;!-- E IIMA --&gt;  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Mr Paddar was reportedly detained in the summer capital, Srinagar, in December 2006. He was killed and later described by police as a Pakistani militant. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;"Equipped with scientific evidence we will now press for harsh punishments for the policemen involved in Padder's killing," the spokesman said, adding other DNA reports were expected to arrive soon. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;The BBC's Altaf Hussain in Srinagar says that police are investigating four cases of staged killings, involving police, paramilitary personnel and the army. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;The senior superintendent of police of Ganderbal district and a deputy superintendent are among seven police officials arrested so far on charges of murder. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Disappeared&lt;/b&gt; &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;The army has ordered a separate inquiry into the involvement of soldiers in the killings.  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Mr Paddar, a carpenter from the Kukernag area in southern Kashmir, was allegedly killed by the anti-militancy task force.  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;  &lt;!-- S IIMA --&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;	 		&lt;table align="right" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="203"&gt; 			&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td&gt; 			 			&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; 		&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt; 		 	  	 &lt;!-- E IIMA --&gt;  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;His family say he had paid 80,000 rupees (more than $2,000) to a police official - who is now in custody - to get himself a government job. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Instead, it is alleged the police official killed him and claimed a reward for killing a militant. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Our correspondent says that thousands of people have disappeared in Indian-administered Kashmir, many of them after being arrested by the security forces, in the past 18 years. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;Their families have been demanding the cases be investigated so that the missing people could at least be declared dead.  &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;!-- E BO --&gt; &lt;font size="2"&gt;		                     	&lt;/font&gt; 		 	 	 &lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt; 		&lt;hr size=1&gt; &lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt;All new Yahoo! Mail - &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;hr size=1&gt;Get a sneak peak at messages with a handy reading pane.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-7957769935882992520?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/7957769935882992520/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=7957769935882992520' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7957769935882992520'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/7957769935882992520'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/02/kashmiri-was-civilian-dna-tests.html' title='Kashmiri was civilian - DNA tests'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-629501931137848379</id><published>2007-02-04T11:59:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2007-02-04T12:01:18.016-08:00</updated><title type='text'>Blame the System, Not the Sucker</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/index.php?id=1748"&gt;http://www.kashmirobserver.com/index.php?id=1748&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Blame the System, Not the Sucker&lt;br /&gt;By David Lepeska&lt;br /&gt;Zero tolerance. It's a phrase Kashmiris have heard a great deal in the past couple of years. A promise of behavioral discipline on the part of Indian armed forces in Kashmir, made first by Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad when he assumed his post in late 2005, and again six months later by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. They swore "zero tolerance for custodial deaths." But what is zero tolerance, exactly? What does it mean, in practice, in reality? Recent events demand we take a closer look.&lt;br /&gt;Last week a routine Ganderbal police investigation uncovered a falsified encounter with militants that ended in the killing of Abdul Rahman Padder, a 35-year-old Kokernag carpenter who made the fatal mistake of trusting Farooq Ahmad Padder, his ostensible friend and a low-level SOG officer.&lt;br /&gt;In early December Farooq Ahmad, finding himself in possession of a cache of seized militant weapons, called Abdul Rahman in Batmaloo and told him to wait for him; apparently he had told his acquaintance that he could help him. Instead, he snatched up Abdul Rahman and brutally killed him, then hurriedly buried the young father and offered his superiors a few previously seized weapons as proof of his victim's (falsified) militancy. W ithout any questioning or investigation, Farooq Ahmad and his fellow constable were immediately awarded Rs 1.2 lakhs each for the killing of an enemy of the state. Despite the fact that they had almost zero evidence to support their claim and that they had in truth committed pre-meditated murder on an innocent, law-abiding Kashmiri, a crime for which any one of us would be condemned and punished with the full force of the law, these two officers were rewarded handsomely. This is not zero tolerance; this is a deeply flawed system.&lt;br /&gt;As details of the story spread the Valley seethed, with open expressions of anger and cries for vengeance, while further investigations turned up three more potential incidents of recent trumped up encounters with militants that resulted in civilian deaths. (On Friday, the victim of another such encounter – a perfume seller that had gone missing a year ago – was identified by his wife.) Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad denounced the Ganderbal incident and called for a judicial inquiry into the Padder killing. Meanwhile, frustrated Kashmiris turned bloodthirsty; thousands of angry locals attended Thursday's disinterment of Abdul Rahman in Sumbal, throwing stones at military personnel and demanding that the guilty parties be hanged.&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, it is all too easy to focus our rage and frustration on Farooq Ahmad. If, as it appears, he was the mastermind of this gruesome and unjust slaying, he is a liar and a murderer and a traitor to his own people, deserving of neither forgiveness nor sympathy. Yet Farooq Ahmad is no more than a sucker, a warped Manchurian candidate and the product of a demented security apparatus that degrades human life – Kashmiri lives, to be specific – to the point of negation. For Indian security personnel the line between good and bad Kashmiri was blurred long ago, ever since several soldiers opened fire on protesting civilians in Bijbehara in 1993, or perhaps even sooner. Under the Special Powers and Disturbed Areas Acts Indian forces have been killing Kashmiris on mere suspicion for nearly two decades, receiving not punishment but rewards and promotions as a result. According to an international rights group that released a detailed study of abuses in Kashmir late last year, such practices have become embedded in the culture of Indian security.&lt;br /&gt;"Police and army officials have told Human Rights Watch that security forces often execute alleged militants instead of bringing them to trial," HRW wrote recently. "Most of those summarily executed are falsely reported to have died during armed clashes between the army and militants in 'encounter killings.' This is done with the knowledge of superior officers and has led to a culture where security forces feel they can murder persons in their custody for rewards and promotions."&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, in September 2003 Abdul Hamid Ganie was killed by officers of this same department – the Ganderbal SOG – because of a debt owed to an SOG officer by his brother Rashid. Afterwards, the perpetrators forced a local dentist untrained in autopsy to sign papers claiming the death had occurred in a gun-battle. A subsequent professional examination revealed torture and pointed towards a custodial killing, but over three years later no charges have been filed and the accused officers still hold the same jobs.&lt;br /&gt;"'These people are like trained killer dogs,'" one senior police official told Human Rights Watch, referring to the SOG. "'Once unleashed, it is difficult to keep them in check.'"&lt;br /&gt;So is it any wonder that Farooq Ahmad killed Abdul Rahman, and that fake encounters and custodial killings continue to occur with regularity? The Indian armed forces put the carrot out there long ago, for all to see. All Farooq Ahmad did was reach out and take a bite.&lt;br /&gt;For his part, CM Azad has altered his tune, saying Thursday that the insurgency made maintaining zero level of human rights violations difficult. He then underscored his argument by pointing out the inability of the all-powerful U.S.A. to eradicate human rights violations in Iraq.&lt;br /&gt;Although weak-kneed and incomplete, his point is well-made. With some 7 lakh security personnel patrolling the state, there will inevitably be some mistakes, some of which will be fatal violations of human rights. It's unfortunate, but it's also the nature of imperfect man; no matter how vigilant the Indian government, keeping watch over every soldier every hour of the day is simply not possible.&lt;br /&gt;Keeping this in mind, then, why not take the next step? Since individual soldiers can never be completely controlled, the system itself must be changed. Soldiers should not be rewarded for murdering Indian citizens, for instance, nor should they be able to kill, arrest, and harass with impunity. Not only because it is morally and socially wrong, but because these practices foster the very cycle of violence they are meant to stamp out; fake encounters and unjust custodial killings inspire Kashmiris to turn militant, precipitating further battles and Indian army deaths, thus justifying future rights violations by Indian security personnel, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;Although he later retracted his statement, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq called last month for an end to the violence, claiming the militants "have not achieved anything other than creating more graveyards." Coming from the leader of a supposed separatist faction, this was an unprecedented and powerful statement, signaling a potential sea change in Kashmiri sentiment vis a vis India. Further, the total death count for 2006 was about 1000, the lowest total since the war began in 1990 and a mere one fifth of the total killed as recently as 2002. Clearly, the climate in Kashmir is changing, and if the Central Government wants to foster any semblance of goodwill in the local populace it should alter its policies to reflect this cooling of hostilities.&lt;br /&gt;And here, right on cue, is the perfect opportunity for Azad and, by implication, Singh, to prove their mettle. Here they have a case in which, by all appearances, human rights were violated and a horribly unlawful custodial death was the result. The evidence seems clear: Farooq Ahmad's number on Abdul Rahman's mobile phone in the days and hours leading up to his early December disappearance; a quickie burial; and false claims of Pakistani origin and armed militancy. How should they proceed? Get the DNA results, investigate the crime with an open and transparent judicial inquiry, and, if the findings merit it, punish the perpetrators of these crimes: put them on trial and send them to prison or death, whatever is deemed appropriate.&lt;br /&gt;But more importantly, revamp the system. Zero tolerance is not just a penalty to be meted out after the fact; it is as much about prevention as punishment. The culture of operating above the law, of killing Kashmiris for reward, must be altered. The Central Government must use its security apparatus to display its intolerance towards these offences and violations, towards unlawful kidnappings, abuse, and custodial killings. In light of a less violent, more diplomatically engaged political climate in Kashmir, the Centre should be capable of making concessions to Kashmiris, who have for a generation suffered grave losses and been understandably unsure of their loyalties. End the black laws. Disband, or at least re-train and rein in, the renegade Special Operations Group officers. If rewards must be handed out they should be offered only when foreign rebels are killed on Indian territory and after concrete proof –more than mere weapons – has been confirmed.&lt;br /&gt;For until zero tolerance is actually enforced – until the state-sponsored perpetrators of these vile acts face justice and the Indian security forces' contemptible culture of falsifying killings and rewarding murder is eliminated – peace in Kashmir will be no more real than the militancy of Kokernag carpenter Abdul Rahman Padder, may he rest in peace.&lt;br /&gt;--David Lepeska is a keen Kashmir Observer&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/index.php?category=0&amp;PHPSESSID=cd98ea94f905738e78e3ee12eece9205"&gt;Back&lt;/a&gt;   03.02.2007.&lt;br /&gt;We encourage users to analyze, comment on and even challenge Kashmir Observer's reports and articles. User reviews and comments that include profanity or personal attacks or other inappropriate comments or material will be removed from the site. Entries without name and location and those containing false names or using signatures by someone elses other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, we will take steps to block users who violate any of our posting standards.&lt;br /&gt;" src="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/images/commentname.gif"&gt; Editor 03.02.&lt;br /&gt;Very Well written David. Completely agree with these views. Its time for India to act decisively and transparently.&lt;br /&gt;" src="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/images/commentname.gif"&gt; Kaushal Desai 03.02.&lt;br /&gt;Its nothing new. Such Genocides are taking place in KASHMIR by the Indian security forces everyday .Its nothing but SHAME for India.I am an American who was in kashmir in 2003.During my trip i was really shocked to see how Indian Forces treat Kashmiri people which i cannot even explain.This has to stop. Moury Becker San Francsico&lt;br /&gt;" src="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/images/commentname.gif"&gt; mourybecker@yahoo.com 03.02.&lt;br /&gt;These incidents are shocking and horrifying but not surprising to Kashmiri's. People like Farooq have committed a grave crime but they have been given an oppurtunity by the demented security apparatus that makes Kashmir a war zone. In criminology, the Rational Choice Theory adopts a practical belief that man is a reasoning actor who weighs means and ends, costs and benefits, and makes a rational choice. It assumes that the rational decision is always the decision that will maximize gain and minimize pain for each individual. Therefore, if the actor is rational, the state can influence any given decision by ensuring that the perpetrators of the crime are brought to book and given a tough punishment. This is supposed to serve as a deterrent both specific (the person will not do it again) as well as general. Now take the case of Kashmir. Indian forces enjoy special powers; they can question, arrest, torture and kill anyone and they are not accountable for tnything they do. There is a bonus too and every killing fetches monetary rewards, encouragement and promotion. It is, therefore, no surprise that hundreds and thousands of innocent Kashmiri's have been arrested, tortured, killed and many more have been subjected to enforced disappearance. When you give a free hand to kill, it is only natural to have horrifying and shocking incidents happening on a daily basis. India may have initiated a peace process and it vows to settle the Kashmir dispute by peaceful means but for a common Kashmiri it means nothing. As long as the special powers act is in place Kashmiri's will continue to endure death and destruction. The biggest confidence building measure would be to repeal the draconian law; in fact this should have been a pre-condition of Huriyat Conference to participate in any kind of peace process. If the killings persist the peace process will cease to make sense and so will the Huriyat.&lt;br /&gt;" src="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/images/commentname.gif"&gt; Sameer 03.02.&lt;br /&gt;In same Gandrebal area wandhama massacre was done by these Muslims. Who bothered? Other Hindus ran away, some houses are occupied, some vandalized, some thrown away in distress sale, some occupied by security forces, this is all gift of Muslims to the Hindus in the villages of Kashmir. And how many of them were killed there? History as they say repeats itself. Murdering the people, then cutting them to pieces, binding the people by rope to the jeeps and then drag them through villages so that they die by striking and fiction on the stones on road was first done by Muslims in villages of Kashmir to the Hindus, that was the Jihad to kill local by the local, now these people are killed on the same pattern, the difference is that these people were killed secretly and people in 1990 were killed openly with most brutal fashion without regard to the human rights of those Hindus, What these people will tell now, look like crocodiles as they are????? Sixty massacres of Hindus in J&amp;amp;K on their head? Where is their cry for justice? WHERE IS THE HUMAN RIGHTS THERE?&lt;br /&gt;" src="http://www.kashmirobserver.com/images/commentname.gif"&gt; kishore 04.02.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-629501931137848379?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/629501931137848379/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=629501931137848379' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/629501931137848379'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/629501931137848379'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/02/blame-system-not-sucker.html' title='Blame the System, Not the Sucker'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-6681634815519228122</id><published>2007-01-19T18:52:00.001-08:00</published><updated>2007-01-19T18:52:58.045-08:00</updated><title type='text'>India has a terrible record of HR abuses in Occupied Kashmir</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;DIV&gt; &lt;TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width=778 align=center border=0&gt; &lt;TBODY&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD vAlign=top width=37&gt; &lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt; &lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD vAlign=top width=611&gt; &lt;TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="96%" align=center border=0&gt; &lt;TBODY&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD align=middle height=20&gt; &lt;TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" align=center border=0&gt; &lt;TBODY&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD&gt;&lt;A href="http://www.thenews.com.pk/default.asp"&gt;&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD class=small_txt vAlign=bottom align=right&gt;Editor-in-Chief: Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman&amp;nbsp;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD width=206&gt;&lt;IMG height=3 alt="" src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/tttttt_04.jpg" width=207&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD width=368&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD width=204&gt;&lt;IMG height=3 alt="" src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/tttttt_06.jpg" width=205&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt;&lt;/TBODY&gt;&lt;/TABLE&gt; &lt;TABLE id=Table_01 cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" align=center border=0&gt; &lt;TBODY&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD class=small_txt width=349&gt;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD width=75&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD class=small_txt align=right width=354&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt;&lt;/TBODY&gt;&lt;/TABLE&gt;&lt;A href="http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=39602"&gt;http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=39602&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD bgColor=#efefef&gt;&lt;IMG height=1 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR bgColor=#f4faff&gt; &lt;TD class=heading_txt height=20&gt;&amp;nbsp;India has a terrible record of HR abuses in Occupied Kashmir&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD&gt;&lt;IMG height=5 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD bgColor=#efefef&gt;&lt;IMG height=1 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD&gt;&lt;IMG height=5 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD class=small_txt height=20&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD class=small_txt&gt;What does not seem to be on the agenda at the next session of the so-called "Composite Dialogue" between India and Pakistan, to be held in New Delhi, is India's appalling record of human rights violations in Occupied Kashmir. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;For the past several years, "confidence building measures" (CBMs) have been the buzzword at talks between the two countries. But CBMs like the much-touted bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad can never generate any confidence among the Muslim population of Indian-occupied Kashmir so long as the Indian army continues its reign of terror in the beleaguered territory.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The struggle of the Muslims of Indian-occupied Kashmir is not about bus services; it is about ridding the territory of the Indian occupation forces and about the holding of a free and fair plebiscite to determine the territory's future status. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Back in 2004, the then-Indian army chief, General N. C. Vij, speaking at the  inauguration of a commanders' conference in New Delhi on April 12 of that year, came out with the astonishing claim that the Indian army's human rights record in Occupied Kashmir was "impeccable".&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Echoing their chief's astonishing comments, Indian army officers were quoted by the Times of India as saying: "Around 1,380 allegations (of human rights abuses) have been leveled in Kashmir since 1990. Out of these, only 36 allegations in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir have been found to be genuine." &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;In fact, the Indian army has a terrible human rights record in Occupied Kashmir, as spelled out in detail in numerous reports by international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;A report by two human rights organisations, Asia Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), charges that Indian security forces in Occupied Kashmir have deliberately executed hundreds of detainees in  custody as part of a "catch and kill" policy to crush the freedom struggle of Kashmiri Muslims. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"More than any other phenomenon, these deliberate killings reveal the magnitude of the human rights disaster in Kashmir," says the report. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Condemning the human rights abuses, the report urges India to take immediate and effective steps to end the abuses, rigorously prosecute security personnel responsible and grant access to international human rights organisations in order to prevent abuse of detainees.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The 163-page report, "The Human Rights Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity", focuses on the sharp escalation in human rights abuses, particularly custodial deaths, reprisal killings, rape, torture and assaults on the medical community by Indian paramilitary and military forces since December 1989, when the current insurgency against Indian occupation began. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The findings contained in the report are based on an analysis of the  testimony of over 130 witnesses, independently selected and interviewed by Asia Watch and PHR, as well as medical examinations and other documentation of the incidents described. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report concludes that while the conflict in Kashmir constitutes a grave security threat, the steps taken by the Indian government to crush the insurgency have resulted in grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"Moreover, the Indian authorities have done little to curb these abuses," the report adds. "Members of the Indian army and security forces are almost never prosecuted for human rights violations in Kashmir. In the rare cases in which investigations have taken place, the most severe punishment for abuses have generally been limited to dismissal or suspension from duty."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report says: "The Indian government's failure to account for these abuses and take rigorous action against those members of its forces responsible for  murder, rape and torture amounts to a policy of condoning human rights violations by the security forces."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Among the worst of these violations have been the summary executions of hundreds of detainees in the custody of the security forces in Occupied Kashmir. "Such killings are carried out as a matter of policy," says the report. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Nineteen cases are documented in detail in the report. In one case, Indian Border Security Force (BSF) troops detained a young man, Masroof Sultan, tortured him with electric shock, and then took him to a field where they shot him four times and left him for dead.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;In another case documented in the report, four young men were shot dead after being taken into custody on April 9, 1993, despite the fact that the deputy commissioner of the district told relatives that the young men were in custody but would be released.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"Indian army soldiers and paramilitary troops of the BSF and the Central Reserve Police Force  (CRPF) have also engaged in frequent reprisal attacks against civilians, opening fire in crowded markets and residential areas, and burning down entire neighbourhoods," says the report. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report says that security legislation has increased the likelihood of such abuses by authorising the security forces to shoot to kill and to destroy civilian property. "Under these laws, the security forces are protected from human rights violations," says the report. The report documents many such incidents.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"Most detainees taken into custody by the security forces in Kashmir are tortured," says the report. "Torture is practiced to coerce detainees to reveal information about suspected militants or to confess to militant activity. It is also used to punish detainees who are believed to support or sympathise with the militants and to create a climate of political repression."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report says methods of torture include severe beatings, electric shock,  suspension by the feet or hands, stretching the legs apart, burning with heated objects, and crushing the muscles with a heavy wooden ruler. "Rape most often occurs during crackdowns, cordon-and-search operations during which men are held for identification in parks or schoolyards while security forces search their homes, " says the report. "In these situations, the security forces frequently engage in collective punishment against the civilian population by assaulting residents and burning their homes."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Another report by Human Rights Watch/Asia says that Indian security forces have intensified their efforts against militant groups, stepping up cordon-and-search operations and summarily executing captured militant leaders.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"Alongside them, operating as a secret, illegal army, have been state-sponsored paramilitary groups," says the report. "Many of these groups have been responsible for grave human rights abuses, including summary executions,  torture and illegal detention as well as election-related intimidation of voters."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report says the deterioration in the human rights situation can be traced to early 1995 when the security forces began making systematic use of these irregular militias.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"While attempting to reassure the international community that they have taken steps to curb human rights abuses in Kashmir, Indian forces have in effect subcontracted some of their abusive tactics to groups with no official accountability," says the report. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;"The extrajudicial killings, abductions and assaults committed by these groups against suspected militants are instead described as resulting from 'intergroup rivalries.'"&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;But civilians have also been their victims, and the state-sponsored militia groups have singled out journalists, human rights activists and medical workers for attack. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;The report says: "They have been given free rein to patrol major hospitals in  Srinagar, particularly the Soura Institute, the Sri Maharaja Hari Singh (SMHS) hospital and the Bone and Joint Hospital. They have murdered, threatened, beaten and detained hospital staff. In some cases these abuses have occurred in full view of security force bunkers or in the presence of security force officers. They have also removed patients from hospitals. These abuses constitute clear violations of medical neutrality."&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Violations of human rights and humanitarian law by the regular security forces - the Indian army, the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force - have also continued. These violations include the deliberate killing of detainees in the custody of the security forces in Occupied Kashmir and reprisal killings of civilians.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;In the 17 years since December 1989, more than 70,000 Muslim civilians, including women and children, have been killed by the Indian army and paramilitary forces in Occupied Kashmir. With some 600,000  Indian army troops and paramilitary forces stationed in Occupied Kashmir today, the beleaguered state has the highest troops-to-population ratio for any territory on earth. &lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;Can things like bus services compensate for the barbaric actions of the Indian army, BSF and Delhi-backed goon squads?&lt;BR&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD bgColor=#efefef&gt;&lt;IMG height=1 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt; &lt;TR&gt; &lt;TD bgColor=#efefef&gt;&lt;IMG height=1 src="http://www.thenews.com.pk/images/shim.gif" width=1&gt;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt;&lt;/TBODY&gt;&lt;/TABLE&gt;&lt;/TD&gt; &lt;TD vAlign=top width=130&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/TD&gt;&lt;/TR&gt;&lt;/TBODY&gt;&lt;/TABLE&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt; 		&lt;hr size=1&gt;Now you can have a huge leap forward in email:&lt;a href="http://us.rd.yahoo.com/evt=40705/*http://mrd.mail.yahoo.com/try_beta?.intl=ca"&gt;&lt;b&gt; get the new Yahoo! Mail.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-6681634815519228122?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/6681634815519228122/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=6681634815519228122' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/6681634815519228122'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/6681634815519228122'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/01/india-has-terrible-record-of-hr-abuses.html' title='India has a terrible record of HR abuses in Occupied Kashmir'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-5091774547570085003</id><published>2007-01-04T12:24:00.001-08:00</published><updated>2007-01-04T12:24:12.323-08:00</updated><title type='text'>United Nations Must Fulfill Kashmir Obligation</title><content type='html'>&lt;div style="font-family:arial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12pt"&gt;&lt;DIV style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: arial, helvetica, sans-serif"&gt; &lt;DIV style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"&gt; &lt;DIV align=center&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" color=blue size=5&gt;&lt;B&gt;Kashmiri American Council / Kashmir Center&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;1111 Sixteenth Street, N.W. Suite 420, Washington, DC 20005&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;Tel: 202-628-6789 / Fax: 202-393-0062&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" color=blue size=4&gt;&lt;B&gt;UN must fulfill Kashmir obligation&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/FONT&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt;  &lt;DIV&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" color=blue size=3&gt;&lt;B&gt;Washington, DC. &amp;nbsp;January 5, 2007.&lt;/B&gt;&lt;/FONT&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt; &amp;nbsp;Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council / Kashmir Center, lamented today's 58th anniversary of the non‑implementation of the January 5, 1949, United Nations Security Council resolution which states that "The question of the ac! cession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;…The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence…No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on  the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit."&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;Dr. Fai said while addressing a gathering of peace activists in Washington that today we find that the resolution of January 5, 1949 has not been implemented even after the lapse of 58 long years. &amp;nbsp;Kashmir is not an integral part of any country and yet we have the failure of the realization of the expression of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. &amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;He emphasized that Kashmiris' claim to self-determination is exceptionally strong even without the United Nations recognition. &amp;nbsp;Kashmir has been historically independent, except in the anarchical  conditions of late 18&lt;SUP&gt;th&lt;/SUP&gt; and the first half of 19&lt;SUP&gt;th&lt;/SUP&gt; centuries. The territory of Kashmir is larger in size than 121 independent countries and bigger in number than 117 nations of the world. &amp;nbsp;The Kashmiri culture - Kashmiriat - is distinct from other cultures in the area in all respects -- folklore, dress, traditions, and cuisine.&lt;/FONT&gt;  &lt;DIV&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;Dr. Fai called upon the newly elected United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon to impress upon the parties concerned to create an atmosphere for a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir that will guarantee peace and prosperity not only in Kashmir but in the whole region of South Asia – that is home to one-fifth of total human race.&lt;/FONT&gt; &lt;BR&gt;&lt;FONT face="Times New Roman" size=3&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/FONT&gt;  &lt;P&gt;&lt;FONT size=3&gt;&lt;TT&gt;&lt;BR&gt;******************************************************************************************************************************************&lt;BR&gt;You received this message as a subscriber to Kashmiri American Council (KAC) Big List. &lt;BR&gt;If you do not wish to receive future email from KAC you can unsubscribe by sending an e-mail to info@kashmiri.com. &lt;BR&gt;Contact us:&lt;BR&gt;by mail : 1111 16th Street, N.W. Suite 420, Washington, DC 20036&lt;BR&gt;by phone:Tel: 202-628-6789, Fax: 202-393-0062 / 703-295-8683&lt;BR&gt;by e-maI: Info@kashmiri.com&lt;BR&gt;&lt;/TT&gt;&lt;/FONT&gt;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;BR&gt;________________________________________________________________________&lt;BR&gt;The information in this e-mail, and any attachment therein, is confidential and for use by the addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, please return the e-mail to the sender and delete it from your computer. Although The Bank of New York attempts to sweep e-mail and attachments for viruses, it does not  guarantee that either are virus-free and accepts no liability for any damage sustained as a result of viruses.&lt;BR&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;BR&gt;&lt;/DIV&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br&gt;__________________________________________________&lt;br&gt;Do You Yahoo!?&lt;br&gt;Tired of spam?  Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around &lt;br&gt;http://mail.yahoo.com &lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-5091774547570085003?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/5091774547570085003/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=5091774547570085003' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/5091774547570085003'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/5091774547570085003'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2007/01/united-nations-must-fulfill-kashmir.html' title='United Nations Must Fulfill Kashmir Obligation'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-2664612715632681743</id><published>2006-12-15T20:07:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-12-15T20:10:00.783-08:00</updated><title type='text'>India's shame by Arundhati Roy</title><content type='html'>India's shame&lt;br /&gt;Arundhati Roy&lt;br /&gt;Friday December 15, 2006&lt;br /&gt;The Guardian&lt;br /&gt;Mohammad Afzal is due to hang for his part in the 2001 attack on India's parliament building. But was he only a bit player? And is the country trying to bury embarrassing questions about its war on terror? By Arundhati Roy &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Friday December 15, 2006&lt;br /&gt;The Guardian &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Mohammed Afzal. Photograph: Prakash Singh/AFP/Getty Images&lt;br /&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;Five years ago this week, on December 13 2001, the Indian parliament was in its winter session. The government was under attack for yet another corruption scandal. At 11.30 in the morning, five armed men in a white Ambassador car fitted out with an improvised explosive device drove through the gates of Parliament House. When they were challenged, they jumped out of the car and opened fire. In the gun battle that followed, all the attackers were killed. Eight security personnel and a gardener were killed too. The dead terrorists, the police said, had enough explosives to blow up the parliament building, and enough ammunition to take on a whole battalion of soldiers. Unlike most terrorists, these five left behind a thick trail of evidence - weapons, mobile phones, phone numbers, ID cards, photographs, packets of dried fruit and even a love letter.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Article continues&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;--------------------------------------------------------------------------------&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;--------------------------------------------------------------------------------&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Not surprisingly, prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee seized the opportunity to compare the assault to the September 11 attacks in the US only three months previously.&lt;br /&gt;On December 14 2001, the day after the attack on parliament, the Special Cell (anti-terrorist squad) of the Delhi police claimed it had tracked down several people suspected of being involved in the conspiracy. The next day, it announced that it had "cracked the case": the attack, the police said, was a joint operation carried out by two Pakistan-based terrorist groups, Lashkar- e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Three Kashmiri men, Syed Abdul Rahman Geelani, Shaukat Hussain Guru and Mohammad Afzal, and Shaukat's wife, Afsan Guru, were arrested.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the tense days that followed, parliament was adjourned. The Indian government declared that Pakistan - America's closest ally in the "war on terror" - was a terrorist state. On December 21, India recalled its high commissioner from Pakistan, suspended air, rail and bus communications and banned air traffic with Pakistan. It put into motion a massive mobilisation of its war machinery, and moved more than half a million troops to the Pakistan border. Foreign embassies evacuated their staff and citizens, and tourists travelling to India were issued cautionary travel advisories. The world watched with bated breath as the subcontinent was taken to the brink of nuclear war. All this cost India an estimated pounds 1.1bn of public money. About 800 soldiers died in the panicky process of mobilisation alone.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The police charge sheet was filed in a special fast-track trial court designated for cases under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Some three years later, the trial court sentenced Geelani, Shaukat and Afzal to death. Afsan Guru was sentenced to five years of "rigorous imprisonment". On appeal, the high court subsequently acquitted Geelani and Afsan, but upheld Shaukat's and Afzal's death sentence. Eventually, the supreme court upheld the acquittals and reduced Shaukat's punishment to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. However, it not just confirmed, but enhanced Mohammad Afzal's sentence. He was given three life sentences and a double death sentence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In its judgment on August 5 2005, the supreme court admitted that the evidence against Afzal was only circumstantial, and that there was no evidence that he belonged to any terrorist group or organisation. But it went on to endorse what can only be described as lynch law. "The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties, had shaken the entire nation," it said, "and the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Spelling out the reasons for giving Afzal the death penalty, the judgment went on: "The appellant, who is a surrendered militant and who was bent upon repeating the acts of treason against the nation, is a menace to the society and his life should become extinct." This implies a dangerous ignorance of what it means to be a "surrendered militant" in Kashmir today.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So, should Afzal's life be extinguished? His story is fascinating because it is inextricably entwined with the story of the Kashmir Valley. It is a story that stretches far beyond the confines of courtrooms and the limited imagination of people who live in the secure heart of a self-declared "superpower". Afzal's story has its origins in a war zone whose laws are beyond the pale of the fine arguments and delicate sensibilities of normal jurisprudence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For all these reasons it is critical that we consider carefully the strange, sad and utterly sinister story of the December 13 attack. It tells us a great deal about the way the world's largest "democracy" really works. It connects the biggest things to the smallest. It traces the pathways that connect what happens in the shadowy grottoes of our police stations to what goes on in the snowy streets of Paradise Valley, and from there to the malign furies that bring nations to the brink of nuclear war. It raises specific questions that deserve specific, and not ideological or rhetorical, answers. What hangs in the balance is far more than the fate of one man.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For the most part, the December 13 attack was an astonishingly incompetent "terrorist" strike. But consummate competence appeared to be the hallmark of everything that followed: the gathering of evidence, the speed of the investigation by the Special Cell, the arrest and charging of the accused and the three-and-a-half-year-long judicial process that began with the fast-track trial court.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The operative phrase in all of this is "appeared to be". If you follow the story carefully, you will encounter two sets of masks. First, the mask of consummate competence (accused arrested, "case cracked" in two days flat), and then, when things began to come undone, the benign mask of shambling incompetence (shoddy evidence, procedural flaws, material contradictions). But underneath all of this - as several lawyers, academics and journalists who have studied the case in detail have shown - is something more sinister, more worrying. Over the past few years the worries have grown into a mountain of misgivings, impossible to ignore.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The doubts set in as early as the day after the parliament attack, when the police arrested Geelani, a young lecturer at Delhi University. His outraged colleagues and friends, certain that he had been framed, contacted the well-known lawyer Nandita Haksar and asked her to take on his case. This marked the beginning of a campaign for the fair trial of Geelani. It flew in the face of mass hysteria and corrosive propaganda that was enthusiastically disseminated by the mass media. But despite this, the campaign was successful, and Geelani was eventually acquitted, along with Afsan Guru.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Geelani's acquittal blew a gaping hole in the prosecution's version of the parliament attack. The linchpin of its conspiracy theory suddenly tuned out to be innocent. But in some odd way, in the public mind, the acquittal of two of the accused only confirmed the guilt of the other two. There was bloodlust that had to be satiated. When the government announced that Afzal, Accused No 1 in the case, would be hanged on October 20 2006, it seemed that most people welcomed the news not just with approval, but with morbid excitement. But then, once again, the questions resurfaced.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To see through the prosecution's case against Geelani was relatively easy. He was plucked out of thin air and transplanted into the centre of the "conspiracy" as its kingpin. Afzal was different. He had been extruded through the sewage system of the hell that Kashmir has become. He surfaced through a manhole, covered in shit (and when he emerged, policemen in the Special Cell pissed on him. Literally.) The first thing they made him do was a "media confession" in which he implicated himself completely in the attack. The speed with which this happened made many of us believe that he was indeed guilty as charged. It was only much later that the circumstances under which this "confession" was made were revealed, and even the supreme court was to set it aside, saying that the police had violated legal safeguards.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;From the very beginning there was nothing pristine or simple about Afzal's case. His story gives us a glimpse into what life is really like in the Kashmir Valley. It is only in the Noddy Book version we read about in our newspapers that security forces battle militants and innocent Kashmiris are caught in the crossfire. In the adult version, Kashmir is a valley awash with militants, renegades, security forces, double-crossers, informers, spooks, blackmailers, blackmailees, extortionists, spies, both Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies, human rights activists, NGOs and unimaginable amounts of unaccounted-for money and weapons. There are not always clear lines that demarcate the boundaries between all these things and people; it is not easy to tell who is working for whom.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Truth, in Kashmir, is probably more dangerous than anything else. The deeper you dig, the worse it gets. At the bottom of the pit are the Special Operations Group and Special Task Force (STF), the most ruthless, indisciplined and dreaded elements of the Indian security apparatus in Kashmir, which play a central role in the Afzal story. Unlike the more formal forces, they operate in a twilight zone where policemen, surrendered militants, renegades and common criminals do business. They prey upon the local population, particularly in rural Kashmir. Their primary victims are the thousands of young Kashmiri men who rose up in revolt in the anarchic uprising of the early 1990s and have since surrendered and are trying to live normal lives.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 1989, when Afzal crossed the border to be trained as a militant, he was only 20. He returned with no training, disillusioned with his experience. He put down his gun and enrolled himself in Delhi University. In 1993, without ever having been a practising militant, he voluntarily surrendered to the Border Security Force. Illogically enough, it was at this point that his nightmares began. His surrender was treated as a crime and his life became hell. Afzal's story has enraged Kashmiris because what has happened to him could have happened, is happening and has happened to thousands of young Kashmiri men and their families. The only difference is that their stories are played out in the dingy bowels of interrogation centres, army camps and police stations where they have been burned, beaten, electrocuted, blackmailed and killed, their bodies thrown out of the backs of trucks for passers-by to find. Whereas Afzal's story is being performed like a piece of medieval theatre on the national stage, in the clear light of day, with the legal sanction of a "fair trial", the hollow benefits of a "free press" and the all pomp and ceremony of a so-called democracy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In documents submitted to the court, Afzal describes how, in the months before the attack on parliament, he was tortured in the camps of the STF - with electrodes on his genitals and chillies and petrol in his anus. He talks of how he was a constant victim of extortion. He mentions the name of Deputy Superintendent of Police Devinder Singh, who said he needed him to do a "small job" for him in Delhi. (Singh has subsequently admitted on record to having tortured Afzal in exactly the ways Afzal has described.) Afzal has also said that from the time he was arrested up to the time he was charged (a few months), his younger brother Hilal was held in illegal confinement in a police camp in Kashmir. As ransom.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Even today, Afzal does not claim complete innocence. It is the nature of his involvement that is being contested. For instance, was he coerced, tortured and blackmailed into playing even the peripheral part he played? In a gross violation of his constitutional rights, from the time he was arrested and right through the crucial phase of the trial when the real work of building up a case is done, Afzal did not have a lawyer. He had nobody to put out his version of the story, or help him or anyone else sift through the tangle of lies and fabrications and propaganda put out by the police. Various individuals worked it out for themselves. Today, five years later, a group of lawyers, academics, journalists and writers has published a reader (December 13th: The Strange Case of the Parliament Attack, published by Penguin India). It is this body of work that has fractured what, only recently, appeared to be a national consensus interwoven with mass hysteria.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Through the fissures, those who have come under scrutiny - shadowy individuals, counter-intelligence and security agencies, political parties - are beginning to surface. They wave flags, hurl abuse, issue hot denials and cover their tracks with more and more untruths. Thus they reveal themselves.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The essays in the Penguin book raise questions about how Afzal, who never had proper legal representation, can be sentenced to death without having had an opportunity to be heard, without a fair trial. They raise questions about fabricated arrest memos, falsified seizure and recovery memos, procedural flaws, vital evidence that has been tampered with, false telephone records, false testimonies, legal lacunae, material contradictions in the testimonies of police and prosecution witnesses, and the outright lies that were presented in court and published in newspapers. They show how there is hardly a single piece of evidence that stands up to scrutiny.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And then there are even more disturbing questions that have been raised, which range beyond the fate of Afzal. Some of these are critical for a country that is claiming to be a responsible nuclear power. Here are 13 questions for December 13:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 1: For months before the attack on parliament, both the government and the police had been saying that parliament could be attacked. On December 12 2001, the then prime minister, AB Vajpayee, warned of an imminent attack. On December 13 it happened. Given that there was an "improved security drill", how did a car bomb packed with explosives enter the parliament complex?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 2: Within days of the attack, the Special Cell of the Delhi police said it was a meticulously planned joint operation of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. They said the attack was led by a man called "Mohammad" who was also involved in the hijacking of flight IC-814 in 1998. (This was later refuted by the Central Bureau of Investigation.) None of this was ever proved in court. What evidence did the Special Cell have for its claim?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 3: The entire attack was recorded live on CCTV. Two Congress party MPs, Kapil Sibal and Najma Heptullah, demanded in parliament that the CCTV recording be shown to the members. They said that there was confusion about the details of the event. The chief whip of the Congress party, Priyaranjan Dasmunshi, said, "I counted six men getting out of the car. But only five were killed. The closed circuit TV camera recording clearly showed the six men." If Dasmunshi was right, why did the police say that there were only five people in the car? Who was the sixth person? Where is he now? Why was the CCTV recording not produced by the prosecution as evidence in the trial? Why was it not released for public viewing?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 4: Why was parliament adjourned after some of these questions were raised?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 5: A few days after December 13, the government declared that it had "incontrovertible evidence" of Pakistan's involvement in the attack, and announced a massive mobilisation of almost half a million soldiers to the Indo-Pakistan border. The subcontinent was pushed to the brink of nuclear war. Apart from Afzal's "confession", extracted under torture (and later set aside by the supreme court), what was the "incontrovertible evidence"?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 6: Is it true that the military mobilisation to the Pakistan border had begun long before the December 13 attack?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 7: How much did this military standoff, which lasted for nearly a year, cost? How many soldiers died in the process? How many soldiers and civilians died because of mishandled landmines, and how many peasants lost their homes and land because trucks and tanks were rolling through their villages and landmines were being planted in their fields?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 8: In a criminal investigation, it is vital for the police to show how the evidence gathered at the scene of the attack led them to the accused. The police have not managed to show how they connected Geelani to the attack. And how did the police reach Afzal? The Special Cell says Geelani led them to Afzal. But the message to look out for Afzal was actually flashed to the Srinagar police before Geelani was arrested. So how did the Special Cell connect Afzal to the December 13 attack?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 9: The courts acknowledge that Afzal was a surrendered militant who was in regular contact with the security forces, particularly the STF of Jammu and Kashmir police. How do the security forces explain the fact that a person under their surveillance was able to conspire in a major militant operation?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 10: Is it plausible that organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad would rely on a person who had been in and out of STF torture chambers, and was under constant police surveillance, as the principal link for a major operation?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 11: In his statement before the court, Afzal says that he was introduced to "Mohammed" and instructed to take him to Delhi by a man called Tariq, who was working with the STF. Tariq was named in the police charge sheet. Who is Tariq and where is he now?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 12: On December 19 2001, six days after the parliament attack, police commissioner SM Shangari identified one of the attackers who was killed as Mohammad Yasin Fateh Mohammed (alias Abu Hamza) of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, who had been arrested in Mumbai in November 2000 and immediately handed over to the Jammu and Kashmir police. He gave detailed descriptions to support his statement. If police commissioner Shangari was right, how did Yasin, a man in the custody of the Jammu and Kashmir police, end up participating in the parliament attack? If he was wrong, where is Yasin now?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Question 13: Why is it that we still do not know who the five "terrorists" killed in the parliament attack are?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These questions, examined cumulatively, point to something far more serious than incompetence. The words that come to mind are complicity, collusion, involvement. There is no need for us to feign shock or shrink from thinking these thoughts and saying them out loud. Governments and their intelligence agencies have a hoary tradition of using strategies such as this to further their own ends. (Look up the burning of the Reichstag and the rise of Nazi power in Germany in 1933; or Operation Gladio, in which European intelligence agencies created acts of terrorism, especially in Italy, in order to discredit militant groups such as the Red Brigades.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The official response to all of these questions has been dead silence. As things stand, Afzal's execution has been postponed while the president considers his clemency petition. Meanwhile, the Bhartiya Janata party (now in the opposition) announced that it would turn "Hang Afzal" into a national campaign. But it does not seem to have taken off. Now other avenues are being explored. The main strategy seems to be to create confusion and polarise the debate on communal lines. In the business of spreading confusion, the media, particularly television journalists, can be counted on to be perfect collaborators. On discussions, chat shows and "special reports", we have television anchors playing around with crucial facts, like young children in a sandpit. Torturers, estranged brothers, senior police officers and politicians are emerging from the woodwork and talking. The more they talk, the more interesting it all becomes.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One character who is rapidly emerging from the shadowy periphery and wading on to centre-stage is deputy superintendent Devinder Singh. He was showcased on the national news (CNN-IBN), in what was presented as a "sting" operation with a hidden camera. It all seemed a bit unnecessary, however, because Singh has been talking a lot these days. He has done recorded interviews, on the phone as well as face to face, saying exactly the same shocking things. Weeks before the sting operation, in a recorded interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, a freelance journalist, he said, "I did interrogate and torture him [Afzal] at my camp for several days. And we never recorded his arrest in the books anywhere. His description of torture at my camp is true. That was the procedure those days and we did pour petrol in his ass and gave him electric shocks. But I could not break him. He did not reveal anything to me despite our hardest possible interrogation ... He looked like a 'bhondu' [fool] those days, what you call a 'chootya' [idiot] type. And I had a reputation for torture, interrogation and breaking suspects. If anybody came out of my interrogation clean, nobody would ever touch him again. He would be considered clean for good by the whole department."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is not an empty boast. Singh has a formidable reputation for torture in the Kashmir Valley. On TV, his boasting spiralled into policy-making. "Torture is the only deterrent for terrorism," he said. "I do it for the nation." He did not bother to explain why or how the "bhondu" that he tortured and subsequently released allegedly went on to become the diabolical mastermind of the parliament attack. Singh then said that Afzal was a Jaish militant. If this is true, why was the evidence not placed before the courts? And why on earth was Afzal released? Why was he not watched? There is a definite attempt to try to dismiss this as incompetence. But given everything we know now, it would take all of Singh's delicate professional skills to make some of us believe that.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The official version of the story of the parliament attack is very quickly coming apart at the seams. Even the supreme court judgment, with all its flaws of logic and leaps of faith, does not accuse Afzal of being the mastermind of the attack. So who was the mastermind? If Afzal is hanged, we may never know. But LK Advani, the leader of the opposition, wants him hanged at once. Even a day's delay, he says, is against the national interest. Why? What is the hurry? The man is locked up in a high-security cell on death row. He is not allowed out of his cell for even five minutes a day. What harm can he do? Talk? Write, perhaps? Surely, even in Advani's own narrow interpretation of the term, it is in the national interest not to hang Afzal? At least not until there is an inquiry that reveals what the real story is and who actually attacked parliament?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A genuine inquiry would have to mean far more than just a political witch-hunt. It would have to look into the part played by intelligence, counter-insurgency and security agencies as well. Offences such as the fabrication of evidence and the blatant violation of procedural norms have already become established in the courts, but they look very much like just the tip of the iceberg. We now have a police officer admitting - boasting - on record that he was involved in the illegal detention and torture of a fellow citizen. Is all of this acceptable to the people, the government and the courts of India?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Given the track record of Indian governments (past and present, right, left and centre) it is naive - perhaps utopian is a better word - to hope that today's politicians will ever have the courage to institute an inquiry that will, once and for all, uncover the real story. A maintenance dose of pusillanimity is probably encrypted in all governments. But hope has little to do with reason.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;(C) Arundhati Roy 2006&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-2664612715632681743?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/2664612715632681743/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=2664612715632681743' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/2664612715632681743'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/2664612715632681743'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2006/12/indias-shame-by-arundhati-roy.html' title='India&apos;s shame by Arundhati Roy'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-4449942271756866771</id><published>2006-12-07T19:21:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-12-07T19:24:25.782-08:00</updated><title type='text'>India says Kashmir toll over 41,000, others differ</title><content type='html'>India says Kashmir toll over 41,000, others differ&lt;br /&gt;07 Dec 2006 09:00:47 GMT&lt;br /&gt;Source: Reuters&lt;br /&gt;http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/B777945.htm&lt;br /&gt;SRINAGAR, India, Dec 7 (Reuters) - The death toll from 17 years of separatist insurgency in Indian Kashmir stands at more than 41,000 people, Indian authorities said on Thursday, but separatists and human rights groups said the figure was higher.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to police records 16,231 civilians, 4,984 members of Indian security forces and 19,966 militants have died since the insurgency began in 1989 in disputed Kashmir, the root of more than a half century of animosity between India and Pakistan.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A senior police officer, who did not want to be identified said the toll of 41,181 had been tallied up to Oct. 31.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"The figure does not include those who died on inaccessible snow-clad mountains while crossing over to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or while returning after receiving arms training," he told Reuters.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The figure also does not include missing people, but in 2004 then Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Syed said more than 3,700 people had disappeared as a result of the conflict.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;India has consistently accused Pakistan of training, arming and sending separatist militants into Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A human rights group, the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Societies (JKCCS), estimates that more than 50,000 people have died and more than 10,000 gone missing since the armed rebellion began against Indian rule.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"These figures are based on daily newspaper reports -- we completely disagree with the government figures," said Khuram Parvez, the coordinator of JKCCS.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"We have already started a door-to-door survey in Kashmir to compile the list of total deaths. Thousands of Kashmiris remain unaccounted for," Parvez added.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kashmir's leading separatist group, the All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference, says more than 100,000 people have died in insurgency-related violence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"When one of our study groups started work to compile the death toll, they were jailed," said Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a hardline separatist leader and former chairman of the Hurriyat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;"Kashmir's death toll will remain a big unanswered question as long as India does not allow our workers, human rights groups to work freely."&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;International human rights groups have accused the Indian army of systematic abuses in Kashmir over the years, but the military says it punishes anyone found guilty of abuse.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Officials say violence involving Indian security forces and separatist militants has been falling since India and Pakistan launched a peace process in 2004.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But an average of between four and six people a day are still being killed in regular gun battles and occasional bomb blasts across the mountainous region.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/7699365257494317784-4449942271756866771?l=hrkashmir.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/feeds/4449942271756866771/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7699365257494317784&amp;postID=4449942271756866771' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/4449942271756866771'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/7699365257494317784/posts/default/4449942271756866771'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://hrkashmir.blogspot.com/2006/12/india-says-kashmir-toll-over-41000.html' title='India says Kashmir toll over 41,000, others differ'/><author><name>Journey</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/00947534482564374053</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='33' height='29' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_Vun_0MfbTW0/SreINQIsNDI/AAAAAAAAApM/zrTzeBnjRMc/S220/Spirals.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7699365257494317784.post-1093192222327516840</id><published>2006-12-05T07:59:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-12-05T08:18:49.580-08:00</updated><title type='text'>HRW Report on Kashmir "Everyone Lives in Fear"</title><content type='html'>&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/index.htm"&gt;http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/index.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I. Summary&lt;br /&gt;In the quiet of the Ramadan afternoon, as Muslim Kashmiris wait to break their fast, the only sound is the wailing of a mother. It is a relentless, desolate howl. People start to gather, standing around in sullen silence. An elderly man steps forward. “Why are you here? Can any of you bring our boy back? Can you punish his killers? So many people are dead. Why? Can you answer that?”&lt;br /&gt;Since 1989, the wails of family members mourning their dead have become ubiquitous to life in Jammu and Kashmir state.&lt;br /&gt;Kashmiris are trapped in an armed conflict between abusive Indian government forces and armed militant groups waging a brutal separatist struggle with the backing of the Pakistani government. Most Kashmiri families have lost a relative, friend, or neighbor in the violence. At least twenty thousand Kashmiri civilians have been killed (Kashmiri groups say that the number is much higher). Tens of thousands have been injured. Hundreds of thousands have been internally displaced, including some three hundred thousand Hindu Kashmiris. Approximately thirty thousand Muslim Kashmiris have fled to neighboring Pakistan as refugees, while thousands have crossed that same border to train as fighters. Ordinary, day-to-day life has been upended and degraded.&lt;br /&gt;Suspicion and fear continue to permeate the Kashmir valley. A knock on the door late at night sends spasms of anxiety through households, afraid that a family member will be asked by the security forces or militants to step outside for “a minute” and then never return. The bombs of militants go off in crowded markets without any warning. Psychological trauma related to the violence has been enormous, as life itself is constantly under threat.&lt;br /&gt;Over the years a conflict over Kashmiri identity and independence has slowly but visibly mutated into an even more dangerous fight under the banner of religion, pitting Islam against Hinduism, and drawing religious radicals into its heart. Indian security forces claim they are fighting to protect Kashmiris from militants and Islamist extremists, while militants claim they are fighting for Kashmiri independence and to defend Muslim Kashmiris from a murderous Indian Army. In reality, both sides have committed widespread and numerous human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war), creating among the civilian population a pervasive climate of fear, distrust, and sadness.&lt;br /&gt;In this report we document serious abuses, especially the targeting of civilians, by both government forces and militants in Jammu and Kashmir. Those abuses continue, despite a tentative peace process that includes talks between New Delhi, Islamabad, and some of Kashmir’s separatist leaders, modest confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, and the 2002 election of a state government with an avowed agenda to improve the human rights situation.  Particular attention is given in this report to the problem of impunity from prosecution, whereby those responsible for abuses rarely get investigated, let alone tried and convicted.&lt;br /&gt;Indian army and paramilitary forces have been responsible for innumerable and serious violations of human rights in Kashmir. Extrajudicial executions are widespread. Police and army officials have told Human Rights Watch that alleged militants taken into custody are often executed instead of being brought to trial because they believe that keeping hardcore militants in jail is a security risk. Most of those summarily executed are falsely reported to have died during armed clashes between the army and militants in what are euphemistically called “encounter killings.” A well-known example is the murder of five men who were identified by the police and army as the militants responsible for the massacre of thirty-six Sikhs in Chattisinghpora in 2000 and then killed in a supposed armed encounter. Forensic tests ordered by the state government later showed them to be local villagers who were innocent of the Sikh massacre.&lt;br /&gt;In many other cases Indian security forces have shot civilians under the authority of laws such as the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, which allow lethal force to be used “against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area.” For example, on February 23, 2006, soldiers in Handwara shot at a group playing cricket, suspecting that a militant was hiding among them, and killed four boys, including an eight-year-old. Even the army has admitted that the extraordinary powers to shoot have led to “mistakes.” The army described as an “error of judgment”  the July 2005 killing of three teenage boys in Kupwara who had sneaked away to smoke a cigarette at night and were shot without warning by troops. Such mistakes, which are not uncommon, greatly inflame public passions in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;Indian security forces have long been responsible for enforced disappearances—that is, they deny having custody of an individual, typically in conjunction with their torture or extrajudicial execution. Kashmiri human rights defenders say that at least eight thousand people have “disappeared” since the conflict began; most were last seen in the custody of troops. While the state government has admitted that nearly four thousand people are “missing” in Jammu and Kashmir, it claims that many of them actually crossed into Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir to join the militants. While the number of new “disappearances” appears to have decreased in the past few years from the huge numbers that characterized the early years of the conflict, that they continue at all is shameful for the world’s largest democracy. Moreover, there is still no information about the fate of thousands of individuals “disappeared” by Indian security forces since the beginning of the insurgency. &lt;br /&gt;Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch show that torture of detainees, in particular severe beatings during interrogations of suspected militants and their supporters, remains the norm. Kashmiris also complain of a form of punishment in which individuals are picked up for questioning and tortured in order to obtain information about a family member believed to be a militant. Militants who have surrendered said that they are treated with suspicion and often brutally interrogated. One former militant told Human Rights Watch that when he “disappeared” for over a month in 2004 he had actually been in army custody, where he was blindfolded, tied up, and beaten while his interrogators asked him for information about his former comrades. Despite claims of a new campaign by the army to train members of the security forces in public relations, army, paramilitary and police behavior towards the public is usually aggressive, distrusting, and rude. “Slaps and kicks have become a form of greeting for the security forces,” observed one villager in Kupwara district.&lt;br /&gt;Kashmiris are often arbitrarily and illegally detained. The Additional Advocate General told the Srinagar High Court recently that there were 4,500 suspected militants in jail, awaiting trial. Many of them, say human rights lawyers, have been in custody for ten or more years and some have never been produced in court. Without evidence to secure a conviction or to prevent them from being released on bail, they are often held under a draconian preventive detention law called the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA). The PSA allows for detention without trial for up to two years to prevent an individual from “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state or the maintenance of public order.” The detention period is often renewed at the end of the two-year period by issuing a new PSA arrest warrant, meaning individuals spend years in detention without ever having the chance to appear before a court and contest the allegations against them.&lt;br /&gt;As part of the current state government’s “healing touch policy” and the ongoing peace talks between New Delhi and some of the separatist groups, dozens of alleged militants, including some who served more than two years under the PSA, have been released. The state government claims that of the nearly 1,200 held in detention when it came to power in November 2002, three years later only 376 alleged militants remain in custody under the PSA, including nearly two hundred foreigners, most of them Pakistani. Human rights defenders insist the number of those in custody is larger, but since no central record is maintained, it is impossible to independently verify the claims. One indication of the current scope of the problem is that 443 habeas corpus (“produce the body”) petitions were filed to challenge detentions in 2005.&lt;br /&gt;Kashmiris have also been subjected to human rights abuses and humanitarian law violations by secessionist armed groups, commonly referred to as militants.  Often intentionally ignored by supporters of Kashmiri independence or its accession to Pakistan are the numerous massacres, bombings, killings, and attacks on schools attributed to the militants.  &lt;br /&gt;Throughout the conflict, militant groups have targeted civilians, including women and children, whom they consider to be “traitors to the cause” or for expressing views contrary to those of one or another armed group. Alleged militants have murdered nearly six hundred Kashmiri politicians since the conflict began, usually as retribution for joining in the electoral process. Officials conducting the polls have been killed or tortured, some with their noses or ears chopped off. Militants have violently assaulted Kashmiris, including women, by chopping off ears or noses, as a means of punishing their relatives whom they consider to be traitors—informers, security personnel, or surrendered militants. In several cases children have been abducted or executed.&lt;br /&gt;Militants have been implicated in bomb attacks even outside Jammu and Kashmir. After a series of bomb blasts in India’s capital New Delhi on October 29, 2005, which killed over fifty civilians, a little-known group called Islami Inqilabi Mahaz claimed responsibility. In March 2006, a series of bomb blasts in Varanasi killed twenty people. Once again, an unknown group called Lashkar-e-Qahar called journalists in Jammu and Kashmir to claim responsibility and threaten more attacks. The July 2006 serial blasts in Bombay’s commuter trains that killed nearly two hundred have also been attributed to militants sympathetic to the Kashmiri struggle for secession, though as of this writing no evidence has been produced.&lt;br /&gt;Militant groups have attacked religious minorities in Kashmir such as Hindus and Sikhs, as well as ethnic minorities such as the Gujjars and Bakarwals whom the militants target because they believe them to be government informers. Militants have committed at least twenty massacres of civilians from minority groups, usually in the middle of the night when they were asleep.  Even as Kashmiris were climbing out of the rubble and mourning their dead after the October 8, 2005 earthquake, militants decapitated ten Hindus in Rajouri district. In May 2006, thirty-five Hindus were killed in the remote hamlets of Doda and Udhampur districts; police blamed the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba. In recent years, as the conflict has increasingly taken on religious overtones, many militant groups have also begun to impose a more fundamentalist version of Islam in predominantly Sufi Kashmir. Some women have been punished for not adopting Islamic dress codes as demanded by some militant groups, while cable television operators and Internet centers have been targeted for promoting “immorality.” Recently, the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami has even asked women to stop using mobile phones or visiting public parks.&lt;br /&gt;Although many of the militant groups currently operating in Jammu and Kashmir have become increasingly unpopular, Kashmiris are afraid to speak out against them. A Kashmiri journalist who requested anonymity explained to Human Rights Watch in July 2005:&lt;br /&gt;We know what the army can do. We are familiar with their abuses. They can kill us, but they cannot destroy us. But the militants are gradually changing our very ethos…. They are killing with impunity and we can never tell who they are.&lt;br /&gt;There is considerable evidence that over many years Pakistan has provided Kashmiri militants with training, weapons, funding, and sanctuary.Officially, Pakistan denies ever arming and training militants. However, real decision-making authority and management of the “Kashmir struggle” has long rested firmly with the Pakistani military and its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the militant organizations it has supported and mentored. Under pressure from Washington after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistan banned several militant groups in January 2002, including the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, although they have continued to operate after changing their names. India blames these groups for many armed attacks.&lt;br /&gt;Yet Pakistan appears to be keeping its options open should peace talks collapse. Former militants told Human Rights Watch that Pakistan’s army and intelligence services, in particular the ISI, continue to support armed groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. In July 2005, as the snow melted and mountain passes opened, the Indian armed forces claimed to have killed at least forty armed militants in just one week as they attempted to cross into Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Recent reports in the Pakistani media have also stated that many training camps are still functioning. After the 2005 earthquake, several armed groups conducted significant emergency relief operations in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, handing out weatherized tents even before the Pakistani government could mobilize.&lt;br /&gt;*           *           *&lt;br /&gt;Under international humanitarian law (the laws of war), the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir is considered to be a non-international (internal) armed conflict. Applicable law, to which both state armed forces and opposition armed groups must abide, includes Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law.  This law prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects, and requires that civilians and captured combatants be treated humanely at all times.  Serious violations of the laws of war are war crimes, which states have a duty to prosecute.&lt;br /&gt;Indian security forces are also bound by international human rights law, such as is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which India ratified in 1979.  Human rights law prohibits extrajudicial executions, torture and other mistreatment, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrest and detention.  States have a duty under international law to investigate and prosecute serious violations of human rights. &lt;br /&gt;Throughout the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, impunity from prosecution for serious crimes has been a common thread. Impunity occurs when the state consistently fails in its responsibility—because of a lack of capability or political will or laws shielding state abusers—to hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. This creates an atmosphere in which violators believe that they can get away with the most serious crimes.  As stated by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in its March 2006 resolution on the right of victims of human rights abuses to a remedy, states must “[i]nvestigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and international law.”&lt;br /&gt;Although India has internal systems of inquiry and punishment, Human Rights Watch—despite several letters requesting the information from the Indian government—has received no details of any cases in which members of the Indian security forces have been prosecuted and convicted for serious human rights violations. In March 2006, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad said that 134 army personnel, seventy-nine members of the Border Security Force, and sixty policemen have been punished for committing human rights abuses since the insurgency first began. However, as no details of these incidents are available and the chief minister claimed at the same time that there were only 122 complaints of human rights violations since 2002, these figures cannot be taken at face value, and the commitment to transparently investigate, prosecute and punish individuals responsible for abuses remains in doubt. Instead, soldiers, paramilitaries, and police are routinely shielded by both their uniformed and civilian superiors in Jammu and Kashmir and New Delhi and by laws that make it extremely difficult to prosecute members of the armed forces in civilian courts.&lt;br /&gt;Indian and Kashmiri policemen watch as shooting breaks out following an attack by suspected Pakistani Islamist militants in the center of Srinagar's business district, July 29, 2005. © 2005 Robert Nickelsberg&lt;br /&gt;Indian law offers a remarkable amount of legal protection to members of the armed forces and civilian officials implicated in criminal offenses. Section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 protects any member of the armed forces from arrest for “anything done or purported to be done [emphasis added] by him in the discharge of his official duties except after obtaining the consent of the Central government.” Section 197(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is a sweeping impunity provision that applies throughout India. It makes it mandatory for a prosecutor to obtain permission from the federal government to initiate criminal proceedings against public servants, including armed forces personnel. And both the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act provide effective immunity from civilian prosecution, stating, in identical language, that:&lt;br /&gt;No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted, except with previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.&lt;br /&gt;Military personnel are also subject to the Manual of Military Law and Regulations, which details the rules and procedures for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of military offenses and crimes in the armed forces.  There is little evidence that the military has shown any greater interest in prosecuting its own for human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir than has the civilian justice system.&lt;br /&gt;This impunity has an impact that spreads well beyond the original crime, encouraging other abuses. For instance, a Kashmiri man whose son was “disappeared” told Human Rights Watch that police warned him that if he failed to pay a bribe or complained to the authorities, not only would the son be killed, but he himself would be taken into the jungle, killed, and identified as a “foreign militant.”&lt;br /&gt;In this report we trace impunity for the most serious abuses dating back to the beginning of the conflict. We describe how in 1990 the Central Reserve Police Force shot and killed at least thirty-five Kashmiri demonstrators (according to some reports, as many as one hundred) as they reached the Gawakadal Bridge on Srinagar’s Jhelum River. A similar number of demonstrators protesting the killing of religious leader Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammad Farooq were gunned down by security forces on May 21, 1990. In October 1993 at least thirty-seven people were killed when personnel from the 74th Battalion Border Security Force opened fire to disperse more than ten thousand people demonstrating in Beijbehara against an earlier incident of indiscriminate firing in Srinagar. And then there is the case of the murder of human rights lawyer Jalil Andrabi in 1996 by the army. No one has been arrested let alone prosecuted in such cases, which have seared the consciences of many Kashmiris and taken on almost legendary status as proof that the Indian state is fighting a war not to protect Kashmiris, but to subjugate them.&lt;br /&gt;Impunity continues to the present. In May 2003, Javed Ahmad Magray, a seventeen-year-old student, was murdered one night near his home in Srinagar. An investigation by the district administration concluded that Magray had been abducted and killed by the army. Although the investigation identified the officer responsible, he was never arrested or even compelled to testify during the inquiry, because the army claimed that his unit had been moved out of Jammu and Kashmir. This is where the immunity provisions in the law kicked in—under the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, the state government must seek permission from the central government to prosecute members of the armed forces. As is almost always the case, as of May 2006 that permission had not been granted. Despite several requests to the army for information, there is no evidence that the Indian army has sought to prosecute the officer under the military justice code. &lt;br /&gt;Pakistan has never held any militant accountable for crimes committed in Jammu and Kashmir.  Instead, many militants enjoy the sanctuary of Pakistani soil after they commit abuses across the border. Leaders of militant groups have never made any public statements renouncing their policy of attacks upon civilians, or given any indication that those responsible for such abuses should be held to account.&lt;br /&gt;Impunity not only affects the victims and their families. In Jammu and Kashmir, impunity has bred cynicism and distrust of authority. It has led to divisions in society that will take a long time to heal. Many Kashmiris told us that impunity for human rights violations is the single biggest obstacle to a restoration of normality in the state. They made it plain that no peace or ceasefire will be meaningful or enduring without an end to the almost complete impunity that the Indian security forces and the militants have enjoyed.&lt;br /&gt;Many in Jammu and Kashmir believe that if the Indian government had taken action against abuses, ordered immediate investigations, and transparently prosecuted and punished those found responsible, many lives might ultimately have been spared. Public willingness to overlook brutal crimes by the militants might have been much lower. Instead, government abuses have acted as a recruiting sergeant for the militants and, throughout the conflict, provided a platform to garner support for the insurgency.&lt;br /&gt;*           *           *&lt;br /&gt;When the armed rebellion first began in 1989, most Kashmiris believed it would be a short struggle. As militants started a campaign of bombings, grenade attacks, and killings of civilian officials, almost every day there were demonstrations. Kashmiris were out in the streets in the tens of thousands, calling for “azaadi,” or independence. Local government came to a halt and, taken aback by the scale of the protests, it scrambled futilely to restore order, deploying nervous, ill-trained troops who used unnecessary lethal force, killing scores of unarmed demonstrators. Separatist leader Abdul Ghani Bhat, recalling those days to Human Rights Watch, said:&lt;br /&gt;We were fools. We thought freedom was round the corner. All we had to do was come out on the streets in protest. Pakistan would send its army to support us, the world would see that every Kashmiri wanted freedom, and India would be forced to agree. Instead, we ended up with all this violence.&lt;br /&gt;“All this violence” has brought immense suffering to Kashmiris. It has even almost led to war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. After a deadly attack on India’s parliament in December 2001 that left twelve people, including the five gunmen, dead, India blamed Pakistan-based militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. All five gunmen, according to the police, were Pakistani. After the attack, the two countries deployed over a million troops to the border. There was frightening talk of a nuclear war until, under international pressure, the troops were pulled back.&lt;br /&gt;A cautious peace process ensued, begun by India’s then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan’s leader, General Musharraf. It has been sustained by international pressure driven by the post-September 11, 2001 “war on terror” and fear of nuclear war between countries that have gone to war three times since independence in 1947, plus a certain amount of “Kashmir fatigue” on both sides of the border, and the desperate yearning of most Kashmiris for an end to the conflict.&lt;br /&gt;Elections in India in 2004 brought a coalition led by the Congress party to power in New Delhi and the two governments have continued to meet, albeit at a languid pace and with a modest agenda. While both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf say they are committed to the peace process, progress has been slow.&lt;br /&gt;Although the two governments may not have found an immediate solution to Kashmir, they are encouraging people-to-people contact by easing visa regulations and providing cheap bus and train services across the border. However, because of a history of distrust, the process is still tenuous and all sides can point to abuses by the other as a reason to continue the fight. However, more and more voices are beginning to point to the same atrocities as a reason to stop. &lt;br /&gt;Many observers believe that there is an unprecedented opportunity to reach a final settlement that addresses Kashmir’s critical human rights situation. The United States, the world’s sole superpower and a proponent of a settlement, is for the first time considered a friend of both India and Pakistan. In Jammu and Kashmir, a coalition government between the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Congress party is in power after defeating a discredited state administration in 2002 elections. The coalition had made human rights one of its main campaign planks. Though it has little power over the national security services, the state government has repeatedly called for an end to chronic problems such as “disappearances” and custodial killings.&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps most important, there has been a significant change in both the Indian and Pakistani governments’ attitudes, with senior Indian officials admitting human rights violations (as opposed to earlier flat denials) and some Pakistani officials admitting their role in influencing and supporting the militants. Kashmiri rebel political leaders also admit that armed groups have committed human rights abuses. That, too, is a significant shift from the early years of the conflict.&lt;br /&gt;Although the process is inordinately slow, India has also begun to talk to Kashmiri rebel political leaders, though it is yet to initiate talks with the Pakistan-based militant leaders. New Delhi is demanding a convincing end to Pakistani support to the militants. There have been some proposals towards a possible solution, including the demilitarization of Kashmir and eventual self-rule for Kashmiris, who are presently separated by the Line of Control that divides Indian- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Most analysts believe this to be premature because neither country will want to relinquish its military presence in the areas under their control. India also says that with militants still attacking civilians, it cannot risk withdrawing troops. Pakistan and the rebel groups say that if India only agreed to work honestly towards an honorable settlement, there would be no need for an armed struggle and militancy would end.&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps the greatest impetus for a settlement is weariness on all sides with a conflict that has brought so much misery but no victory for either the Indian army or the militants. Nor has it resolved Kashmir’s future as part of India, Pakistan, or as an independent entity. It is noteworthy that many Kashmiris in favor of independence have come to this view not just as a political statement, but because of the constant abuse that they have witnessed and suffered.&lt;br /&gt;Many ordinary Kashmiris are beginning to say that they are paying too heavy a price in this conflict and that it is the militants, and not just the Indian security forces, that are to be blamed. According to the Mumbai-based International Center for Peace Initiatives, nearly 85 percent of those killed in militant attacks since the conflict started have been Kashmiri Muslims. Many Kashmiris told Human Rights Watch that they have a desperate hope for peace and, feeling let down by those claiming to represent them, including mainstream politicians, Kashmiri nationalists and militant leaders, seek new leadership. They believe that without authentic local leadership, they will not be adequately represented in negotiations. But they are concerned that independent Kashmiri voices with priorities inconsistent with established militant agendas will be branded as “traitors” and targeted for attack.&lt;br /&gt;Abdul Ghani Lone was one of the first moderate leaders of the All Party Hurriyat Conference to become a vocal advocate of dialogue and compromise. He was killed on May 21, 2002. His son Sajjad Lone believes that Pakistan-backed militant groups murdered his father because he advocated a settlement with India. Sajjad Lone described what he said had become the greatest tragedy in the Kashmir conflict, that Kashmiris were being killed by their professed liberators:&lt;br /&gt;I did not want my father’s body in the martyrs’ graveyard. I knew what would happen. The victims and the killers are increasingly ending up lying beside each other in our martyrs’ graveyard.&lt;br /&gt;Just as human rights abuses and impunity have been a cause and fuel for the conflict, human rights protections and accountability can be key ingredients for a solution. There can be no better confidence building measure than an end to abuses on both sides and the beginnings of an effort to address the crimes of both the past and present. With strong and committed political leadership in India, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir, and pressure and support from the United States and other key international actors, substantial progress can be made in a short period of time. Then “all this violence” may begin to become part of Kashmir’s past, instead of its future.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362272"&gt;Key recommendations&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The government of India, the government of Pakistan, and all militant and Kashmiri groups should place human rights protection mechanisms at the center of any attempt to resolve the conflict and ensure responsibility for abuses by ending impunity, without which a sustainable settlement is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;India and the state government of Jammu and Kashmir should each establish an independent and impartial commission of inquiry into serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Indian security forces since the beginning of the conflict.&lt;br /&gt;India is a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council and thus bound to cooperate with its mechanisms. The Indian government should issue a standing invitation to the relevant United Nations thematic human rights rapporteurs or working groups to come to Jammu and Kashmir to investigate the human rights situation.&lt;br /&gt;The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint a special rapporteur with an ongoing mandate to publish regular and public reports on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. The governments of India and Pakistan should publicly commit to full cooperation with the special rapporteur, including with any necessary visits.&lt;br /&gt;Given the continuing failure of the military justice system to prosecute members of the armed forces for human rights abuses, members of the army and other security forces of all ranks implicated in serious rights abuses should be fully and fairly prosecuted in civilian courts.&lt;br /&gt;All legal provisions providing effective immunity to members of the armed forces should be repealed, including Section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 197(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act.&lt;br /&gt;The Indian parliament should amend the Human Rights Protection Act to allow the National Human Rights Commission to independently investigate allegations of abuse by members of the armed forces.&lt;br /&gt;The Indian government should publicly release detailed information on all arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of army troops, paramilitaries, police, and public officials for human rights violations since the beginning of the conflict. It should release the same information on an annual basis in the future.&lt;br /&gt;Militant groups should take all necessary steps to abide by international humanitarian law, including: ending direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians; the summary execution, torture or other ill-treatment of persons in custody; attacks on schools; and the recruitment of children into their forces.  Militants groups should publicly condemn abuses by any militant group and ensure that there is accountability for such abuses.&lt;br /&gt;Pakistan should stop providing arms, finance, sanctuary, and training to militant groups that have failed or are unwilling to abide by international humanitarian law. Otherwise Pakistan will be held complicit in abuses by such groups.&lt;br /&gt;The international community should urge the governments of India and Pakistan and all militant and Kashmiri groups to place human rights protection mechanisms at the center of any attempt to resolve the conflict. No sustainable settlement will be possible without an end to abuses and impunity.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362273"&gt;A note on methodology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Human Rights Watch conducted research for this report by sending teams to both Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. Research in Jammu and Kashmir was conducted from 2004 to February 2006 and in Azad Kashmir in 2005 and 2006. Additional research was conducted by telephone, email and in meetings with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and officials in New Delhi, Islamabad and elsewhere. Human Rights Watch interviewed government officials, army officers, police officials, politicians, journalists, human rights defenders, members of the international and diplomatic community, militants, and victims of human rights violations. Information here about unresolved or ongoing cases is at least as reported at the time of Human Rights Watch’s most recent research in Jammu and Kashmir, in February 2006.  Wherever possible, efforts have been made to provide more up-to-date information in such cases. Despite several letters requesting the information from the Indian government, at the time of writing Human Rights Watch had received no details of any cases in which members of the Indian security forces have been prosecuted and convicted for serious human rights violations.&lt;br /&gt;In order to protect victims and others who might face reprisals by either side for speaking against them, names and any information that might identify them, such as places where interviews were held or specific dates of those meetings, have been withheld in certain cases.&lt;br /&gt;II. Background: People, the India-Pakistan Dispute, Political History, Recent Developments, and Peace Talks&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362275"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075951"&gt;The people of &lt;/a&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;br /&gt;India’s northernmost state, Jammu and Kashmir, lies in the Himalayas and borders Pakistan, Tibet, and China. The state comprises the administrative regions of Jammu, which lies in the plains below the Pir Panjal range, and has a population of approximately 4.39 million; Ladakh, bordering Tibet, with a population of 0.23 million; and the Kashmir valley between the Pir Panjal and Panjri ranges, with a population of 5.44 million.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in India. However, the state is divided roughly along religious lines. Ninety-five percent of the residents of the Kashmir valley are Muslim, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni, while 50 percent of the population of Ladakh is Buddhist and 46 percent is Muslim (most of the Muslims of Ladakh are Shia). Jammu has a very different religious make-up, with 66 percent of the population Hindu and most of the rest Muslim.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; The literacy rate is 54 percent, lower than the national average of 65 percent.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Before the conflict, Jammu and Kashmir had a large and profitable tourist industry, which provided a major portion of the state revenue. But tourist numbers have dropped from more than seven hundred thousand visitors a year before 1989 to fewer than eight thousand per year in the 1990s. With an improvement in the overall security situation, the number of tourists visiting the state is gradually increasing, though those numbers may decrease after the recent deliberate targeting of tourists by militants in 2006.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"&gt;4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The conflict has also exacted a heavy toll on the state’s infrastructure. Over 1,100 government buildings, 640 educational buildings, eleven hospitals, 337 bridges, and more than ten thousand privates houses and shops have been destroyed in violent incidents since the conflict began.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The state’s inability to generate sufficient resources has led to an increased dependency on central assistance and borrowings. In an effort to generate employment opportunities and prevent the youth from joining the militancy, the central government has announced several aid packages over the years. The central government spends eight to ten times more on each citizen in Jammu and Kashmir than any other Indian state.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362276"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075952"&gt;India-Pakistan dispute&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir was the name of the territory that now includes territory under Pakistani and Chinese control. Since 1947, roughly a third has come under Pakistan’s control; this territory is called Azad Kashmir by Islamabad and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir by New Delhi. The remaining two-thirds is called Jammu and Kashmir by New Delhi and includes the Hindu and Buddhist majority regions.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"&gt;7&lt;/a&gt;  Islamabad calls this portion Indian-Occupied Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;The conflict in Kashmir has its origins in the state’s accession to India in 1947. As colonial rule came to an end in South Asia, the British decided to create two separate countries, India and Pakistan. The smaller kingdoms that were part of the British “Raj,” having accepted the suzerainty of Britain, were offered the choice of resuming their independent status or joining with either Hindu-majority India or Muslim-majority Pakistan. Most chose to accede based on geography or religious majority. However, Kashmir was a problem because it was a border Muslim-majority state ruled by a Hindu king. The British left its fate for future negotiations because the Maharaja of Kashmir had failed to decide whether to accede to either India or Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"&gt;8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Kashmir immediately became the subject of conflict between the two new countries. Pakistan believed that the division of territories generally between the two countries had been influenced by Lord Mountbatten, the last colonial viceroy, who got on well with Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru but had no great personal affection for Pakistan’s leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"&gt;9&lt;/a&gt; Believing that it had already received an unfair division of territory, soon after the end of British rule in the subcontinent, Pakistan backed an invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribesmen. Unable to defend his kingdom, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, sought India’s assistance, and on October 26, 1947, signed an Instrument of Accession,&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"&gt;10&lt;/a&gt; paving the way for Indian soldiers to come to his aid.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"&gt;11&lt;/a&gt; The first war between India and Pakistan had begun.&lt;br /&gt;The war ended in January 1949 with Indian and Pakistani military representatives defining a ceasefire line, freezing the positions held by the two armies. The contour of this line has changed slightly after later wars, but has remained more or less the de facto border between Pakistan and India in Kashmir and is called the Line of Control. The total area of Jammu and Kashmir is 101,387 sq. km., while Azad Kashmir contains about 78,387 sq. km. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"&gt;12&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In January 1948 India filed a complaint against Pakistan with the U.N. Security Council under the dispute mechanism of the United Nations Charter.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"&gt;13&lt;/a&gt; In retrospect this is ironic, as India now vehemently opposes any U.N. or other third-party involvement in working out a solution to the Kashmir dispute. In a series of resolutions in 1948-49, the Security Council called for a ceasefire; asked Pakistan to withdraw all forces, regular or irregular; and, in a third part that was not binding unless the first two had been implemented, said that the future status of the entire Kashmir state would be determined “through a free and impartial plebiscite.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"&gt;14&lt;/a&gt;  Both countries supported the provision in Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on April 21, 1948, which stated that in a fair plebiscite Kashmiris should only have the choice to accede to either India or Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"&gt;15&lt;/a&gt; The resolution did not include an option to vote for independence, an aspiration of many Kashmiris. India has never held the plebiscite described in Security Council Resolution 47. Nor has Pakistan withdrawn its troops from Kashmir as envisaged by this and the other resolutions of 1948-49.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"&gt;16&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Security Council also created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"&gt;17&lt;/a&gt; In January 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"&gt;18&lt;/a&gt; On March 30, 1951, following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council in Resolution 91 decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"&gt;19&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To defend its failure to hold a plebiscite, India points to Pakistan’s failure to withdraw troops from the area under its control and also cites the vote of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, elected in 1952 in polls held by India that, despite an overwhelming Muslim representation, voted in favor of confirming accession to India.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"&gt;20&lt;/a&gt; New Delhi also says that since Kashmiris have voted in successive national elections in India, there is no need for a plebiscite.&lt;br /&gt;India’s argument for the legitimacy of its claim to all of Jammu and Kashmir, including the portion administered by Pakistan, is based on the 1947 Instrument of Accession signed with Maharaja Hari Singh.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"&gt;21&lt;/a&gt; Similar instruments determined the distribution of all princely states in the 1947 partition; questioning the accession of Jammu and Kashmir would imply unraveling the constitutional and legal basis for the creation of India and Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"&gt;22&lt;/a&gt; Pakistan, however, has always questioned the legality of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India and pointed out that India agreed to the U.N. resolutions calling for self-determination after the Instrument of Accession had been signed. Pakistan believes that Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir will choose to be part of Pakistan and it will justify, once again, the ideological basis for the 1947 partition.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"&gt;23&lt;/a&gt; India, for that same reason, is unwilling to let go of Jammu and Kashmir, as a Muslim majority state is proof that India is a secular and liberal state.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"&gt;24&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;India and Pakistan fought another war over Jammu and Kashmir in 1965. Once again, infiltrators from Pakistan entered Jammu and Kashmir state, backed by the Pakistan army in what was called Operation Gibraltar. Initially, Indian troops were deployed only in Kashmir, but in September 1965 Indian forces opened another front in Punjab, advancing towards Lahore. The United States and United Kingdom, the primary suppliers of arms to the two countries, reacted by suspending military aid. After a meeting in Tashkent (in the then-Soviet Union) between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakisani President General Ayub Khan, peace was declared with both armies withdrawing to the 1949 ceasefire line.&lt;br /&gt;In 1971, a third war between the two countries led to the secession of East Pakistan and its independence as Bangladesh. This truncation of Pakistan further exacerbated the distrust between Pakistan and India.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"&gt;25&lt;/a&gt; Since India had helped in dividing Pakistan, it also became a priority for Islamabad to ensure unity in the country that remained through an anti-Indian Islamic ideology.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"&gt;26&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After the 1971 war, India and Pakistan signed a pact on July 2, 1972, commonly known as the Simla Agreement, which defined the Line of Control in Kashmir and committed both sides to future bilateral negotiations on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"&gt;27&lt;/a&gt; India then took the position that the mandate of the United Nations mission UNMOGIP had lapsed and said that Resolution 47 no longer applied because of changes in the original territory, with some parts “having been handed over to China by Pakistan and demographic changes having been effected in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"&gt;28&lt;/a&gt; UNMOGIP, however, continues to maintain its mandate and functions, but has failed to make any discernable progress in maintaining peace in the region.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"&gt;29&lt;/a&gt; Pakistan still formally insists on a plebiscite, as do some factions among the Kashmiri rebel groups. But recently, President Musharraf and some militant groups have said that they are willing to give up the demand for self-determination if India agrees to be flexible on demands for demilitarization and self-governance in Kashmir.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"&gt;30&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The neighbors came to the brink of war several times after the Simla treaty: in 1986 when India conducted Operation Brasstacks, massive military maneuvers near the Pakistani border; in 1990, when India first discovered the extent to which the Kashmir rebellion was being assisted by Pakistan and threatened retaliation; in 1999, when Pakistan seized territory in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kargil sector; and once again in 2002, when both countries deployed troops at the border after the Indian parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001, allegedly by Pakistani militants (the last two episodes are described in more detail below).&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"&gt;31&lt;/a&gt; In each case it was international diplomacy—particularly pressure from the United States—that dissuaded the rivals. But the heavy deployment of troops and the exchange of fire each time led to civilian deaths, injuries and displacement.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362277"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075953"&gt;Political history inside &lt;/a&gt;Jammu and Kashmir&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in India with its own constitution.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"&gt;32&lt;/a&gt; It was guaranteed autonomy in all regional affairs apart from foreign policy, defense and communications. However, this autonomy never materialized.&lt;br /&gt;Through the 1950s and 1960s, there was increasing political discontent with the central government’s attempts to manipulate politics in Jammu and Kashmir. Political leaders who demanded genuine autonomy and pro-plebiscite activists were repeatedly jailed. In 1964 the first militant group, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), was formed to fight for an independent state.&lt;br /&gt;In 1975, in a move that largely discredited him with pro-independence Kashmiris, Sheikh Abdullah, who had originally led popular dissent against Maharaja Hari Singh and later against political control by Delhi, signed an accord with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that promised greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"&gt;33&lt;/a&gt; Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference party, however, won an overwhelming victory in the 1977 state elections, which were considered to be free and fair.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"&gt;34&lt;/a&gt; Parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, which openly advocated allegiance to Pakistan, were virtually wiped out politically.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"&gt;35&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After Sheikh Abdullah’s death in 1982, his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah took over as chief minister. Once again, New Delhi interfered in Kashmiri politics. The ruling Congress party removed Farooq Abdullah in 1984, and then his successor, G.M. Shah, in March 1986, when for the first time the central government imposed governor’s rule––direct rule by New Delhi––in the state.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"&gt;36&lt;/a&gt; Governor Jagmohan took charge of the state administration until fresh elections could be held.&lt;br /&gt;In 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah signed a new political agreement establishing an electoral alliance. This only added to a sense of betrayal among Kashmirs, who were shocked at Farooq Abdullah’s compromise with the very Congress party that had pushed him out of power two years earlier.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"&gt;37&lt;/a&gt; Many Kashmiris had already turned against Farooq Abdullah because of allegations of widespread corruption and incompetence during his previous rule. After Farooq’s perceived sell-out to the Congress party, there seemed to be increasing support for a new opposition party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), a collection of Islamic and secessionist parties that included the Jamaat-e-Islami.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"&gt;38&lt;/a&gt; Many Kashmiri youth supported this coalition, which contested the March 1987 elections to the state assembly.&lt;br /&gt;The state elections of 1987 were the turning point in the history of Jammu and Kashmir. There were mass arrests of MUF candidates and party workers and widespread and credible allegations of vote-rigging.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"&gt;39&lt;/a&gt; Kashmiris became disillusioned with electoral politics and there was enormous resentment against the victorious National Conference-Congress coalition that claimed victory in the elections. Journalist Tavleen Singh writes in her well-regarded book, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors:&lt;br /&gt;The rigged election was the beginning of the end…. Nearly everyone I met said that most of the youths who had acted as election agents and workers for MUF candidates were now determined to fight for their rights differently. They had no choice but to pick up the gun, was the message I was given.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"&gt;40&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Many of those youths were supporters of the pro-independence JKLF.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"&gt;41&lt;/a&gt; Many other MUF workers joined their ranks.&lt;br /&gt;There were several demonstrations with protestors shouting anti-India slogans.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"&gt;42&lt;/a&gt; Militant groups successfully organized a boycott of the 1989 Indian parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, a militant campaign of violence began, with the JKLF claiming responsibility for a series of explosions in Kashmir, damaging government buildings and public transport. The JKLF openly admitted that it received arms and training in Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"&gt;43&lt;/a&gt; The law and order situation began to spiral out of control.&lt;br /&gt;On December 8, 1989, the JKLF abducted Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the new home minister in the Indian government, a Kashmiri named Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (later to be chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir—see below).&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"&gt;44&lt;/a&gt; She was freed when the government complied with ransom demands and released five detained members of the JKLF. National attention was suddenly focused on Kashmir. In Kashmir the public mood had initially changed: most Kashmiris did not support the kidnapping of a young, unmarried woman. But when the released militants were brought to Srinagar, jubilant crowds celebrated in the streets. Support for the militants soared, with many Kashmiris treating the release of the five as a victory against New Delhi.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"&gt;45&lt;/a&gt; Taken aback, the Indian government dispatched more troops to the state.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"&gt;46&lt;/a&gt; In January 1990, Jagmohan, already unpopular because he was seen as party to New Delhi’s dismissal of an earlier elected government, was once again appointed governor.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"&gt;47&lt;/a&gt; Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah resigned in protest. Governor’s rule was imposed, putting New Delhi into direct confrontation with the Kashmiri rebels.&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir by then had fallen into near civil war. There were daily protests as tens of thousands marched on the streets, calling for independence. The militant groups, with arms and training from Pakistan, continued their attacks, murdering and threatening Hindu residents, carrying out kidnappings and assassinations of government officials and suspected informers, and engaging in sabotage and bombings. Hundreds of thousands of Hindu Kashmiris, known as “pandits,” fled the valley. Militant groups that espoused an extremist Islamist ideology issued threats to shopkeepers and others engaged in business that they considered un-Islamic, including liquor dealers and cinema hall owners.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"&gt;48&lt;/a&gt; In a book called My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Jagmohan claims that law and order had collapsed when he took charge in 1990, with the valley “stricken with violence, bloodshed and brutality.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"&gt;49&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Unwilling to acknowledge or appease disenchanted Kashmiris, the Indian government termed the rebellion as Pakistan’s “proxy war” with India.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"&gt;50&lt;/a&gt; Indian security agencies responded with unprecedented brutality to quell the rebellion. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"&gt;51&lt;/a&gt; Counter-insurgency laws such as the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act and the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act were enacted in 1990, giving security agencies draconian powers of detention and interrogation. Since it was virtually impossible to identify the militants, who had local support, civilians were subjected to terrible abuses by state security forces. The Indian army and other state forces carried out large numbers of summary executions, custodial killings, torture, “disappearances,” and arbitrary detentions.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"&gt;52&lt;/a&gt; Security operations included regular warrantless searches, usually in the middle of the night, and after grenade and sniper attacks by militants upon security posts, security guards would storm the neighborhood nearby, setting fire to buildings, and randomly beating up residents. Writes journalist Humra Quaraishi: “Through those months, journalists, both Indian and foreign, reported on havoc Jagmohan’s policies were wreaking on the lives of ordinary Kashmiris. Going back to those reports, the year 1990 seems to me the year of the written forewarnings that were never heeded.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"&gt;53&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Peaceful demonstrations were dispersed by indiscriminate firing by the security forces. In this report, we describe three such incidents, in January 1990 in Srinagar, in October 1990 also in Srinagar, and in 1993 in Beijbehara.&lt;br /&gt;Many former militants say that they joined the armed groups because they were furious at the violations and wanted revenge.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"&gt;54&lt;/a&gt; The basis of the armed conflict gradually changed from a secular demand for independence to a war grounded in Islamic terms. The pro-independence JKLF became weaker and was gradually replaced by the religious extremist Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, which promoted accession to Pakistan. Several JKLF members and supporters were killed, allegedly by militants belonging to the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin.&lt;br /&gt;Jagmohan’s administration came under increasing criticism, and eventually, five months after his re-appointment, Jagmohan was recalled and a new governor appointed.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55"&gt;55&lt;/a&gt; Jagmohan has refused to acknowledge that human rights violations took place under his watch, insisting that the “militants and propaganda outfits, and the rumor mill, which had always worked overtime in Kashmir, were soon busy churning out stories of excesses, of atrocities, of hundreds of persons being killed.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56"&gt;56&lt;/a&gt; But he adds, “Sitting in your office, you cannot really say with precision whether the force used was excessive.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57"&gt;57&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Meanwhile, after a series of collapsed coalition governments in New Delhi, the Congress party came to power again in 1991, led by P.V. Narasimha Rao. But despite the change in governments, the policy towards Jammu and Kashmir remained the same. While there were some efforts at talks with the separatists, troops continued to act with brutality.&lt;br /&gt;In mid-1992 the government launched a “catch-and-kill’ policy to execute captured militants.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58"&gt;58&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch reported in 1993:&lt;br /&gt;In August 1992, Indian government forces launched a new offensive against the militants, called Operation Tiger, a campaign of surprise raids designed to capture and kill suspected militants and terrorize civilian sympathizers. Summary executions of detainees and indiscriminate attacks on civilians escalated during the operation, and during the one that followed, called Operation Shiva. Over the next several months, the security forces also engaged in frequent arson attacks, burning houses, shops and entire neighborhoods.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59"&gt;59&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;India offered to negotiate with militant groups, but often claimed that there were no Kashmiri representatives with whom they could hold talks.&lt;br /&gt;In response, on March 9, 1993, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of over twenty groups, some demanding independence and others accession to Pakistan, was founded to act as the political voice of the movement.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60"&gt;60&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By the mid-1990s, Indian forces had gained the upper hand in the major towns and villages of the Kashmir valley. But the nature of the conflict had changed. While in the early years of the conflict the militants were usually from the Kashmir valley, by 1996 the Kashmiri component of the battle for secession had largely been subdued. Amnesty offers had encouraged many to surrender. Others had been killed or detained. Many dropped out of combat but stayed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;By the mid-1990s, the battle for Kashmir was taken up largely by foreign fighters drawn from the waning Afghan war.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61"&gt;61&lt;/a&gt; The groups they belonged to represented a dangerous development in the conflict as they had no accountability to the local populations. They operated openly out of Pakistan, often with the support of the Pakistan army and intelligence services, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Pakistan's powerful military intelligence service.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62"&gt;62&lt;/a&gt; Young Pakistanis responded to the appeal for religious war in Kashmir. After a few months of training, they were sent into Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani army helped arrange the infiltration of the militants across the Line of Control.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63"&gt;63&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These organizations seldom claim responsibility for any attacks, and often change their names, particularly after they have been banned. Some, like the Harkat-ul Ansar,&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64"&gt;64&lt;/a&gt; Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, Al Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba have, over the years, been blamed for several attacks in which civilians were executed. The Harkat-ul Ansar, for instance, calling itself Al Faran, kidnapped six Western tourists in July 1995. One, a Norwegian, was beheaded. There is still no news of the others, who were British and U.S. citizens.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65"&gt;65&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Indian government responded to the influx of foreign fighters into Jammu and Kashmir by expanding the army’s role in the conflict.  By 1993 the government had introduced the Rashtriya Rifles, an elite unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;In 1999, militants and Pakistani troops infiltrated into Indian territory, occupying areas in the Himalayas in the Kargil and Drass sectors of Jammu and Kashmir. India responded with force. The U.S. administration of President Bill Clinton, fearing an all-out war between the now nuclear-armed neighbors, stepped in to defuse the situation, getting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw the intruders.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66"&gt;66&lt;/a&gt; Soon after, Nawaz Sharif was deposed by his army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in a bloodless coup. India-Pakistan relations fell to an all-time low as violence peaked in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67"&gt;67&lt;/a&gt; In December 1999, militants hijacked an Indian plane to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and secured the release of three Pakistani militant leaders as ransom.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68"&gt;68&lt;/a&gt; In December 2001, an attempted attack on the Indian parliament was foiled by security forces; six policemen and a gardener were killed in the exchange of fire, as were the five militants. Over twenty others, including some journalists, were injured.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69"&gt;69&lt;/a&gt; India accused Islamabad of organizing the attack.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70"&gt;70&lt;/a&gt; India began to deploy troops to the border, as did Pakistan. As both sides began to threaten nuclear conflict, the international community stepped in once again to pull both sides back from the brink.&lt;br /&gt;After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan was successfully pressured by its main international supporter, the United States, to withdraw overt support to groups that were active in Afghanistan and Kashmir to demonstrate its commitment to the “war on terror.” Militant infiltration decreased noticeably. According to Indian government reports, while 3,500 militants are believed to have crossed into Jammu and Kashmir in 2001, the number dipped to 237 in 2005.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71"&gt;71&lt;/a&gt; A slowing down of the peace process in 2006, however, has coincided with a gradual increase in attacks by militants, which the army blamed on increased infiltration.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72"&gt;72&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the Indian army, which does not necessarily provide reliable statistics, the proportion of foreigners among those killed had steadily increased until 2003—when it was reportedly as high as 70 percent—reflecting that the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir was being run primarily by Pakistan-based groups, but then began to drop.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73"&gt;73&lt;/a&gt; The army said that in 2004 only 374 of the 976 militants killed, or 38 percent, were foreigners.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74"&gt;74&lt;/a&gt; In 2005, the number of militants killed had dropped to 178; fifty-nine of them were reportedly foreigners.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75"&gt;75&lt;/a&gt; While these numbers have been disputed because the armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir have frequently killed civilians and later claimed they were foreign militants, they still likely reflect the trend of decreasing infiltration by non-Kashmiri fighters, as India has little incentive to under-report infiltration from Pakistan.&lt;br /&gt;Recent developments&lt;br /&gt;In 2002, India surprised most observers by holding the most credible elections in Jammu and Kashmir in many years, which militants tried to disrupt by threatening and killing several voters and candidates. Kashmiri nationalists and separatist groups, however, refused to participate, since the elections were held under Indian supervision. Their lack of participation, they argue, means that the election cannot be considered to be representative of the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;A coalition government led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) replaced the Farooq Abdullah government of the National Conference. While in opposition, the PDP had campaigned vigorously against rampant state human rights violations, and the new state government under Sayeed took initial steps to respond to charges of human rights violations. In March 2003, it opened investigations into alleged “disappearances” and deaths in custody reported after it took office.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn76" name="_ftnref76"&gt;76&lt;/a&gt; It also set up a cabinet committee to examine charges of tampering with evidence in an earlier case. In November 2005, according to the coalition agreement, Ghulam Nabi Azad of the Congress party replaced Sayeed as chief minister. A day after his appointment, the new chief minister once again called for an end to human rights violations and said that custodial killings (summary executions of detainees) would not be tolerated.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn77" name="_ftnref77"&gt;77&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In November 2003, India and Pakistan announced a ceasefire at the Line of Control, ending almost a decade of relentless exchange of fire.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn78" name="_ftnref78"&gt;78&lt;/a&gt; India’s then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee began peace talks with Pakistani president Musharraf of Pakistan. General elections in India in 2004 saw a change in government, with a Congress-led coalition coming to power. The new prime minister, Manmohan Singh, has held several meetings with General Musharraf. Both say they are committed to the peace process. The process has led to dialogue between Kashmiri separatist political representatives and the Indian government. Kashmiri leaders have also traveled to Pakistan for dialogue with Pakistan.&lt;br /&gt;However, it is still a fragile process that is easily stalled because of deep distrust accompanied by intransigence by both parties. India insists that Pakistan should close down militant training camps and put an end to militants’ infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan says that the camps have been shut down. However, it allowed militant groups to openly undertake relief work after the October 2005 earthquake, leading to fears of further militancy in the future.&lt;br /&gt;After the earthquake, centered in Pakistan-administered Kashmir but also causing substantial damage in Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan opened up five points on the Line of Control to deliver relief materials to the worst-affected Pakistan-held areas. Opened several weeks after the earthquake, and only under considerable Kashmiri and international pressure, the efficacy of these relief points remains unclear. However, the delay is explained by the concerns of Indian security officials about the revival of the militant groups who took over relief operations in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and fears that donations for relief might be used instead to recruit and train more militants.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn79" name="_ftnref79"&gt;79&lt;/a&gt; In Azad Kashmir, militant groups were the first on the scene dispensing relief goods and aid. These groups won much local appreciation for their rescue and relief efforts. This could not have been possible without logistical support from sections of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. Seen in this context, the post-earthquake role of militant organizations actually underlines the continuity of the Pakistani military-militant relationship rather than an unexpected revival of militant fortunes in the aftermath of natural disaster. Very possibly, the Pakistani military sees the earthquake as an opportunity to craft a new role for the militant groups rather than attempting to disband them.&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir state remains a heavily militarized and armed area: according to the International Center for Peace Initiatives, there are about five hundred thousand army and paramilitary personnel deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and some seventy-nine thousand police.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftn80" name="_ftnref80"&gt;80&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075954"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362278"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"&gt;1&lt;/a&gt; The Planning Commission of India, Jammu and Kashmir Development Report, District-wise Population of Jammu and Kashmir, Chapter II, September 2003 [online]  http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_jandk/sdr_jandk.htm (retrieved April 4, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; BBC News, India/Pakistan government census, [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/Kashmir_future/html/default.stm (retrieved January 9, 2006). (The portion of Kashmir administered by Pakistan is 99 percent Sunni.)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"&gt;3&lt;/a&gt;Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"&gt;4&lt;/a&gt; “Valley’s Tourist Graph on High,” The Indian Express, January 9, 2006, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2006/kashmir20060109d.html"&gt;http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2006/kashmir20060109d.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved February 5, 2006). Shujaat Bukhari, “Protest Against Attacks on Tourists,” The Hindu, July 15, 2006, [online] http://www.thehindu.com/2006/07/15/stories/2006071505511500.htm (retrieved July 29, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"&gt;5&lt;/a&gt; International Center for Peace Initiatives, “Costs of Conflict Between India and Pakistan, Costs for Jammu and Kashmir”, July 2004, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;Ibid. p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"&gt;7&lt;/a&gt; Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Country Studies, India, 2003-2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm"&gt;http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"&gt;8&lt;/a&gt; M.J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003), pp. 94-102.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"&gt;9&lt;/a&gt; Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (UK: Roxford Books, 1991), p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"&gt;10&lt;/a&gt; Instrument of Accession, 1947, [online] &lt;a href="http://mha.nic.in/accdoc.htm"&gt;http://mha.nic.in/accdoc.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"&gt;11&lt;/a&gt; The Maharajah, however, insisted on a special deal under which Kashmir would have its own constitution. Under Clause 7 of the Instrument of Accession, Kashmir retained a measure of autonomy. It stated that, “Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India.” As a result of Kashmir’s conditional accession, Article 370 was incorporated into the Indian Constitution which provided inter alia: “Only Article 1 of the Constitution of India, which defines the territories of India, and Article 370 itself apply to Kashmir ipso facto. All other articles …may be extended to Kashmir… only in ‘consultation’ with the state government if it pertains to matters regarding legislative power of Parliament, and with the ‘concurrence’ of the state government if it pertains to other matters.” Text of Article 370, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/jk_art370.html"&gt;http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/jk_art370.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"&gt;12&lt;/a&gt; Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Country Studies, India, 2003-2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm"&gt;http://countrystudies.us/india/123.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005). China controls another 42,685 sq. km.  In 1963 Pakistan handed over around 5,000 sq km. area in the Shaksgam Valley to China. Although the transfer was subject to a settlement on the Kashmir issue between the two claimants, China has already built a military highway on this territory and is unlikely to vacate it.  Rahul Bedi, "After failing to talk through their differences, India and Pakistan resume the shelling in Kashmir," Janes.com, July 23, 2001, [online] http://www.janes.com/regional_news/asia_pacific/news/misc/janes010723_1_n.shtml (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"&gt;13&lt;/a&gt; Text of India’s complaint to the Security Council, January 1, 1948, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/jkindiacomplaintun.html"&gt;http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/jkindiacomplaintun.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).  Article 35 of the U.N. Charter states in part: “Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 [situations ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’], to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"&gt;14&lt;/a&gt; India and Pakistan, United Nations Documents, Security Council Resolution 47 (1948), S/726, April 21, 1948, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/docs.html"&gt;http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/docs.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved December 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"&gt;15&lt;/a&gt; Security Council Resolution 47 says that:  “The Security Council, … Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite… Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India and Pakistan.”  [online]  http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/sc21apr48.htm (retrieved January 9, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"&gt;16&lt;/a&gt; Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass &amp; Co, 2003), pp. 2-3.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"&gt;17&lt;/a&gt; United Nations Peacekeeping, “India-Pakistan Background,” [online] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unipombackgr.html (retrieved January 9, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"&gt;18&lt;/a&gt;  United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html"&gt;http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 1, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"&gt;19&lt;/a&gt; Security Council Resolution 91, S/2017, India Pakistan Question, March 30, 1951, [online] &lt;a href="http://daccessdds.un.org/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/072/IMG/NR0007210.pdf"&gt;http://daccessdds.un.org/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/072/IMG/NR0007210.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"&gt;20&lt;/a&gt; In Security Council Resolution 122, January 24, 1957, the United Nations Security Council rejected this argument. The various Security Council resolutions on Kashmir are available online at &lt;a href="http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/"&gt;http://www.kashmiri-cc.ca/un/&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"&gt;21&lt;/a&gt; It is worth noting that when the Muslim rulers of the Hindu-majority Gujrati states of Junagadh and Manavadar signed instruments of accession to Pakistan, they were overruled by the Indian government, which seized the states on the grounds of geographical contiguousness and religious majority. In Hyderabad, which had a Muslim ruler and a Hindu majority, India argued that the right of self-determination was paramount when the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to declare independence for his state. Hyderabad was forced into the Indian Union through “police action” in 1948.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"&gt;22&lt;/a&gt; J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak Relations, 1970-1994 (Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1995), p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"&gt;23&lt;/a&gt; Apart from religion, Pakistani scholars also explain that Jammu and Kashmir is vital to the country’s economy because it is the source of most rivers flowing into Pakistan. Among the various disputes related to Kashmir between India and Pakistan is the construction of dams in Jammu and Kashmir, which will allow India control over Pakistan’s irrigation and water sources.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"&gt;24&lt;/a&gt;Wajahat Habibullah, “The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict: Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy,” Special Report 121, United States Institute of Peace, June 2004, [online] &lt;a href="http://www/usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr121.html"&gt;http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr121.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 18, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"&gt;25&lt;/a&gt; Not only did Pakistan end up losing half of its territory, but its military was routed, leaving some ninety thousand prisoners of war—a reason, many Indians believe, why the Pakistani military is strongly opposed to India. See “India Pakistan Troubled Relations, 1971 War,” BBC News, [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1971.stm (retrieved April 12, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"&gt;26&lt;/a&gt; Hussan Haqqani, “Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, pp. 43-45.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"&gt;27&lt;/a&gt; Under the agreement, both countries agreed to resolve their differences over Jammu and Kashmir bilaterally and “by peaceful means.” The full text of the Simla Agreement is available online at  &lt;a href="http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/hist_persp/simla_agreement_text.shtml"&gt;http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/hist_persp/simla_agreement_text.shtml&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 1, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"&gt;28&lt;/a&gt; Embassy of India, Washington D.C., “A Comprehensive Note on Jammu &amp; Kashmir,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/Kashmir_MEA/UN.html"&gt;http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/Kashmir_MEA/UN.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 20, 2005). India believes that a number of non-Kashmiris have moved into the region, which will make a fair plebiscite impossible.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"&gt;29&lt;/a&gt; Before the Simla Agreement had been signed, Pakistan had repeatedly raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations. By the 1960s, however, India had developed close ties with the Soviet Union, which vetoed any Security Council resolutions reminding India of its commitments to the United Nations on Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"&gt;30&lt;/a&gt; “Pak Militant Groups Say UN Resolutions on Kashmir Not Viable,” Press Trust of India, January 14, 2006, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/14pak1.html"&gt;http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/14pak1.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved February 7, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"&gt;31&lt;/a&gt; Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (University of Washington Press, 2005), [online excerpts] &lt;a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/02spec1.htm"&gt;http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/jun/02spec1.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"&gt;32&lt;/a&gt; Legislation adopted by the Indian parliament does not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which must adopt those laws through its own legislature. The state has many separate laws, such its penal code, called the Ranbir Penal Code.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"&gt;33&lt;/a&gt; Often called the “Lion of Kashmir,” Sheikh Abdullah had been a prominent leader of India’s independence movement in Kashmir. In 1931, he founded the Muslim Conference, later renamed the National Conference. In May 1946, Maharaja Hari Singh jailed Sheikh Abdullah for dissent. Sheikh Abdullah was released after the Instrument of Accession was signed, and was made prime minister of the state’s interim government. Sheikh Abdullah’s insistence on autonomy soon led to disagreements with New Delhi and he was put under detention on August 9, 1953. The National Conference remains one of the largest political parties in Jammu and Kashmir and has won several elections. In recent years, National Conference party workers and leaders have come under increasing attacks by militants.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"&gt;34&lt;/a&gt;Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"&gt;35&lt;/a&gt;Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 192.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"&gt;36&lt;/a&gt; President’s rule, or in the case of Jammu and Kashmir state, governor’s rule, is provided for under Article 356 of the constitution. Under this article, the central government is empowered to dismiss a state legislature if the governor, a federal appointee, advises that “governance of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.” Under the Jammu and Kashmir constitution, governor’s rule may be imposed for six months, after which president’s rule, which permits New Delhi to suspend state government and rule directly, may be enacted for six-month periods. Constitution of India, [online] http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html (retrieved April 16, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"&gt;37&lt;/a&gt; Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"&gt;38&lt;/a&gt; Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"&gt;39&lt;/a&gt; Balraj Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited,1993), p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"&gt;40&lt;/a&gt; Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 103.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"&gt;41&lt;/a&gt; Formed in 1964, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front was the first Kashmiri militant group formed to fight for independence. Initially known as the Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front, it was renamed in 1971. The group opened offices in several countries including Pakistan, the United States and United Kingdom. In February 1984, the group was accused of kidnapping and murdering an Indian diplomat in the U.K. Its leader, Amanullah Khan, was deported to Pakistan in 1986. A unit of the JKLF was set up in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"&gt;42&lt;/a&gt; Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"&gt;43&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia) and Physicians for Human Rights, A Pattern of Impunity (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 21. Zulfiqar Ali, ‘’Pakistan Trained Us’, Rebel Says,” BBC News, June 16, 2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4099740.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4099740.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 29, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"&gt;44&lt;/a&gt; Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir in November 2002.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"&gt;45&lt;/a&gt; Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 120.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"&gt;46&lt;/a&gt; “Excess Will Continue As Long As Militancy Exists,” Rediff.com, December 16, 1999, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/16blood1.htm"&gt;http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/16blood1.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"&gt;47&lt;/a&gt; Although initially with the Congress party, Jagmohan eventually became a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party and was a cabinet minister from 1998 to 2004 in the BJP-led coalition government. Jagmohan’s appointment as governor in 1990 by the V.P. Singh government which was supported by the BJP was opposed by the Congress Party, the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other opposition political groups.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"&gt;48&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), Kashmir Under Siege (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"&gt;49&lt;/a&gt; Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1991), p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"&gt;50&lt;/a&gt; The Indian government has consistently blamed Pakistan for planning, training and arming the insurgency in Kashmir. Militants, both Kashmiris and Pakistani citizens fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, have never denied that they receive arms and training from Pakistan. When the violence first began, Indian officials chose only to focus on the Pakistani influence. Governor Jagmohan, in his book My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, describes at length Pakistan’s Operation Topac, which was conceived by then president, General Zia-ul-Haq. The basic objective of Operation Topac was to make Kashmir part of Pakistan. The first phase of this operation, Jagmohan quotes General Zia-ul Haq as saying, would be: “A low level insurgency against the regime…. We whip up anti-Indian feelings amongst the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issues…. Organize and train subversive elements and armed groups with capabilities, initially to deal with paramilitary forces located in the Valley.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"&gt;51&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"&gt;52&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch has regularly reported the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir. See Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege; Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity; Human Rights Watch, “India’s Secret Army in Kashmir: New Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 8, No. 4 (C), May 1996, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1996/"&gt;http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1996/&lt;/a&gt;; and “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue,” A Human Rights Watch Report, July 1999, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/"&gt;http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kashmir/&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"&gt;53&lt;/a&gt;Humra Quraishi, Kashmir: The Untold Story (Penguin Books India, 2004), p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"&gt;54&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. pp. 56-59. Quraishi also cites newspaper editorials written at that time. For instance, The Hindustan Times on April 28, 1990, said that “the ‘tough’ policies adopted by Jammu and Kashmir governor Jagmohan has not only proved counterproductive but has further alienated the people of Kashmir… [who] have been virtually driven to the terrorists’ fold due to hatred generated by the repressive measures of the state administration.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55"&gt;55&lt;/a&gt; See The Origins of Impunity: Failure of Accountability in Jammu and Kashmir Since the Start of the Conflict, Death of Maulvi Farooq, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56"&gt;56&lt;/a&gt; Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, p. 18&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57"&gt;57&lt;/a&gt;Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58"&gt;58&lt;/a&gt; “India’s Secret Army in Kashmir,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 8, No. 4(C), Chapter III, [online] http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1996/India-05.htm (retrieved April 2, 2003).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59"&gt;59&lt;/a&gt;  Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60"&gt;60&lt;/a&gt; Global Security.org, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference [online] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/aphc.htm (retrieved January 9, 2006). The All-Parties Hurriyat Conference has since split. While some leaders have broken away, others have formed a separate faction of the APHC. However, the faction led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq is still regarded as the most powerful of the Kashmiri separatist political voices.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61"&gt;61&lt;/a&gt; Praveen Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, p. 55.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62"&gt;62&lt;/a&gt; In The Lost Rebellion, author Manoj Joshi writes: “Over the years, Indian intelligence has identified some five brigadiers and eleven colonels working out of the ISI headquarters in operations connected to India. In addition, there are have been nine officers involved in training militants, and another twenty field officers in Muzaffarabad and other points of infiltration. In the field, the ISI also maintains an extensive presence of camp instructors, launch specialists and counter-intelligence agents.” Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 20-21.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63"&gt;63&lt;/a&gt;Ghulam Hasnain, “Inside Jihad,” Time Magazine, February 5, 2001, Vol. 157 No. 5, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2001/0205_kashmirsb1.html"&gt;http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2001/0205_kashmirsb1.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64"&gt;64&lt;/a&gt; The Harkat-ul Ansar was listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in October 1997. The group changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and continued to operate out of Pakistan. Later the group split into Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. A number of groups were listed as terrorist organizations by Washington and Islamabad after Sep. 11, 2001, but continue operations under new names. See the 2006 Human Rights Watch report on abuses in Pakistan-administered Kashmir for details: “’With Friends Like These…‘: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir,” A Human Rights Watch Report, publication pending.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65"&gt;65&lt;/a&gt; K. Santhanam et al, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66"&gt;66&lt;/a&gt; Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for Resolution,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67"&gt;67&lt;/a&gt; Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Nuclear Flashpoint: Quest for Safety,” South Asian Journal, August-September 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.southasiamedia.net/Magazine/Journal/nuclearflashpoint.htm"&gt;http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/nuclearflashpoint.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 21, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68"&gt;68&lt;/a&gt;“Indian Hijack Drama Over,” BBC News, December 31, 1999, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/584729.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/584729.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69"&gt;69&lt;/a&gt;“Indian Parliament Attack Kills 12,” BBC News, December 13, 2001, [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/south_asia/1707865.stm (retrieved April 4, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70"&gt;70&lt;/a&gt; “India Recalls Parliament Attack,” BBC News, December 13, 2002, [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2572091.stm (retrieved April 4, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71"&gt;71&lt;/a&gt; Rajnish Sharma, “Tourists Throng J&amp;K As Terror Dips,” The Hindustan Times, March 16, 2006, p. 8.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72"&gt;72&lt;/a&gt; “Increase in Infiltration Across LOC: Army,” Press Trust of India, July 27, 2006 [online] http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1754237,0006.htm (retrieved July 29, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73"&gt;73&lt;/a&gt; “Terrorists Killed in J&amp;amp;K Up To August 17, 2005,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/statistical_facts/ft_actual_data.shtml"&gt;http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/statistical_facts/ft_actual_data.shtml&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74"&gt;74&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75"&gt;75&lt;/a&gt; “Army in Kashmir, Terrorists killed in J&amp;K up to July 12, 2005,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/statistical_facts/ft_actual_data.shtml"&gt;http://www.armyinkashmir.org/v2/statistical_facts/ft_actual_data.shtml&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref76" name="_ftn76"&gt;76&lt;/a&gt; U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India, 2004 [online] &lt;a href="http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41740.htm"&gt;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41740.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref77" name="_ftn77"&gt;77&lt;/a&gt; “Abjure Human Rights Violations, Azad Tells Forces,” Press Trust of India, November 4, 2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/nov/04azad.htm"&gt;http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/nov/04azad.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved February 7, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref78" name="_ftn78"&gt;78&lt;/a&gt; Khursheed Wani, “Shell Shocked Kashmir Welcomes India-Pakistan Ceasefire,” OneWorld South Asia, November 26, 2003, &lt;a href="http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/73659/1/95"&gt;http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/73659/1/95&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved October 8, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref79" name="_ftn79"&gt;79&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/3.htm#_ftnref80" name="_ftn80"&gt;80&lt;/a&gt; International Center for Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” p. 74.&lt;br /&gt;III. Legal Causes of Abuses and Impunity&lt;br /&gt;Several Kashmiris interviewed for this report said that while they understand that there is an ongoing conflict that can result in deaths and injuries, what they find particularly unbearable is the lack of accountability. Many Kashmiris who had been illegally detained or tortured, or those who suspect their relatives were victims of extrajudicial executions by troops, said they would not lodge complaints as that would only lead to harassment and would not result in justice because the government was unwilling to act against its troops.&lt;br /&gt;This is because of the lack of commitment from India’s political and security force leaders to hold officials and troops accountable, and a series of Indian laws that make it difficult or impossible to prosecute abusers in the employ of the state. This has led to a serious climate of impunity in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;Impunity occurs when perpetrators of human rights violations are not held accountable by the state for their actions.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn81" name="_ftnref81"&gt;81&lt;/a&gt; Impunity can be divided into two types. De facto impunity takes place when the state fails to prosecute for lack of capacity or will, often for political reasons, such as state support for the abuses or to protect high-ranking officials or state institutions.  De facto impunity has been rampant in Jammu and Kashmir state, where in even well-documented abuse cases there is no political will to prosecute. The second kind of impunity is de jure impunity, in which laws or regulations providing immunity or amnesty make it difficult or impossible to prosecute a perpetrator for human rights abuses. India has several such provisions in its laws, aimed at shielding its military personnel and civilian officials from legal accountability. Such laws are contrary to the right to a remedy and reparation for gross violations of international human rights law.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn82" name="_ftnref82"&gt;82&lt;/a&gt;  Both forms of impunity lead to more human rights violations and undermine faith in the government and security forces; de jure impunity sends a particularly negative signal to victims about state indifference and complicity in their suffering. This section sets out the various immunity provisions in Indian law that foster impunity, as well as laws that facilitate the excessive use of force.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362279"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075955"&gt;Preventing arrest: Section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;While the special status of Jammu and Kashmir State under the Indian constitution means that it has a separate criminal code called the Ranvir Penal Code, army and paramilitary forces deployed in the state by the federal government are protected by the immunity provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 that apply to the rest of India.&lt;br /&gt;Section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code protects any member of the armed forces from arrest by civilian authorities for&lt;br /&gt;anything done or purported to be done by him in the discharge of his official duties except after obtaining the consent of the Central government.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn83" name="_ftnref83"&gt;83&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362280"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075956"&gt;Preventing prosecution: Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Section 197(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is a sweeping immunity provision that applies throughout India. It makes it mandatory for a civilian prosecutor to obtain permission from the federal government to initiate criminal proceedings against public servants, including the armed forces. The Indian government argues that this provision was intended to prevent frivolous lawsuits against government employees. Yet it has been used to shield human rights abusers from accountability in the courts, thereby degrading the right to the equal protection of the law and the right to an effective remedy.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn84" name="_ftnref84"&gt;84&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Section 197(2) has been used to block the trial in civilian courts of members of the armed forces alleged to be responsible for human rights abuses. It provides that:&lt;br /&gt;No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central government.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn85" name="_ftnref85"&gt;85&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Permission is seldom granted even when an investigation by local law enforcement officials has strong evidence that a member of the security forces is responsible for a human rights violation. In Kashmir, Mian Abdul Qayoom, president of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, told Human Rights Watch that he estimated there to have been at least 150 cases since 1990 where the state government requested permission to prosecute members of the army or paramilitary forces for alleged human rights abuse but was refused or there was no response from the central government.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn86" name="_ftnref86"&gt;86&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International said in 2005 that the Jammu and Kashmir government had made almost three hundred requests for permission to prosecute, but none were granted.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn87" name="_ftnref87"&gt;87&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Human Rights Watch has obtained a copy of a standard letter issued by the government of India in response to requests for launching prosecutions against suspected perpetrators in federal armed forces, which merely states that “after due consideration of the facts and the circumstances of the case,” the government has “decided not to grant the sanction to prosecute.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn88" name="_ftnref88"&gt;88&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In addition to facilitating impunity, laws in force in Jammu and Kashmir encourage the security forces to use excessive lethal force in dealing with law and order problems, to commit arbitrary arrests, and to detain suspected militants in violation of the right to a fair trial.   These laws on their face are contrary to international policing standards, particularly the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn89" name="_ftnref89"&gt;89&lt;/a&gt;  and violate the due process provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn90" name="_ftnref90"&gt;90&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362281"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075957"&gt;The &lt;/a&gt;Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act&lt;br /&gt;On July 5, 1990, the Jammu and Kashmir state government promulgated the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act. At the time, Jammu and Kashmir was under governor’s rule, so this act was the responsibility of the central government.&lt;br /&gt;Under this act twelve districts of the state are deemed “disturbed.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn91" name="_ftnref91"&gt;91&lt;/a&gt; In these areas, in sweeping language, the act empowers security forces personnel to use lethal force “against any person indulging in any act which may result in serious breach of public order, acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force, or the carrying of weapons.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn92" name="_ftnref92"&gt;92&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act is linked to the Disturbed Areas Act. Also promulgated in 1990, it authorizes the state government, governor, or central government to declare the whole or part of the state to be a “disturbed area” if it is determined to be in such a “disturbed and dangerous condition” that “the use of the armed forces in aid of the civil power” is necessary to prevent secessionist or terrorist acts.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn93" name="_ftnref93"&gt;93&lt;/a&gt; The act empowers officers, including non-commissioned officers, to:&lt;br /&gt;[I]f he is of the opinion so to do for the maintenance of public order, giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable as being used as weapons or of firearms, ammunition or explosive substances[.]&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn94" name="_ftnref94"&gt;94&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Under Section 4(c) the armed forces are also empowered to “arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect the arrest.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn95" name="_ftnref95"&gt;95&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Both the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act provide immunity to those exercising powers under the acts. In identical language, both state that:&lt;br /&gt;No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted, except with previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn96" name="_ftnref96"&gt;96&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The immunity provisions in the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act are used most often in Kashmir to prevent civilian prosecutors from prosecuting soldiers. When the state government asks the federal government for permission to prosecute those found responsible after police or magisterial inquiries, that permission is seldom granted.&lt;br /&gt;These laws are based on the national “Armed Forces Special Powers Act,” which similarly provides immunity for soldiers.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn97" name="_ftnref97"&gt;97&lt;/a&gt; The AFSPA has its roots in British colonial legislation dating back to the 19th century and is based on a 1942 colonial ordinance intended to suppress the Indian independence movement.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn98" name="_ftnref98"&gt;98&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Under Indian law, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a “dangerous or disturbed condition.” Instead, this depends on the decision of government officials and is not subject to judicial review.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn99" name="_ftnref99"&gt;99&lt;/a&gt; The extraordinary powers provided under these acts have led to a number of deaths in Jammu and Kashmir. In some cases cited in this report, troops have opened fire on civilians without warning, resulting in deaths and serious injury. No legal action has followed.&lt;br /&gt;In November 2004, following protests in Manipur after the extrajudicial execution of a woman by security forces, the central government set up a five-member committee to review the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Several domestic and international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, had previously called for a review of the Act.&lt;br /&gt;The review committee submitted its report to the Home Ministry on June 6, 2005.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn100" name="_ftnref100"&gt;100&lt;/a&gt; While the report has still not been made public, some journalists reported that the committee recommended that the Act be repealed with some provisions incorporated into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn101" name="_ftnref101"&gt;101&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362282"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075958"&gt;The &lt;/a&gt;Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978&lt;br /&gt;The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA), enacted in 1978 and amended in 1987 and 1990, also allows for immunity from prosecution, stating that:&lt;br /&gt;No suit, prosecution or any other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of the provisions of this Act.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn102" name="_ftnref102"&gt;102&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The PSA is an overly broad and vague preventive detention law that allows the government to keep an individual in detention without trial for up to two years to prevent them from “acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state or the maintenance of public order.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn103" name="_ftnref103"&gt;103&lt;/a&gt;  The PSA is discussed in detail below in Section V, on arbitrary detention. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362283"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075959"&gt;Legal weaknesses in the Human Rights Protection Act&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 1993, responding to increasing criticism of human rights violations committed by its security forces, the Indian government established the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) through the Human Rights Protection Act (HRPA).&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn104" name="_ftnref104"&gt;104&lt;/a&gt; While a major step forward, human rights activists and the NHRC itself say that there are several restrictions in the law that prevent the commission from performing a meaningful role in addressing impunity. The National Human Rights Commission has repeatedly said that certain provisions of the HRPA need to be re-examined, “as they were, in fact, tending to militate against the purposes of the Act itself.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn105" name="_ftnref105"&gt;105&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Under Section 19 of the HRPA, when the commission receives a complaint of a human rights violation by the armed forces, it cannot independently investigate the case but can only seek a report from the central government and make recommendations. Different governments of different political hues have consistently taken an uncompromising stance on Section 19. For example, although the HRPA was a Congress Party initiative, in 2002 the then ruling Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition government also said that: “The present system of enquiry by the forces and punishment of the guilty persons has been working satisfactorily and, in view of this, it is felt that there is no need to change the procedure that has already been spelled out in the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 for dealing with the armed forces.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn106" name="_ftnref106"&gt;106&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The National Human Rights Commission has criticized the government’s position on the issue, stating that its experience leads to a different conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;It is not the view of the Commission that the “present system” of inquiry into allegations of human rights violations by the armed forces is working satisfactorily. The Government is fully aware that the Section 19 of the Act, as at present worded, prevents the Commission from itself initiating an inquiry into, or investigating, the violation of human rights by the armed forces and that this provision has been widely criticized both at home and abroad. Yet, spokespersons of the Government, even at the highest levels, have frequently referred to the existence of the Commission and its powers under the Act as a sure defence against the violation of human rights by the armed forces when allegations of such violations are brought against them. The Commission finds this tendency to use it to provide an alibi for possible wrong doing by the armed forces disturbing, to say the least.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn107" name="_ftnref107"&gt;107&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Section 19 is inconsistent with international standards for national human rights institutions. The “Paris Principles” on national human rights institutions provide that national institutions shall have the responsibility to submit to the government reports and opinions on “[a]ny situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn108" name="_ftnref108"&gt;108&lt;/a&gt; A handbook on the establishment and operation of such institutions by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights states:&lt;br /&gt;Designating the military as exempt from the complaints mechanism may also have a detrimental effect on an institution’s effectiveness, particularly in view of the strength of the military in many States and its corresponding potential to violate human rights.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn109" name="_ftnref109"&gt;109&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362284"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075960"&gt;Weaknesses in &lt;/a&gt;Military Court Jurisdiction&lt;br /&gt;Indian law permits members of the Indian armed forces accused of crimes to be prosecuted by either the military or civilian justice systems.  However, various statutes make trial by the civilian courts unlikely in practice.  The Armed Forces Special Powers Act and other provisions noted above require prior approval of the central government for civilian prosecutions of military personnel.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn110" name="_ftnref110"&gt;110&lt;/a&gt; And under the Army Act, the military may transfer a soldier from civilian to military custody for offenses that can be tried by a court martial.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn111" name="_ftnref111"&gt;111&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;Available information shows scant evidence that the military is fully and effectively prosecuting soldiers and officers for abuses committed in Jammu and Kashmir.  In May 2004, Chief of Army Staff Gen. N.C. Vij informed the National Human Rights Commission that 131 army personnel, including officers, had been punished for rights violations in Kashmir since 1990 (fewer than ten per year).  These included sentences of two life imprisonments, fifty-nine “rigorous” imprisonments, and eleven instances of one year’s imprisonment and dismissal. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn112" name="_ftnref112"&gt;112&lt;/a&gt;   However, to date the army has not publicly released details of any of these cases: no incidents described, no names of those sentenced, and no information on the crimes committed.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn113" name="_ftnref113"&gt;113&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The absence of a record of military prosecutions for serious abuses in Kashmir contradicts army chief Gen. J.J. Singh’s assertion that “commanders at all levels have been directed to ensure that all instances of indiscipline are thoroughly investigated and the guilty brought to book without undue delay.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn114" name="_ftnref114"&gt;114&lt;/a&gt;  One high-profile case that highlights the military’s failure to prosecute its own is the 2000 killing in Pathirabal of five persons whom the army falsely claimed were militants.  Military responsibility for the deaths became evident in 2001 when it was conclusively determined that those killed were local villagers, not militants.  In 2006, the civilian Central Bureau of Investigation filed criminal charges against five military officers for these killings: for more than five years military prosecutors either failed to fully investigate the case or were simply unwilling to bring charges against the officers, whose cases are now pending before civilian courts.  Even now, the various procedural obstacles to prosecuting military personnel in civilian courts make a trial in this case uncertain.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn115" name="_ftnref115"&gt;115&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Courts martial in India can readily be subject to manipulation by commanding officers.  The officer who convenes a court martial selects the panel from among the officers under their command.  A senior military lawyer concluded that this selection process “makes the ‘command influence’ of the convening officer, on whose order the prosecution is launched, over the court-martial all too pervasive.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn116" name="_ftnref116"&gt;116&lt;/a&gt;  A retired military jurist likewise noted:  “Frequently, the members of the court martial must look to the appointing officer for promotions, advantageous assignments and efficiency ratings; in short, for their future progress in the service.”  Court martial members “do not and cannot have the independence of jurors drawn from the general public or of civilian judges.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn117" name="_ftnref117"&gt;117&lt;/a&gt;  While these problems affect all military trials, whether for routine indiscipline or serious rights abuses, they invariably are exacerbated when the victim is an alleged militant or a civilian wrongfully suspected of militant activity.&lt;br /&gt;Of particular concern is the absence of civilian control over India’s military justice system.  A genuinely independent and impartial judiciary must be separate from the executive branch of government.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn118" name="_ftnref118"&gt;118&lt;/a&gt;  Unlike the U.K. and U.S. military justice systems, in which court-martial decisions can ultimately be appealed to a civilian court, Indian courts martial are purely a military affair. The retired military jurist considered Indian courts martial as “simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the executive chain of command.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn119" name="_ftnref119"&gt;119&lt;/a&gt;  Even the Supreme Court’s extraordinary appellate jurisdiction, the Special Leave Petition, does not extend to courts martial.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn120" name="_ftnref120"&gt;120&lt;/a&gt;  A 1999 report of the Law Commission of India recommended the creation of a civilian Armed Forces Appellate Tribunal, a call that has gone unheeded.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftn121" name="_ftnref121"&gt;121&lt;/a&gt;  Ultimately the military justice system is problematic both for military defendants who feel they are being treated unfairly, and victims of abuses and their families who wish to see justice properly done. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075961"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362285"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref81" name="_ftn81"&gt;81&lt;/a&gt; The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has defined impunity as the “impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims.”  “Report of the independent expert to update the set of principles to combat impunity,” of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, February 8, 2005, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref82" name="_ftn82"&gt;82&lt;/a&gt; See U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (December 16, 2005), Part VIII, “Access to Justice.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref83" name="_ftn83"&gt;83&lt;/a&gt; Section 45, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/crpc.html"&gt;http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/crpc.html&lt;/a&gt;  (retrieved June 6, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref84" name="_ftn84"&gt;84&lt;/a&gt; See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1976), G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force March 23, 1976, Arts. 26 and 2. India became a party to the ICCPR in 1979.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref85" name="_ftn85"&gt;85&lt;/a&gt; Section 197 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/crpc.html"&gt;http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/crpc.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref86" name="_ftn86"&gt;86&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview with Mian Abdul Qayoom, president, Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, Srinagar, October 11, 2004. Amnesty International said in 2005 that there were almost three hundred cases that were forwarded to the federal government by the Jammu and Kashmir government for permission to prosecute, and permission was granted in none of them. Amnesty International, “India: Briefing on The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958,” May 9, 2005, [online] http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200252005?openandof=ENG-IND (retrieved February 14, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref87" name="_ftn87"&gt;87&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “Briefing on The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref88" name="_ftn88"&gt;88&lt;/a&gt; Copy of a letter refusing permission to prosecute made available to Human Rights Watch by the High Court Bar Association, October 2004.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref89" name="_ftn89"&gt;89&lt;/a&gt; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, August 27 to September 7 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref90" name="_ftn90"&gt;90&lt;/a&gt; Arts. 9 &amp; 14, ICCPR (1976).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref91" name="_ftn91"&gt;91&lt;/a&gt; Annual Report 2004-2005, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref92" name="_ftn92"&gt;92&lt;/a&gt; The Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act (4), 1990.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref93" name="_ftn93"&gt;93&lt;/a&gt;  Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (3), 1990, [online] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/states/jandk/documents/actsandordinances/J&amp;K_Specialpoweract.htm (retrieved June 6, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref94" name="_ftn94"&gt;94&lt;/a&gt;Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (4)(a).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref95" name="_ftn95"&gt;95&lt;/a&gt; Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (4)(c).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref96" name="_ftn96"&gt;96&lt;/a&gt;Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (7); The Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act (6).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref97" name="_ftn97"&gt;97&lt;/a&gt;  Armed Forces Special Powers Act (6), 1958, [online] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/armed_special_powers_act_1958.html (retrieved February 14, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref98" name="_ftn98"&gt;98&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “Briefing on The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref99" name="_ftn99"&gt;99&lt;/a&gt;Asian Center for Human Rights, “Review of AFPSA: Too Little, Too Late,” November 3, 2004, [online] http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/45-04.html (retrieved February 14, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref100" name="_ftn100"&gt;100&lt;/a&gt; “Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act Review Committee Submits Report,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, June 6, 2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=9607"&gt;http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=9607&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 29, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref101" name="_ftn101"&gt;101&lt;/a&gt; Shishir Gupta, “Scrap Armed Forces Law But Retain Bite: Panel to Center,” The Indian Express, June 29, 2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://www/indianexpress.com/print.php?content_id=73514"&gt;http://www/indianexpress.com/print.php?content_id=73514&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 29, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref102" name="_ftn102"&gt;102&lt;/a&gt;Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (22), 1978, [online] http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/humanrts/emergency/India/ind5.htm (retrieved June 15, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref103" name="_ftn103"&gt;103&lt;/a&gt; Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (8).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref104" name="_ftn104"&gt;104&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Act, 1993, [online] http://nhrc.nic.in/HRAct.htm (retrieved February 14, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref105" name="_ftn105"&gt;105&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2001-2002, Chapter 2, (2.5), p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref106" name="_ftn106"&gt;106&lt;/a&gt; Memorandum of Action Taken, Government of India, April 2002, National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2001-2002, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref107" name="_ftn107"&gt;107&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2001-2002, Chapter 2 (2.8), p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref108" name="_ftn108"&gt;108&lt;/a&gt; National institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, G.A. res. 48/134, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 252, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (“Paris Principles”), Principle 3(c).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref109" name="_ftn109"&gt;109&lt;/a&gt; U.N. Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions, No. 4 (Geneva: United Nations, 1995), p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref110" name="_ftn110"&gt;110&lt;/a&gt; Armed Forces Special Powers Act (6), 1958.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref111" name="_ftn111"&gt;111&lt;/a&gt; Army Act, Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code (1973), Section 475, provides that military personnel held in civil custody who could be tried by both civilian and military courts will be delivered to the commanding officer for trial by court martial.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref112" name="_ftn112"&gt;112&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, “NHRC takes up Human Rights violations with the Chief of Army Staff,” May 27, 2004.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref113" name="_ftn113"&gt;113&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref114" name="_ftn114"&gt;114&lt;/a&gt; “A Talk with the Chief: Gen. J.J. Singh’s Views on Military Law,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond (New Delhi: Judge Advocate General’s Department, 2005), p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref115" name="_ftn115"&gt;115&lt;/a&gt; The military courts have largely remained impervious to outside judicial scrutiny.  According to Col. Indra Sen Singh, the high courts, concerned about undermining military discipline by interfering in military affairs, have “generally adopted a ‘hands off’ attitude towards the [sic] military matters.”  Col. Indra Sen Singh, “Military Justice System: Re-inforcing the Confidence,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref116" name="_ftn116"&gt;116&lt;/a&gt; Ibid., p. 235.  Colonel Singh suggested that all members of the court martial be drawn from outside the jurisdiction of the convening authority.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref117" name="_ftn117"&gt;117&lt;/a&gt; Col. Y.R. Sharma (retd), “Growth of Military Law,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref118" name="_ftn118"&gt;118&lt;/a&gt; As the International Commission of Jurists has noted:&lt;br /&gt;Military jurisdiction is often used as a means of escaping the control of the civilian authorities and of consolidating the military as a power within society, as well as a tool through which the military authorities can exert supremacy over civilians.  The Human Rights committee has repeatedly stated that States must take steps to ensure that military forces are subject to civilian authority.&lt;br /&gt;International Commission of Jurists, Military jurisdiction and international law (Geneva: 2004), p. 28 (citations omitted).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref119" name="_ftn119"&gt;119&lt;/a&gt; Sharma, “Growth of Military Law,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref120" name="_ftn120"&gt;120&lt;/a&gt; See Indian Constitution, Art. 136 (2).  According to a lawyer at Naval headquarters, “The only way in which a civilian court could consider the findings of a court martial is by way of the writ of ‘Certiorari,’ ‘Prohibition’ or ‘Mandamus’ or ‘Habeas Corpus.’  Under the writ jurisdiction, however, the civil courts have a very limited authority to interfere with the findings of court martial.”  Capt. Rakesh Kumar Mehta, NM, “Need for a Court Martial Appellate Tribunal,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/4.htm#_ftnref121" name="_ftn121"&gt;121&lt;/a&gt; Law Commission of India, 169th report on “Amendment of the Army, Navy and Air Force Acts (1999),” quoted in A.K. Upadhyay, “Recommendations of the Law Commission of India on Military Law,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 201.  See also Mehta, “Need for a Court Martial Appellate Tribunal,” in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond, p. 197. (“In any democratic society there must be means available by which a convicted soldier can test outside the military legal system the legality of a judgment against him.”)&lt;br /&gt;IV. The Origins of Impunity: Failure of Accountability in Jammu and Kashmir Since the Start of the Conflict&lt;br /&gt;Over the years there have been well known cases of government abuse that have had a great impact on public opinion in Jammu and Kashmir. Because of the abuses themselves and the very public failure of accountability for the military and paramilitary personnel, police and high-ranking officials responsible, these cases have served as a recruiting sergeant for the insurgency.&lt;br /&gt;Many Kashmiris, and some officials in New Delhi, believe that the course of events in Jammu and Kashmir could have been much different if the Indian government had properly supervised its forces so that abuses did not happen; if when their forces did commit abuses the government had held its forces accountable in a public and credible manner; and if it had quickly established the principle that the law would apply equally to soldiers and police, as it applied to militants and civilians. It is widely viewed that the insurgency derived much of its strength and longevity from this failure by government. &lt;br /&gt;Below are some of the many serious cases of human rights violations that have seared the public consciousness in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. No matter how “old” these cases, the Indian government remains obligated to investigate and punish those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn122" name="_ftnref122"&gt;122&lt;/a&gt;  Human Rights Watch believes that no cases since the beginning of the insurgency are too old for justice to take place, and no effort at accountability and reparations is too late to be meaningful to Kashmiris, especially to the victims and their families.&lt;br /&gt;In each of the cases discussed below, stretching over a ten-year period from early 1990 to early 2000, members of the security forces deployed in Jammu and Kashmir were accused of unlawful killings. In some cases official inquiries were ordered, but in the end no credible action was taken against the individuals implicated. This, along with immunity provisions in Indian law, has conveyed the impression to the population that the government has condoned the abuses.&lt;br /&gt;The cases below are, of course, not the only serious incidents that have blotted the human and political landscape in Jammu and Kashmir in recent years. While these cases are illustrative, we believe that each, in its own way, serves as a milestone of the Indian government’s failure to hold its security forces accountable.  Atrocities by the militants during this period are not included, though more recent militant abuses are set out in Section VI.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362286"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075962"&gt;A. Shootings at Gawakadal, &lt;/a&gt;Srinagar&lt;br /&gt;Violence in Jammu and Kashmir erupted in November 1989, though signs of unrest had started almost a year earlier. After the kidnapping by the JKLF of Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of India’s Home Minister, in December 1989, the government decided to “get tough.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn123" name="_ftnref123"&gt;123&lt;/a&gt; New Delhi appointed as governor Jagmohan, a Hafizabad-born (now in Pakistan) politician who was known as a forceful administrator, and who, as noted above, had held the post before.&lt;br /&gt;“President’s rule” is provided for under Article 356 of the Indian constitution.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn124" name="_ftnref124"&gt;124&lt;/a&gt; This empowers the central government to dismiss a state legislature if the governor, a federal appointee, advises that governance of the state “cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn125" name="_ftnref125"&gt;125&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Jagmohan was appointed governor despite opposition from the elected chief minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah. In protest, the Abdullah government resigned. The imposition of governor’s rule put New Delhi into direct confrontation with the Kashmiri insurgents.&lt;br /&gt;Jagmohan was appointed on January 19, 1990. That night, in response to the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed and other militant attacks, Indian security forces conducted warrantless and thus illegal house-to-house searches in Srinagar, hunting for illegal weapons or other evidence of support to the militants. They dragged many people out of their beds into the bitter cold. Many Kashmiris complained that they were beaten and abused.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn126" name="_ftnref126"&gt;126&lt;/a&gt; Jagmohan maintains that he had nothing to do with the decision.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn127" name="_ftnref127"&gt;127&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The next morning, as word of the searches and beatings began to spread, people began to pour out into the streets of Srinagar. From the mosques, loudspeakers urged Kashmiris to come out and fight for azaadi, or freedom. Thousands of Kashmiris gathered to protest the actions of the security forces.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn128" name="_ftnref128"&gt;128&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The state government declared a curfew, but few if any Kashmiris observed it.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn129" name="_ftnref129"&gt;129&lt;/a&gt; It was early evening when one group of marchers reached the Gawakadal Bridge on Srinagar’s Jhelum River.  They were shouting slogans and some were pelting the soldiers with stones. Troops from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) opened fire into the crowd. Eyewitnesses say the shooting was a brutal and excessive use of lethal force against demonstrators. Many demonstrators were shot from behind as they turned to run away.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn130" name="_ftnref130"&gt;130&lt;/a&gt; Kashmiri news photographer Meraj-ud-din described the scene:&lt;br /&gt;When I reached Gawakadal, all I could see were the dead. I saw bodies of children, bodies of women, bodies of men…. Later they brought the bodies to the police compound. I saw them again. There I cried. I shouted, screamed. ‘Don’t do this to the people.’ That day I saw everything.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn131" name="_ftnref131"&gt;131&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Human Rights Watch, in its 1991 report on the shootings, criticized the killings and concluded that the use of lethal force was not proportional to the threat.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn132" name="_ftnref132"&gt;132&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At least thirty-five people died. Many estimates put the toll near one hundred. Until then, this was the highest number of persons killed on a single day since the violence erupted in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn133" name="_ftnref133"&gt;133&lt;/a&gt; The killings drew international attention. The London based daily,the Independent, carried an interview with one of the survivors, a thirty-eight-year-old mechanical engineer called Farooq Ahmad, who worked for the government:&lt;br /&gt;I was just standing watching the procession of Muslims demonstrating against India. It was curfew time and there were CRPF on both sides of the lane. They should have given a warning, telling people to go back to their rooms. But there was no warning, so people thought the procession was allowed. Then there were two shots in the air, and more shots, shots and shots––people were falling down. I also fell down. Someone pushed me down. The CRPF took control of the area. There were a lot of dead and injured. But I was safe, no bullet. Then came somebody, they said I was still alive, and that fellow, an officer, came with a Bren gun, a light machine gun. He aimed at me and started firing.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn134" name="_ftnref134"&gt;134&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Farooq Ahmad survived. But few in Jammu and Kashmir have forgotten that incident. Human Rights Watch recently met with an eyewitness who recalled the events at Gawakadal.&lt;br /&gt;I remember that scene perfectly. There were so many people. I remember thinking that all of Srinagar must be out on the streets. They were shouting slogans and calling for freedom. There was a CRPF bunker just near the bridge. Suddenly the soldiers opened fire. It was machine-gun fire and all I could hear is the rat-a-tat sound. At that time, we were not used to the sound of firing like we are today. I think everyone was shocked. No one had expected the troops to start firing. Soon, there were people falling down all over the place. I remember the man standing next to me saying, ‘I know I have been shot but I can’t feel anything.’ I looked at him. And then I saw his foot. There was a bullet stuck inside his shoe… All around people were groaning with pain. Everyone that could ran away. I stayed where I was in case they fired at me. I stood there for many hours. Finally, the police brought trucks and started taking the dead and wounded away. But they had been lying there for many hours before the trucks came. I remember that there were dogs sniffing at the bodies. I will never forget one sight. I saw a dog eating a human arm.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn135" name="_ftnref135"&gt;135&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The shooting at Gawakadal Bridge and the way the Indian government responded may have been the turning point in the rebellion. As Human Rights Watch said in a May 1991 report, “In the weeks that followed as security forces fired on crowds of marchers and as militants intensified their attacks against the police and those suspected of aiding them, Kashmir’s civil war began in earnest.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn136" name="_ftnref136"&gt;136&lt;/a&gt; Almost every day there were protests. Teachers, students, and government employees came out into the streets shouting slogans. At the same time, there were increased attacks from militants, now with a religious dimension. Hindu Kashmiris, called pandits, came under attack. Many were abducted or killed. Many received anonymous notes that were threatening and abusive.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn137" name="_ftnref137"&gt;137&lt;/a&gt; Thousands of pandits began to flee the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley, relocating to squalid camps in Jammu and Delhi. At least three hundred thousand Kashmiri Hindus still remain displaced.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn138" name="_ftnref138"&gt;138&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The state administration, led by Jagmohan, sought to end the militancy and the mass protests through the increased use of force. Government forces fired live ammunition on crowds of unarmed demonstrators.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn139" name="_ftnref139"&gt;139&lt;/a&gt; Round-the-clock curfews were imposed for days in major towns to prevent protests.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn140" name="_ftnref140"&gt;140&lt;/a&gt; Paramilitary troops conducted large-scale searches, called “crackdowns” in Jammu and Kashmir. Residents were forced to gather outside while troops ransacked their belongings, looking for hidden weapons. Informers, in hoods, identified alleged militants to be taken into custody, who were then often tortured and sometimes killed.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn141" name="_ftnref141"&gt;141&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;No known action was taken against any CRPF officials who ordered their forces to open fire at Gawakadal, or against the officers present during the shooting. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn142" name="_ftnref142"&gt;142&lt;/a&gt; No public inquiry was ordered into the incident.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn143" name="_ftnref143"&gt;143&lt;/a&gt; The police did file complaints against demonstrators who pelted stones at security forces, but they were not investigated. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn144" name="_ftnref144"&gt;144&lt;/a&gt; Without an investigation into what exactly happened in Gawakadal, there will be no chance of holding those responsible accountable.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn145" name="_ftnref145"&gt;145&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The consequences of Gawakadal and the failure to hold the security forces accountable have been far reaching. Many young Kashmiris began to join the militants, whose popularity shot up. One man told Human Rights Watch that he and other parents watched helplessly as their sons enlisted with the militants: “Boys, as young as fourteen or fifteen, crossed the border and came back with guns. No one could stop them.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn146" name="_ftnref146"&gt;146&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The crackdowns also created greater schisms between the security forces and the public. Author and editor of the Asian Age newspaper, M.J. Akbar, summed up the feelings of many:&lt;br /&gt;January 19 became the catalyst which propelled into a mass upsurge. Young men from hundreds of homes crossed over into Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir to receive arms and training in insurrection… Pakistan came out in open support of secession, and for the first time, did not need to involve its regular troops in the confrontation. In Srinagar, each mosque became a citadel of fervor.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn147" name="_ftnref147"&gt;147&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362287"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075963"&gt;B. Death of Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammad Farooq&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammad Farooq was gunned down on May 21, 1990. The position of the “Mirwaiz,” which is hereditary, is considered the most important religious authority in Srinagar.  Farooq supported the independence movement led by the JKLF, although he had opposed the abduction of Rubaiya Sayeed. At the time of his death, he had also fallen out of favor with the more hardline Islamist groups, particularly the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, which preferred accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan over independence.&lt;br /&gt;According to police reports, on May 21 three persons visited Farooq at his home, claiming to have a prior appointment.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn148" name="_ftnref148"&gt;148&lt;/a&gt; Farooq was alone when they went in to see him, while his secretary and guard waited outside. After about ten or fifteen minutes, the men waiting outside heard gun shots. They found Farooq critically injured with at least fifteen bullet wounds to the chest, head, stomach, and legs.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn149" name="_ftnref149"&gt;149&lt;/a&gt; His assailants managed to escape.&lt;br /&gt;As soon as they heard of the attack, people began to pour into the streets of Srinagar. Initially, public wrath was directed at members of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, which was suspected of the attack. The Hizb-ul-Mujahedin had by then begun a campaign of assassinating members of the old political order and Farooq’s was a significant political voice.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn150" name="_ftnref150"&gt;150&lt;/a&gt;  After the attack, some of Farooq’s followers began to surround and threaten to beat up supporters of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn151" name="_ftnref151"&gt;151&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Many Kashmiris gathered at the Sher-i-Kashmir Institute (a hospital) where Farooq had been taken, fatally wounded. At the news of his death, the crowd became restive and angry. A group snatched Maulvi Farooq’s body and carried it in a procession towards the city. India Today magazine described what happened next:&lt;br /&gt;The crowd forcibly took the body of the Mirwaiz, and wound its way through the downtown areas of Srinagar where curfew had been imposed. On its route lay the Islamia College, which houses the headquarters of the 69th battalion of the CRPF. Seeing the mob heading towards them, the security forces panicked and opened fire, killing 57.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn152" name="_ftnref152"&gt;152&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There were varying accounts of the exact death toll.  While some newspapers said that the death toll was fifty-seven, others reported that forty-seven were killed. Medical authorities certified thirty-five deaths.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn153" name="_ftnref153"&gt;153&lt;/a&gt; Some press reports, however, put the toll at over one hundred.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn154" name="_ftnref154"&gt;154&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The protestors were carrying Farooq’s coffin from the hospital to his office. The CRPF post was along the route. According to Yusuf Jameel, a Kashmiri journalist who covered the events, he first heard what sounded like a single shot.&lt;br /&gt;It could have been militants or maybe a CRPF soldier guarding the camp fired his gun by mistake. But the CRPF reacted in panic. First the guards started firing blindly at the crowd and then the soldiers inside the camp thought there was fighting going on and came out and started firing as well.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn155" name="_ftnref155"&gt;155&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At least two bullets pierced the coffin.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn156" name="_ftnref156"&gt;156&lt;/a&gt; Farooq’s body fell out and was picked up by mourners, who replaced it in the coffin and ran with it to his office.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn157" name="_ftnref157"&gt;157&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;J.N. Saxena, director general of police, however, gave a different account of the events in his official report:&lt;br /&gt;The processionists pelted stones at the CRPF and some militants opened fire with AK-47 rifles from three sides and attacked the CPRF picket… The CRPF had to return the fire and in the cross firing and stampede, several persons sustained injuries. The tally of fatal injuries is 24.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn158" name="_ftnref158"&gt;158&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Eyewitnesses told journalists that there had been no crossfire.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn159" name="_ftnref159"&gt;159&lt;/a&gt; No troops were shot and injured or killed.&lt;br /&gt;Jammu and Kashmir state police investigations later alleged that Farooq had been assassinated by a faction of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin called the “Green Army,” on the instructions of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. The alleged assassin, Mohammad Abdullah Bangroo, was reportedly killed in an armed encounter a month later, on June 18, 1990.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn160" name="_ftnref160"&gt;160&lt;/a&gt; Others allegedly involved in the plot continue to evade justice. In the irony that is Jammu and Kashmir, both Farooq and his alleged killer are buried in the same Martyr’s graveyard in Srinagar.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn161" name="_ftnref161"&gt;161&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There was widespread criticism in the national and international press at the killing of unarmed mourners. Public rage shifted from the armed group blamed for the killing of Farooq to the government of India and the CRPF.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn162" name="_ftnref162"&gt;162&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One hundred and thirty-seven state government officials signed a letter to the governor expressing their anger over the mishandling of the situation and the indiscriminate attacks by security forces on unarmed civilians.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn163" name="_ftnref163"&gt;163&lt;/a&gt; Ten senior officers also wrote a memorandum to the governor on May 28, 1990, expressing concern about the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and particularly about the incidents that had followed Maulvi Farooq’s killing.&lt;br /&gt;As responsible administrators we are appalled by the lack of planning, forethought and consideration for the mourners that led to indiscriminate killing of large numbers of peaceful processionists by nervous and trigger happy security forces. It is apparent that these security forces did not get the benefit of guidance of their officers and that frantic wireless messages from officers of the State Police asking for instructions to be conveyed to the CRPF to desist from firing on the procession were not heeded which is indicative of a breakdown of the command and control structure of the law and order machinery.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn164" name="_ftnref164"&gt;164&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Tavleen Singh, a journalist, later wrote that some in the administration conceded that the killings were unwarranted:&lt;br /&gt;Later, a close aide of Jagmohan admitted to me that the whole thing had been a ghastly mistake and that men had acted without any proper instructions. They just went berserk and emptied all the bullets they had.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn165" name="_ftnref165"&gt;165&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;While it appears that CRPF troops may have panicked and opened fire mistakenly, this may not relieve the commanders of legal responsibility for the deaths. Commanders have a duty to ensure that the soldiers under their command are trained in and understand the “rules of engagement,” and that such rules of engagement are consistent with the requirements of international law.  Poor soldiering is a command responsibility.&lt;br /&gt;Governor Jagmohan later defended his term in Jammu and Kashmir in an 855-page book called My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir. Jagmohan absolves himself of responsibility for ordering that first crackdown on January 1990 that sparked the protests. He blames the state administration led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah, who had ordered the crackdown before his resignation, and says that Director General of Police J.N. Saxena should have taken responsibility for following the chief minister’s orders.&lt;br /&gt;This would not only have been in accordance with the highest tradition of public service but would have denied my denigrators any opportunity to mount false propaganda against me. I was their main target… Saxena would not have lost anything. We would not have let him down, as his action was bona fide. Regrettably, he could not pick up enough moral courage.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn166" name="_ftnref166"&gt;166&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On Maulvi Farooq’s death and the killings that followed, Jagmohan claimed that the events happened so quickly that he could not assume charge of the situation. He once again placed the blame on the police, particularly Additional Director General M.N. Sabharwal, who was at the hospital but left when trouble erupted. Jagmohan writes:&lt;br /&gt;Had he gone with the crowd or sent a strong contingent of police under the charge of a senior police officer to move with the crowd, the incident might have been averted, and if firing had to be resorted to by the [CRPF] to return the firing by the terrorists who were in the crowd, the casualties could be kept at a minimum. His conduct, to say the least, was highly irresponsible.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn167" name="_ftnref167"&gt;167&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Summarizing the events, he states that, “Unfortunately, in public affairs, you have to put up with the lesser evil to eliminate the greater evil, and events do not always take the direction that you intend.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn168" name="_ftnref168"&gt;168&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With a deteriorating human rights and political situation, it was critical that the government conduct a credible investigation and hold those responsible for the deaths accountable, at the very least with administrative sanctions. New Delhi forced Jagmohan to step down as Governor. This was a good first step, but not sufficient. If those with direct responsibility for the killings had also been held accountable, confidence within the community may have been restored to some degree.&lt;br /&gt;But this did not happen. Jagmohan claims to have ordered an inquiry, but it is not clear that it ever took place.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn169" name="_ftnref169"&gt;169&lt;/a&gt; No findings were ever made public. No one was ever held publicly accountable, except for Jagmohan. New Delhi failed to take credible action against those members of the CRPF or police who were responsible for the incident. If they had been fully and fairly prosecuted and those convicted appropriately sentenced, perhaps public rage at the death of unarmed protestors might have been contained. Militant leaders even joked to journalists that Jagmohan had achieved what they could not in forty years.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn170" name="_ftnref170"&gt;170&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The incident further turned Kashmiris against the Indian government and its security forces. Many seemed to forget that Farooq had not been killed by the government. As Tavleen Singh writes, “Whoever killed Maulvi Farooq it was certainly not Jagmohan, but because of the manner in which he handled the aftermath of [Farooq’s] murder it was easy for militant groups to blame it on him.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn171" name="_ftnref171"&gt;171&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362288"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075964"&gt;C. The Beijbehara killings&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On October 22, 1993, at least thirty-seven people were killed when personnel from the 74th Battalion Border Security Force (BSF) opened fire to disperse more than ten thousand people marching on the National Highway in Beijbehara in Jammu and Kashmir. The protestors were demonstrating against an earlier incident of firing on protestors near the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn172" name="_ftnref172"&gt;172&lt;/a&gt; One eyewitness recalled the events to Human Rights Watch:&lt;br /&gt;The people had gathered on the National Highway which passes through Beijbehara town. It was like this even then, narrow, with shops on both sides of the road. There were thousands of people shouting slogans. But it was peaceful…. The BSF just opened fire without any warning. It was terrible. There were so many people lying on the ground. Others were running in panic…. This road, this very road, was full of blood.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn173" name="_ftnref173"&gt;173&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The government later said that thirty-seven persons had died.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn174" name="_ftnref174"&gt;174&lt;/a&gt; The 1993 U.S. Department of State country report on human rights in India said, “Despite government claims that the security forces were ambushed by militants, only one BSF sub inspector was injured.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn175" name="_ftnref175"&gt;175&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The indiscriminate killing at Beijbehara is particularly important because it followed the  September 1993 passage of the Human Rights Protection Act (see Section III above), adopted under the pressure of persistent allegations of human rights abuse in Jammu and Kashmir as well as in other areas of armed conflict in India. The law established the National Human Rights Commission, which began operations in October 1993 and promptly took up the Beijbehara massacre. In proceedings that followed, it became apparent that the commission would not be able to challenge the armed forces’ effective immunity from prosecution under Indian laws.&lt;br /&gt;On November 1, 1993, the National Human Rights Commission, having on its own authority taken notice of the incident at Beijbehara, sent notices to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which controls the Border Security Force.  The Ministry of Home Affairs sent to the NHRC a report on the incident based on the magisterial inquiry ordered by the state government as well as on the Staff Court of Inquiry ordered by the BSF.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn176" name="_ftnref176"&gt;176&lt;/a&gt;  This report stated that thirty-seven persons had died and seventy-three were injured in the shooting, and included evidence from six witnesses. The report also claimed that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against fourteen BSF officials, but no details were provided.&lt;br /&gt;On January 17, 1994, the National Human Rights Commission, based on the government report, made some strong recommendations that included immediate interim compensation to the victims’ families and that, apart from disciplinary proceedings under the Border Security Force Act, there should be parallel criminal prosecution proceedings based on the magisterial inquiry.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn177" name="_ftnref177"&gt;177&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The government provided the standard 100,000 rupees [roughly U.S.$4,000 at that time] as compensation to the relatives of thirty-one civilians whom the local magistrate confirmed had been killed in the incident.  Seventy-five others received compensations for injuries.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn178" name="_ftnref178"&gt;178&lt;/a&gt; The National Human Rights Commission reported that the government, while indicating the extremely complex and serious situation on the ground, had assured the commission that it would ensure that:&lt;br /&gt;[A]ny kind of excesses in the operations being carried out by the Security Forces, even in the most difficult of the situations, is effectively curbed.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn179" name="_ftnref179"&gt;179&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, on the NHRC recommendation that there should be parallel criminal prosecution, the government responded that the BSF Staff Court of Inquiry, Record of Evidence proceedings, “broadly correspond to committal proceedings in a criminal court.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn180" name="_ftnref180"&gt;180&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There are no details available of the proceedings of the BSF Staff Court of Inquiry.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn181" name="_ftnref181"&gt;181&lt;/a&gt; But nearly three years after the NHRC had called for action, on November 12, 1996, A.K. Tandon, then director general of the BSF, informed the NHRC that “a General Security Force Court trial was conducted in respect of the twelve BSF personnel involved in the said incident,” but that results of the trial were “being withheld for the time being.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn182" name="_ftnref182"&gt;182&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On March 16, 1998, the NHRC, while acknowledging the BSF report, said that it wanted to review the proceedings of the General Security Force Court before taking any final position in the matter. The NHRC has the right to examine transcripts of trials to ensure that genuine attempts have been made to secure convictions.  The commission directed the Ministry of Home Affairs to supply records of the proceedings. But the ministry refused, stating in a letter on May 5, 1998, the “inability of the Government of India to show records of the GSFC [General Security Force Court] to any authority other than those provided under the Border Security Force Act.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn183" name="_ftnref183"&gt;183&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The NHRC tried several times subsequently to insist that the government allow it to examine the proceedings of the trial, but no avail. In its annual report in 1998-1999, saying that it was “deeply disturbed,” the NHRC noted that:&lt;br /&gt;The Commission is yet to satisfy itself that justice has fully been done in regard to the tragic loss of life that occurred in Bijbehara, in the State of Jammu &amp; Kashmir, on 22 October 1993 in respect of which incident it had made specific recommendations…. The Commission is determined to see this case through to its logical conclusion. At the end of the year under reporting, it was awaiting the records of those proceedings and was contemplating moving a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court if it were denied full access to the records that it had sought.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn184" name="_ftnref184"&gt;184&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On February 8, 1999, the NHRC told the government to preserve all related documents and then appealed to the Supreme Court “to issue a writ… to make available to the petitioner the relevant records of the court martials conducted in respect of the armed forces personnel involved in the said incident.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn185" name="_ftnref185"&gt;185&lt;/a&gt; The writ petition was later withdrawn by the NHRC, probably because the verdict would have gone against the commission due to the restrictions imposed under Section 19 of the Human Rights Protection Act, 1993 (see Section III above).&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn186" name="_ftnref186"&gt;186&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;The Border Security Force had initially claimed that it had taken action against the responsible officials, but the only available information about this concerns one sub-inspector who the BSF told the NHRC had been found not guilty.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn187" name="_ftnref187"&gt;187&lt;/a&gt; According to press reports, all those charged with murder were acquitted by the General Security Force Court.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn188" name="_ftnref188"&gt;188&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;When the NHRC took up the incident there was hope among many Kashmiris that those responsible would be brought to justice. But this outcome made it clear that the NHRC would have a limited role in investigating abuses by the armed forces and promoting prosecutions of military personnel. Impunity was the victor again.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362289"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075965"&gt;D. The killing of Jalil Andrabi&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The trussed-up body of Jalil Andrabi, a human rights lawyer, was found on the banks of the Jhelum river in Srinagar on March 27, 1996.&lt;br /&gt;Andrabi had been detained for questioning on March 8, 1996. After he failed to come home, a habeas corpus petition was filed by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association. When Andrabi’s body was found nineteen days after he “disappeared,” it was discovered that he had been shot in the head and his eyes gouged out.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn189" name="_ftnref189"&gt;189&lt;/a&gt; He had been dead for at least a week when his corpse was found.&lt;br /&gt;On August 13, 1996, the High Court directed the police and security forces to make joint efforts to arrest the suspected perpetrators. In late 1996, after hearing representations from a Special Investigation Team (SIT) looking into the case, the High Court noted “that functionaries of the Union of India have not been cooperating with the [SIT] in a proper manner.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn190" name="_ftnref190"&gt;190&lt;/a&gt; On April 10, 1997, the SIT presented its initial findings to the High Court and said that Maj. Avtar Singh from the 103rd Unit of the Territorial Army&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn191" name="_ftnref191"&gt;191&lt;/a&gt; and some other soldiers under his command were responsible for the abduction and killing of Andrabi. The team told the court that they had not been able to arrest Major Singh because no one appeared to know his whereabouts.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn192" name="_ftnref192"&gt;192&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;When the army was told to produce Major Singh, the army representative told the High Court that Singh had been with the army for only a limited period and that his term of service had been terminated. He was no longer in the army and therefore could not be produced by it.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn193" name="_ftnref193"&gt;193&lt;/a&gt; The army representative also said that the major had not committed the crime in his official capacity and therefore the army as a whole could not be held responsible for his actions.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn194" name="_ftnref194"&gt;194&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the NHRC, the army refused to hand over the accused Major Singh to the Special Investigation Team.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn195" name="_ftnref195"&gt;195&lt;/a&gt; The police team had also been told that Major Singh could not be prosecuted by civil courts because he was employed by the state and would be considered for court martial. Stating that the case was “a source of continuing embarrassment to the country,” the NHRC noted that,&lt;br /&gt;[d]espite a notice having been served on the army to produce the officer of the army suspected to be involved in the abduction and subsequent death of Jalil Andrabi, this has not been done. The persistence of such a situation reflects extremely poorly on the conduct of those who are failing to cooperate in ensuring justice is done in this most serious case.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn196" name="_ftnref196"&gt;196&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The government of India has consistently failed to deliver justice in the Jalil Andrabi case. Soon after his murder, the government, in fact, chose to be defiant. In response to an Amnesty International report, the Indian government said in a September 1996 letter: “The allegations of [a] Government hand in the killing of human rights activists in J &amp; K has been made earlier also. In all incidents of killings of so-called human rights activists, Government has made available clinching evidence showing they were targets of one or other militant organization, whose ideology did not match with theirs.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn197" name="_ftnref197"&gt;197&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, when the Special Investigation Team handed in a report to the state government on October 11, 2000, it again blamed Maj. Avtar Singh, who had been posted for anti-terrorist operations in Rawalpora, Srinagar. On October 18, 2000, the High Court, based on the inquiry report, ordered the SIT to file charges including murder, and asked the commanding officer of Major Singh to provide all possible assistance in producing the accused before the court.&lt;br /&gt;Several orders were issued to the army, requiring that the accused be produced before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, which was hearing murder charges against Major Singh. On December 26, 2000, the magistrate, noting that the army authorities had repeatedly ignored requests to produce the suspect in court, presented the army with the option to try the suspect by court martial or in a civilian court. On January 22, 2001, the army sent a letter to the magistrate stating that Major Singh would be tried in a court martial.&lt;br /&gt;The Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association then submitted a petition to the High Court demanding that Major Singh be tried in a civilian court. The petition reminded the court of the failure to produce Major Singh before the judge. The High Court, acting on the petition, stayed the court martial.&lt;br /&gt;In March 2001, the SIT submitted its final report to the High Court. The SIT had found during its investigations that Major Singh may have been involved in at least six other extrajudicial executions.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn198" name="_ftnref198"&gt;198&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The delays and failure of due process in this case reflect the government’s failure to address impunity for the armed forces. Arshid Andrabi, brother of Jalil Andrabi, is also a lawyer and has been pursuing the case. He says that there is no option but to follow the rule of law, but the failure to arrest his brother’s alleged killer reflects a breakdown in the judicial system.&lt;br /&gt;We are pursuing the case, but we have no hope at all. I have just returned from a hearing. Maj. Avtar Singh had still not been arrested. It was claimed that he cannot be found. It has been nine years and the man is still at large. Despite orders by the court, they have not bothered to arrest him… The army says that he retired two years ago, but even before that, the police knew where he was posted. They sent summons. He did not appear but still he was not arrested. It proves that there is some sort of connivance between the police and the army…. This man has been blamed for other killings as well. He has been questioned by the police. Why was he not detained then as is the rule for all those accused of murder?&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn199" name="_ftnref199"&gt;199&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The failure of the government to prosecute those responsible for the murder of Jalil Andrabi is still cited in Jammu and Kashmir as an example of how New Delhi permits its troops to commit crimes with impunity. As Mian Abdul Qayoom, president of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, put it to Human Rights Watch:&lt;br /&gt;Jalil Andrabi was a well-known man. His case was taken up by so many organizations, including many in India, the NHRC, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. Nothing has happened. His murderers are living in comfort on government salaries or pension. How then can there be justice in any other case?&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn200" name="_ftnref200"&gt;200&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Indeed, as far back as July 1999 Human Rights Watch had recommended to the government of India that, “Major Avtar Singh of the 35th Rashtriya Rifles should be apprehended immediately and prosecuted for the March 1996 murder of human rights lawyer and JKLF member Jalil Andrabi.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn201" name="_ftnref201"&gt;201&lt;/a&gt; The state’s willingness and ability to resist even a police finding to prosecute a military officer reflects a pattern of impunity that has had broad-reaching consequences in Jammu and Kashmir. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362290"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075966"&gt;E. Chattisinghpora massacre and ensuing killings&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On March 20, 2000, on the eve of a visit by then U.S. President Bill Clinton to India, armed men in Indian army uniforms entered the village of Chattisinghpora in Anantnag district at night.  The villagers, most of them Sikhs, were told that it was a routine investigation and identity check. Male residents were asked to come out of their homes with their identification cards. Once they were lined up outside, however, the gunmen opened fire, killing thirty-six and injuring several others. It was the first time in more than a decade of violence in Jammu and Kashmir that the Sikh community had come under attack.&lt;br /&gt;The killings shocked many Kashmiris. India immediately blamed Pakistan and the Islamist groups based there. Others claimed that the killings were in fact carried out by Indian troops.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn202" name="_ftnref202"&gt;202&lt;/a&gt; Generally, Kashmiris were willing to wait for a credible inquiry.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn203" name="_ftnref203"&gt;203&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In August 2000, the government said that it had evidence that the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba was behind the killings.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn204" name="_ftnref204"&gt;204&lt;/a&gt; In response to a notice from the National Human Rights Commission, the director general of police of Jammu and Kashmir, Gurbachan Jagat, said a case had been registered and investigations were in progress. The commission said that according to information received from the government of India:&lt;br /&gt;Of the twenty accused persons identified in connection with the killing of 35 Sikhs, 6 were killed in subsequent encounters; 2 were further detained under the Public Safety Act and 12 were absconding. A charge sheet has been filed in the case on 13 November 2000. The report stated three Pakistani nationals belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba had confessed their involvement in the killings.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn205" name="_ftnref205"&gt;205&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This was a partial representation of the facts. After the murders of the Sikhs, the government ordered an inquiry and combing operation to locate those responsible. On March 25, 2000, the security forces claimed that five militants responsible for the massacre had been killed in an armed encounter at Pathirabal. The encounter was later found to have been fabricated; the dead men were ordinary villagers. On April 3, 2000, security forces opened fire on a demonstration in Brakpora to protest the killing of the five villagers, this time killing eight civilians.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075967"&gt;Pathirabal killings&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On March 25, 2000, five days after the Chattisinghpora massacre, Farooq Khan, senior superintendent of police in Anantnag, claimed that security forces had killed the militants responsible for the killings in an operation in Pathirabal, Panchalthan. Describing the joint operations by the police led by Khan and the army’s 7th Rashtriya Rifles led by Col. Ajay Saxena, Khan told journalists that assault rifles, grenades, and two wireless sets had been recovered from the militants who all belonged to the Abu Maaz unit of a foreign militant group.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn206" name="_ftnref206"&gt;206&lt;/a&gt; They had been hiding inside a hut that later caught fire. Director General of Police Jagat said a member of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin had provided information about the militant hideout. All of the militants were “probably foreigners,” he said, adding: “It is certain that they were the killers.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn207" name="_ftnref207"&gt;207&lt;/a&gt; The daily update for March 25, 2000, on an army website claims: “5 foreign terrorists (Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba group) killed. These terrorists were involved in the massacre of 36 innocent Sikhs on the night of 20 March.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn208" name="_ftnref208"&gt;208&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The army handed over the bodies to the police and filed a police report.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn209" name="_ftnref209"&gt;209&lt;/a&gt; The bodies were badly mutilated, with three completely charred and another that had been decapitated. All of them were buried by the police.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn210" name="_ftnref210"&gt;210&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Meanwhile, a number of villagers had been abducted on March 24, 2000, from three different places in the area, and missing person complaints had been lodged at the local police station. After hearing about the killing of so-called militants, villagers went to the site of the killings, where they found some items of clothing belonging to two of the five missing men.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn211" name="_ftnref211"&gt;211&lt;/a&gt;  Local residents of the area insisted that those killed were not militants but the abducted men who had then been murdered in a fake encounter, and the bodies burned to prevent identification.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn212" name="_ftnref212"&gt;212&lt;/a&gt; An army spokesman, however, said: “Genuine terrorists have been killed. Do not give much credence to these reports about a fake encounter. People are twisting facts.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn213" name="_ftnref213"&gt;213&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Refusing to believe the official version, the villagers held several protests. On April 1, 2000, the Chief Judicial Magistrate ordered Deputy Superintendent of Police Sheikh Abdul Rahman to investigate the matter to ascertain whether the dead men were civilians or armed gunmen. An inquiry was also launched into the disappearance of the five villagers. At the same time, the district magistrate ordered that the bodies be exhumed for identification.&lt;br /&gt;The bodies were finally exhumed on April 6-7, 2000. Although badly burnt, relatives identified the bodies. However, the identification was not conclusive.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn214" name="_ftnref214"&gt;214&lt;/a&gt; It was decided that DNA tests would be conducted to settle the issue. Meanwhile, all five bodies were handed over to the relatives for reburial pending a final identification from the forensics laboratories.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn215" name="_ftnref215"&gt;215&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Forensic samples were collected by Dr. Balbir Kaur and a team of forensic experts from a government medical college under the supervision of police officer Rahman and sent to the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics in Hyderabad and to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory in Kolkatta. On February 26, 2001, the Hyderabad laboratory wrote to the police, saying that some of the samples were spurious because in one case samples supposed to be from a female relative were actually from a male, and in another case samples from an alleged female were in fact composed of the blood of two different men.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn216" name="_ftnref216"&gt;216&lt;/a&gt; Fresh samples were gathered and sent by Dr. Kaur.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn217" name="_ftnref217"&gt;217&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Meanwhile, information about the spurious samples was leaked to the press.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn218" name="_ftnref218"&gt;218&lt;/a&gt; On March 14, 2002, the National Human Rights Commission issued a notice to the government of Jammu and Kashmir about reports of tampering with the DNA testing, and called for an “up to date report of the action taken in this matter,” stating that:&lt;br /&gt;In view of these media reports, which have not come as a surprise to the Commission because of the reservations it has had on the performance of the concerned public servants reported earlier to the Commission not being found very satisfactory, the Commission requires the Government of J &amp; K to submit a comprehensive up to date report of the action taken in this matter together with that in contemplation to correctly identify the five deceased as well as the follow up action.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn219" name="_ftnref219"&gt;219&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Farooq Abdullah, then chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, had already made a statement on March 8, 2002, in the state assembly, admitting that officials had tampered with the DNA samples. On March 15, he also ordered an inquiry headed by retired High Court Judge G. A. Kuchai, and promised that all those found responsible for tampering with evidence would be prosecuted and punished.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn220" name="_ftnref220"&gt;220&lt;/a&gt; Dr. Kaur and five others were suspended, pending the Kuchai Commission report.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn221" name="_ftnref221"&gt;221&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On July 16, 2002, Chief Minister Abdullah released a final report from the Central Forensic Science Laboratory in Kolkatta stating: “It has been clearly established that the deceased were not foreign terrorists as claimed by the forces who led the operations, but they were innocent civilians.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn222" name="_ftnref222"&gt;222&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The chief minister recommended an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation into the entire Pathirabal operation, “in view of the gravity of the offence as well as the attempt made by certain officials to destroy evidence.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn223" name="_ftnref223"&gt;223&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The commission under G.A. Kuchai submitted its report on December 12, 2002, but it was not made public.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn224" name="_ftnref224"&gt;224&lt;/a&gt; According to press reports, the inquiry found that Senior Superintendent of Police Farooq Khan may have organized the manipulation of DNA samples, noting that he “might have managed behind the scene that blood samples collected turn fake by indirect methods.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn225" name="_ftnref225"&gt;225&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Kuchai Commisison also questioned the conduct of Deputy Superintendent of Police Abdul Rahman, who had been responsible for organizing the collection of DNA samples from relatives of the killed men. The donors were not properly identified by the paramedical staff escorted by Rahman. The conduct of the police, the paramedical staff and the doctors, the commission found, “gave enough opportunity to fudge the material.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn226" name="_ftnref226"&gt;226&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In March 2003, a newly elected state government led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed set up a three-member ministerial committee to consider the findings of the Kuchai Commission. The committee found that “only those persons related to the killings [of the five civilians] would be interested in the destruction or falsification of evidence.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn227" name="_ftnref227"&gt;227&lt;/a&gt; Based on the committee recommendations, disciplinary action was ordered against Deputy Superintendent Rahman for subverting proper evidence gathering. Strong displeasure was conveyed to Dr. Balbir Kaur, who had headed the team of forensic experts for the government medical college that collected the samples, blaming them for “lack of proficiency and diligence.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn228" name="_ftnref228"&gt;228&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Senior Superintendent of Police Farooq Khan, a federal government employee and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the state government, was suspended for his actions in Pathirabal.  Assistant Sub Inspector Bashir Ahmad, who belonged to the Jammu and Kashmir state police, was dismissed from service.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn229" name="_ftnref229"&gt;229&lt;/a&gt; Khan, who had earlier received the President’s Police Medal for Gallantry, denied any involvement in the case.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn230" name="_ftnref230"&gt;230&lt;/a&gt; He contested his suspension and was reinstated.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn231" name="_ftnref231"&gt;231&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, many Kashmiris believe that Farooq Khan knows what happened, even if he did not take part in the faked armed encounter, and has therefore obstructed justice. They base their opinion on an earlier report of a commission headed by Justice S. R. Pandian set up to inquire into the Barakpora incident described below&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn232" name="_ftnref232"&gt;232&lt;/a&gt; which said that the security forces had deliberately obliterated evidence of the Pathirabal operation&lt;br /&gt;by completely charring three of the five bodies… and leaving one of the remaining with missing of the entire upper portion of the body over and above the chest including the head—all with a malafide intention of getting rid of even the last traces of physical identity and finally burying all the dead bodies in various places within a radius of 2 to 2 ½ km and far away from the scene of the alleged encounter.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn233" name="_ftnref233"&gt;233&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;During inquiries by Justice Pandian, Senior Superintendent Farooq Khan said that the police could not be held responsible for the events at Pathirabal.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn234" name="_ftnref234"&gt;234&lt;/a&gt;  The operation in which the five villagers were killed, he said, was conducted by the army.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn235" name="_ftnref235"&gt;235&lt;/a&gt; On questioning, he clarified that although the operation at Pathirabal had been conducted jointly by the police and the army, police representatives had “accompanied the Army, but [had] not necessarily [taken part] in the actual shoot out.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn236" name="_ftnref236"&gt;236&lt;/a&gt;  He said that although representatives of the police had been with the commandant of the unit, “Army operations are always led by their officers.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn237" name="_ftnref237"&gt;237&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Khan, who had made the statement to the media claiming that five militants responsible for the Chattisinghpora massacre had been killed, told the inquiry commission that his statement was based on the briefing he had received from the army.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn238" name="_ftnref238"&gt;238&lt;/a&gt;  It is true that when there are joint operations by the police and the army, it is usually the army that is in command.&lt;br /&gt;Assistant Sub Inspector Bashir Ahmad had told the commission that he had received a telephone call from a shopkeeper informing him of the presence of foreign militants in the neighborhood. Ahmad claimed that he was part of an operation led by the 7th Rashtriya Rifles and had fired twenty to twenty-five rounds of ammunition. Eventually, the firing stopped and he found charred bodies on the ground.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn239" name="_ftnref239"&gt;239&lt;/a&gt; The state government decided to prosecute Ahmad for his role in the Pathirabal killings, in addition to terminating his services.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn240" name="_ftnref240"&gt;240&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In September 2005, the Central Bureau of Investigation, which had been asked to take over the investigation in February 2003, exonerated Senior Superintendent of Police Farooq Khan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn241" name="_ftnref241"&gt;241&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;While there have been investigations, albeit unsatisfactory, into the role of police in the events surrounding the Pathirabal killings, what had largely been ignored was that the army’s Rashtriya Rifles had also been involved in the operation and, according to Superintendent Khan, had actually led it. As described above, an army spokesman had insisted that “genuine terrorists have been killed.” The daily update for that day on the official website managed by the 15th  Corps headquarters in Srinagar still claims that “5 AK rifles, 12 magazines with 44 grenade launcher attachments, 4 timer devices and 2 radio sets recovered.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn242" name="_ftnref242"&gt;242&lt;/a&gt;  Yet this information has been found to be false by government inquiry commissions.&lt;br /&gt;A major development in the case occurred on May 11, 2006, when the Central Bureau of Investigation completed its investigations and filed murder charges against five army officers, Brig. Ajay Saxena, Lt. Col. Brajendra Pratap Singh, Maj. Saurabh Sinha, Maj. Amit Saxena and Subedar Idrees Khan, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in Srinagar. Interestingly, the CBI took the position that filing these charges was not a violation of Section 197(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (see Section III above), since these cases involved murder and could not be attributed to actions taken in the course of performing official duty. The CBI concluded that:&lt;br /&gt;The army unit 7 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) which was then stationed in Anantnag came under tremendous psychological pressure and in order to show quick results these five Army personnel and their under command, whose identity could not be established, entered into a criminal conspiracy to pick up some innocent persons and stage manage an encounter to create and impression that the militants responsible for [the Chattisinghpora] killings had been neutralized.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn243" name="_ftnref243"&gt;243&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The CBI also said that the “accused showed fake recovery of arms and ammunition from the five deceased after obtaining signatures of two local civilians on blank papers and subsequently filling in details on a typewriter.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn244" name="_ftnref244"&gt;244&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Chief Judicial Magistrate, after reading the charges, said on May 11, 2006 that the “accused persons were subject to military law,” and directed the army to decide whether it wished to exercise the option of a court martial.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn245" name="_ftnref245"&gt;245&lt;/a&gt; This is an inexplicable decision that undermines the principle of equality before the law and further entrenches the military as being above the law. &lt;br /&gt;In Jammu and Kashmir, there are fears that the army will take charge of this case and process it through a court martial. Given the army’s poor record in holding its soldiers accountable, and considering that the army had taken no internal disciplinary action until the charges were filed, it is unlikely that a military court can be trusted to deliver justice.  Indeed, a CBI officer told the Indian Express that the army had not cooperated with the investigations, and that “[w]henever the CBI asked for files or documents, there was no response. It was exasperating.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn246" name="_ftnref246"&gt;246&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the Indian Express, Brig. Amit Saxena, one of the accused, has written a letter of protest to the director general of military operations saying that he and the other officers were being singled out for “harassment, ignominy, humiliation, agony and financial strain.” &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn247" name="_ftnref247"&gt;247&lt;/a&gt; The army, in its response to the charges, filed a petition since the operation took place in an area notified as “disturbed,” the officers were eligible for protections provided by the Armed Forces Special Powers (Jammu and Kashmir) Act. The army sought to quash the charges on the grounds that the CBI did not have prior permission from the federal government to file them. In its petition, the army claimed: “The incident in question occurred during the military operation conducted officially, with the full concurrence and knowledge of superior authorities. The said acts of encounter cannot be viewed as individual acts of the alleged accused persons because there was no motive or ill-will on their part and the entire military operation was launched in good faith to apprehend the terrorists involved in the Chittisinghpora massacre.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn248" name="_ftnref248"&gt;248&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In its response, the CBI responded that since this was not a genuine encounter, “The acts of the accused do not come under the purview of discharge of official duties as provided by the act.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn249" name="_ftnref249"&gt;249&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There was no decision from the court at the time of writing. Despite the seriousness of the charges against the five men, they have not been taken into custody.&lt;br /&gt;The CBI's investigation and charges could be an important precedent, or simply a case in which political considerations carried more sway than legal ones. If the five accused were in fact responsible for the killings, are successfully prosecuted, and no other responsible senior officer or official is protected from prosecution, this case could prove to be a watershed in Jammu and Kashmir. But the decision of the magistrate to allow the army to handle the case through a court martial and the refusal of the army to cooperate with the CBI investigation indicate that this might be yet another missed opportunity to show Kashmiris that justice is possible for human rights violations and the law will be applied equally to all.&lt;br /&gt;Most independent investigations by human rights groups have concluded that the Sikh villagers at Chattisinghpora were killed by militants. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn250" name="_ftnref250"&gt;250&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075968"&gt;Barakpora killings&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After the March 25, 2000 killing of the five alleged foreign militants in Pathirabal, villagers went to the site of the encounter. As described above, villagers immediately began a protest, insisting that the encounter was faked and that five innocent villagers had been killed. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn251" name="_ftnref251"&gt;251&lt;/a&gt; They persisted in challenging the “encounter” and demanded that the bodies be exhumed, insisting that the police had picked up and “disappeared” ordinary citizens; their demands over the following few days led to the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s offer to exhume the bodies.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn252" name="_ftnref252"&gt;252&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On April 3, 2000, several hundred demonstrators set out on a march to the district headquarters in Anantnag to present a petition to the deputy commissioner to speed up the exhumation.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn253" name="_ftnref253"&gt;253&lt;/a&gt; At a junction of three streets was the Brakpora Camp, composed of one building housing police personnel, and another the 54th Battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force, who were jointly involved in combating militancy in the area.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn254" name="_ftnref254"&gt;254&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The police and Central Police Reserve Force at the camp opened fire on the procession, killing eight people and injuring at least fifteen.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn255" name="_ftnref255"&gt;255&lt;/a&gt; The police claimed that they had opened fire because the protesters had hurled stones at them and that some militants, posing as unarmed demonstrators, had fired on the military camp prompting return fire.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn256" name="_ftnref256"&gt;256&lt;/a&gt; The police also blamed the deaths of unarmed protestors on militants, stating that those killed had been shot from behind,&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn257" name="_ftnref257"&gt;257&lt;/a&gt; a claim disputed by eyewitnesses.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn258" name="_ftnref258"&gt;258&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There were angry protests in the state assembly, with legislators insisting that those responsible for firing on the demonstration be punished.  Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, after visiting Brakpora, suspended several police officers implicated in the shooting and also ordered that three senior officers from the district, including the deputy inspector-general of police, senior superintendent of police and the deputy commissioner, be transferred.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn259" name="_ftnref259"&gt;259&lt;/a&gt;  He also promised a judicial inquiry.&lt;br /&gt;Former High Court judge S.R. Pandian was asked to head the commission set up to investigate the police shooting.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn260" name="_ftnref260"&gt;260&lt;/a&gt; His report, issued on October 27, 2000, concluded that:&lt;br /&gt;There can be no second opinion that the incident that had taken place in front of the SOG [Special Operations Group] and CRPF Camp at Brakpora/Bulbul Nowgam, Anantnag is nothing but a sort of butchery [by the troops] in which eight innocent persons had laid down their lives and 14 persons sustained injuries, some of them very seriously. The loss to life is irrevocable.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn261" name="_ftnref261"&gt;261&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Justice Pandian, who also examined the causes that led to the incident at Brakpora, said that its “direct root causes” were linked to the Chattisinghpora massacre and the faked encounter killings in Pathirabal.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn262" name="_ftnref262"&gt;262&lt;/a&gt; His commission fixed responsibility on seven people: three policemen and four members of the CRPF.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn263" name="_ftnref263"&gt;263&lt;/a&gt; Both officers in-charge, Ashok Kumar of the state police and R. P. Roy of the CRPF, were held responsible. The commission findings were unequivocal, stating that the shooting was “nothing short of an unwarranted brutal attack amounting to murder, attempt to murder and causing grievous and simple hurt, without any justification and authority.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn264" name="_ftnref264"&gt;264&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Pandian Commission report was placed before the state cabinet on October 31, 2000. The Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, accepting the findings, said that the cases relating to the four CRPF personnel would be forwarded to the central government for appropriate action.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn265" name="_ftnref265"&gt;265&lt;/a&gt; Murder charges, he said, would be brought against the police personnel found responsible for the shooting.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftn266" name="_ftnref266"&gt;266&lt;/a&gt; Nearly six years on, the three policemen have yet to be arrested or charged. There is no information available about any action taken against CRPF personnel.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075969"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362291"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref122" name="_ftn122"&gt;122&lt;/a&gt; The Human Rights Committee, in its Concluding Observations to Argentina in 2000, stated that with respect to human rights violations during military rule, gross human rights violations “should be prosecutable for as long as necessary, with applicability as far back in time as necessary to bring their perpetrators to justice.” Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Argentina (Nov. 3, 2000), CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 9.  See also the Convention against Torture, Arts. 4, 5 &amp; 7 and other human rights treaties. The Human Rights Committee has stated that states are “under a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations of human rights, and in particular forced disappearances of persons and violations of the right to life, and to prosecute criminally, try and punish those held responsible for such violations.”  Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, Communication No. 563/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993 (1995), para. 8.6.&lt;br /&gt;Under international humanitarian law, states must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their armed forces or on their territory and prosecute as appropriate. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 607-10.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref123" name="_ftn123"&gt;123&lt;/a&gt; Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref124" name="_ftn124"&gt;124&lt;/a&gt; See footnote 36.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref125" name="_ftn125"&gt;125&lt;/a&gt;Constitution of India, [online] http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm (retrieved April 17, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref126" name="_ftn126"&gt;126&lt;/a&gt;Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p. 60.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref127" name="_ftn127"&gt;127&lt;/a&gt; Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, p.15.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref128" name="_ftn128"&gt;128&lt;/a&gt; Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 218&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref129" name="_ftn129"&gt;129&lt;/a&gt;Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref130" name="_ftn130"&gt;130&lt;/a&gt;Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref131" name="_ftn131"&gt;131&lt;/a&gt; Chindu Sreedharam’s interview with photojournalist Meraj-ud-din, “A lensman’s record of the vale of violence,” in “Blood in the Snow: Ten Years of Conflict in Kashmir,” December 11, 1999, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/11blood.htm"&gt;http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/dec/11blood.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved May 10, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref132" name="_ftn132"&gt;132&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref133" name="_ftn133"&gt;133&lt;/a&gt; Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p.61. There are other estimates that nearly one hundred people were killed; see Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref134" name="_ftn134"&gt;134&lt;/a&gt;Tony Allen-Mills, “The Secret Massacre of Srinagar,” The Independent (London), January 28, 1990. Several other foreign magazines and newspapers reported the incident. See also Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: I.B. Tauris &amp; Co Ltd., 1996) [online excerpts] &lt;a href="http://www.kashmirpoint.com/Bookexerts.htm"&gt;http://www.kashmirpoint.com/Bookexerts.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved May 26, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref135" name="_ftn135"&gt;135&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Srinagar, July 29, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref136" name="_ftn136"&gt;136&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref137" name="_ftn137"&gt;137&lt;/a&gt;Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, pp. 147-153.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref138" name="_ftn138"&gt;138&lt;/a&gt; Kanchan Gupta, “The Pandits: Dole and Despair,” rediff.com, February 3, 2005, [online] http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/feb/04kanch.htm (retrieved February 16, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref139" name="_ftn139"&gt;139&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref140" name="_ftn140"&gt;140&lt;/a&gt; Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref141" name="_ftn141"&gt;141&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref142" name="_ftn142"&gt;142&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch email interview with Parvez Imroz, Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, Srinagar, March 17, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref143" name="_ftn143"&gt;143&lt;/a&gt; Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p. 61.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref144" name="_ftn144"&gt;144&lt;/a&gt; “Kashmir’s First Blood,” The Indian Express, May 1, 2005, [online] &lt;a href="http://in.news.yahoo.com/050430/48/5yd80.html"&gt;http://in.news.yahoo.com/050430/48/5yd80.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 10, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref145" name="_ftn145"&gt;145&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref146" name="_ftn146"&gt;146&lt;/a&gt;Human Rights Watch interview with the father of a JKLF militant who surrendered in 1994, Srinagar, July 30, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref147" name="_ftn147"&gt;147&lt;/a&gt;Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 219.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref148" name="_ftn148"&gt;148&lt;/a&gt;Report from J.N. Saxena, director general of Police to Jagmohan, governor of Jammu and Kashmir, reproduced in Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, pp. 587-589.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref149" name="_ftn149"&gt;149&lt;/a&gt;“Cleric Killed, 30 Mourners Slain in India,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1990, p.2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref150" name="_ftn150"&gt;150&lt;/a&gt; Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref151" name="_ftn151"&gt;151&lt;/a&gt; David Devadas, “Will CRPF Overcome Memories of Excesses that Haunt Kashmiri Minds?” The Tribune (Chandigarh), November 23, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://www/tribuneindia.com/2003/20031123/edit.htm#4"&gt;http://www/tribuneindia.com/2003/20031123/edit.htm#4&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 1, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref152" name="_ftn152"&gt;152&lt;/a&gt;Report from India Today, June 15, 1990, cited in Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref153" name="_ftn153"&gt;153&lt;/a&gt; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 58.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref154" name="_ftn154"&gt;154&lt;/a&gt;Akhila Raman, “India’s Human Rights Record in J&amp;amp;K”, November 2002, indiatogether.org, online] &lt;a href="http://www.indiatogether.org/peace/kashmir/articles/indhr.htm"&gt;http://www.indiatogether.org/peace/kashmir/articles/indhr.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005); Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref155" name="_ftn155"&gt;155&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview with Yusuf Jameel, journalist, Srinagar, August 3, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref156" name="_ftn156"&gt;156&lt;/a&gt; Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 219.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref157" name="_ftn157"&gt;157&lt;/a&gt; “Cleric Killed, 30 Mourners Slain in India,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1990.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref158" name="_ftn158"&gt;158&lt;/a&gt;Report reproduced in Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, p. 588.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref159" name="_ftn159"&gt;159&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 58.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref160" name="_ftn160"&gt;160&lt;/a&gt;Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 74.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref161" name="_ftn161"&gt;161&lt;/a&gt; Praveen Swami, “Mutfi’s Turn,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 23, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.flonnet.com/fl1923/stories/2002112006200400.htm"&gt;http://www.flonnet.com/fl1923/stories/2002112006200400.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 16, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref162" name="_ftn162"&gt;162&lt;/a&gt; David Devadas, “Will CRPF Overcome Memories of Excesses that Haunt Kashmiri Minds?” The Tribune, November 23, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20031123/edit.htm#4"&gt;http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20031123/edit.htm#4&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 1, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref163" name="_ftn163"&gt;163&lt;/a&gt;Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref164" name="_ftn164"&gt;164&lt;/a&gt; Memorandum from senior officials to Governor Girish Saxena, May 28, 1990, as reproduced in Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref165" name="_ftn165"&gt;165&lt;/a&gt; Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref166" name="_ftn166"&gt;166&lt;/a&gt;Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref167" name="_ftn167"&gt;167&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref168" name="_ftn168"&gt;168&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref169" name="_ftn169"&gt;169&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 589.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref170" name="_ftn170"&gt;170&lt;/a&gt;Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref171" name="_ftn171"&gt;171&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref172" name="_ftn172"&gt;172&lt;/a&gt; “10 years on, Bejbehara massacre victims await ‘healing touch,’” Kashmir Times, October 20, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/"&gt;http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref173" name="_ftn173"&gt;173&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Beijbehara, August 1, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref174" name="_ftn174"&gt;174&lt;/a&gt; “10 years on, Bejbehara massacre victims await ‘healing touch,’” Kashmir Times, October 20, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/"&gt;http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref175" name="_ftn175"&gt;175&lt;/a&gt; U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India”, January 31, 1994, [online] &lt;a href="http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_sasia/India.html"&gt;http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_sasia/India.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref176" name="_ftn176"&gt;176&lt;/a&gt;Under the Border Security Force Act and BSF Rules, offenses by members of the force are examined by the Staff Court of Inquiry and those found responsible face trial by a Security Force Court.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref177" name="_ftn177"&gt;177&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 1993-94, Annexure V.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref178" name="_ftn178"&gt;178&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref179" name="_ftn179"&gt;179&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref180" name="_ftn180"&gt;180&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref181" name="_ftn181"&gt;181&lt;/a&gt; Siddharth Varadarajan and Manoj Joshi, “BSF record: Guilty Are Seldom Punished,” The Times of India, April 21, 2002, [online] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/7503214.cms (retrieved October 30, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref182" name="_ftn182"&gt;182&lt;/a&gt; Asian Center for Human Rights, “Holy Cows, Chained Watchdog and a Banana Republic,” January 28, 2004, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/0504.htm"&gt;http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/0504.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref183" name="_ftn183"&gt;183&lt;/a&gt; A.G. Noorani, “Audit of Human Rights,” Economic and Political Weekly, 3-9 November 2001, Vol. XXXVI, No. 44; “Bijbehara Killings, India’s NHRC: The Best Case is Quite the Worst” in “Commissions and Conflict: Briefing Papers on the Role of the National Human Rights Institutions in Conflict Situations”, Asian Center for Human Rights, September 11, 2004, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref184" name="_ftn184"&gt;184&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Section 3.6, Annual Report, 1998-1999, [online] &lt;a href="http://nhrc.nic.in/"&gt;http://nhrc.nic.in/&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 4, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref185" name="_ftn185"&gt;185&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref186" name="_ftn186"&gt;186&lt;/a&gt; Asian Center for Human Rights, “Holy Cows, Chained Watchdog and a Banana Republic,” ACHR Review,  January 28, 2004, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/0504PF.htm"&gt;http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/0504PF.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved February 9, 2005).  As described in Chapter III, under Section 19, the NHRC cannot independently investigate abuses committed by the armed forces. The NHRC has repeatedly demanded amendments to certain provisions of the HRPA, particularly of Section 19, which “has resulted in instances of a lack of accountability and indeed, opacity in respect of complaints relating to the violation of human rights by members of the armed forces.”  National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2001-2002.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref187" name="_ftn187"&gt;187&lt;/a&gt; South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center, Human Rights Features, “Justice And Accountability in Kashmir-Chasing the Mirage,” April 24, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.hri.ca/partners/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF19.html"&gt;http://www.hri.ca/partners/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF19.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 2, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref188" name="_ftn188"&gt;188&lt;/a&gt; Siddharth Varadarajan and Manoj Joshi, “BSF record: Guilty Are Seldom Punished,” The Times of India, April 21, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/7503214.cms"&gt;http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/7503214.cms&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved October 30, 2004). “10 years on, Bejbehara massacre victims await ‘healing touch,’” Kashmir Times, October 20, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/"&gt;http://kashmir.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/news/200210/294/&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref189" name="_ftn189"&gt;189&lt;/a&gt;Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref190" name="_ftn190"&gt;190&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “India: Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir,” April 2001, AI Index: ASA 20/023/2001, [online] &lt;a href="http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA200232001"&gt;http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA200232001&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref191" name="_ftn191"&gt;191&lt;/a&gt; The Territorial Army is part of the regular army and its role is to relieve regular army from static duties and assist civil administration. Territorial Army units have taken part in active combat including the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, the Indo-China war in 1962 and the peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. The Territorial Army has also been deployed in situations of internal conflict including operations in the northeast and in Punjab. For details, see [online] &lt;a href="http://indianarmy.nic.in/arcar.htm"&gt;http://indianarmy.nic.in/arcar.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 2, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref192" name="_ftn192"&gt;192&lt;/a&gt;Amnesty International, “Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref193" name="_ftn193"&gt;193&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview with Arshid Andrabi, lawyer and brother of Jalil Andrabi, Srinagar, May 19, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref194" name="_ftn194"&gt;194&lt;/a&gt;  Amnesty International, “Submission to the Human Rights Committee Concerning the Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” July 1997, [online] &lt;a href="http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200271997?open&amp;of=ENG-IND"&gt;http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA200271997?open&amp;amp;of=ENG-IND&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref195" name="_ftn195"&gt;195&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Complaints Before the Commission, Case of Jalil Andrabi, (Case No. 9/123/95-LD), Annual Report 2002-2003.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref196" name="_ftn196"&gt;196&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2001-2002, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref197" name="_ftn197"&gt;197&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref198" name="_ftn198"&gt;198&lt;/a&gt;“Jaleel Andrabi Murder Case; SIT submits final report,” Informative Missive, Vol. 46, March 2001, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref199" name="_ftn199"&gt;199&lt;/a&gt;Human Rights Watch interview with Arshid Andrabi, Srinagar, May 19, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref200" name="_ftn200"&gt;200&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch interview with Mian Abdul Qayoom, Srinagar, August 2, 2005.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref201" name="_ftn201"&gt;201&lt;/a&gt;Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Kashmir Conflict.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref202" name="_ftn202"&gt;202&lt;/a&gt; Celia W. Dugger, “Pall Cast by Sikh Slaying Settles Over Clinton Visit,” The New York Times, March 22, 2000; Sonia Jabbar, “A Spring in Kashmir: First Hand Report from South Asia Citizen’s Web,” SACW, April 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/2000/000613.html"&gt;http://bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/2000/000613.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved May 26, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref203" name="_ftn203"&gt;203&lt;/a&gt;Balraj Puri, “Aftermath of Chhitisinghpora Massacre of Sikh,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www.pucl.org/reports/JammuKashmir/chhitisinghpora.htm"&gt;http://www.pucl.org/reports/JammuKashmir/chhitisinghpora.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved April 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref204" name="_ftn204"&gt;204&lt;/a&gt; “Two Main Accused in Chattisinghpora Arrested,” Press Trust of India, August 31, 2000, [online] https://www.rediff.com/news/2000/aug/31jk.htm (retrieved April 6, 2006). The Ministry of External Affairs said that two Pakistani men were arrested in the case. One of them, Mohd. Suhail Malik of Sialkot, Pakistan, reportedly confessed to having been part of the group of militants that had put on army uniforms and carried liquor bottles to falsely give the impression that the Chattisinghpora massacre had been carried out by the Indian Army. The other militant, Zahid Hussain of Gujrnawalla, reportedly admitted that he was also part of the same militant group but did not take part in the killings. See [online] &lt;a href="http://meaindia.nic.in/searchhome.htm"&gt;http://meaindia.nic.in/searchhome.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 2, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref205" name="_ftn205"&gt;205&lt;/a&gt; National Human Rights Commission, “Killing of 35 Members of Sikh Community in Anantnag District of Jammu &amp; Kashmir by Militants”, Case No. 206/9/1999-2000, Annual Report, 2000-2001, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.nhrc.nic.in/ar00_01.htm"&gt;http://www.nhrc.nic.in/ar00_01.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved May 26, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref206" name="_ftn206"&gt;206&lt;/a&gt;Praveen Swami, “The Massacre at Chattisinghpora,” Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 07, April 1-14, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1707/17070340.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1707/17070340.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 13, 2005). See also Farooq Khan’s testimony as described in the Report of the Inquiry Commission led by Justice S.R. Pandian, October 27, 2000, p. 12.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref207" name="_ftn207"&gt;207&lt;/a&gt;“Troops Kill 5 Rebels Linked to Massacre in Kashmir,” Chicago Tribune reproducing New York Times News Service, March 26, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref208" name="_ftn208"&gt;208&lt;/a&gt; “Army in Kashmir, Events in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir as on March 25, 2000,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www.armyinkashmir.org/updates/25032000.html"&gt;http://www.armyinkashmir.org/updates/25032000.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 2, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref209" name="_ftn209"&gt;209&lt;/a&gt; Praveen Swami, “In Search of the Truth,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 07, March 30-April 12, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref210" name="_ftn210"&gt;210&lt;/a&gt; Report of the Inquiry Commission led by Justice S. R. Pandian, October 27, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref211" name="_ftn211"&gt;211&lt;/a&gt; “Massacre Perpetrators Killed by Army were Ordinary People,” The Times of India, March 31, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref212" name="_ftn212"&gt;212&lt;/a&gt;  Amnesty International said that: “Local observers, however, disbelieved the official account; they pointed out that if armed men hidden in a hut on a hilltop had indeed been involved in a gunfight as claimed by the authorities, they would have injured some of the security force personnel attacking them from the valley - but none was injured. Moreover, security forces could have exchanged fire until those trapped in the hut ran out of ammunition and then arrested them instead of using heavy weapons to blast the hut killing those inside.” Amnesty International, “A Trail of Unlawful Killings in Jammu &amp; Kashmir: Chattisinghpora and Aftermath,” AI Index: ASA 20/024/2000, June 15, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA200242000"&gt;http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA200242000&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref213" name="_ftn213"&gt;213&lt;/a&gt; “Massacre Perpetrators Killed by Army were Ordinary People,” The Times of India, March 31, 2000.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref214" name="_ftn214"&gt;214&lt;/a&gt; Informative Missive, July 2003, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref215" name="_ftn215"&gt;215&lt;/a&gt; Report of the Inquiry Commission led by Justice S.R. Pandian, October 27, 2000, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref216" name="_ftn216"&gt;216&lt;/a&gt; Siddharth Varadarajan, “State of Discontent,” Newsline, June 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJune2002/cover3june.htm"&gt;http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJune2002/cover3june.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 15, 2005); Praveen Swami, “Outrage in Anantnag,” Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 08, April 15-28, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1708/17080340.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1708/17080340.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 13, 2005); Praveen Swami, “In Search of the Truth,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 07, March 30-April 12, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June  14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref217" name="_ftn217"&gt;217&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref218" name="_ftn218"&gt;218&lt;/a&gt;The Times of India reported on March 7, 2002, that forensic samples had been tampered with, creating a national furor, with the NHRC calling for immediate action. A Srinagar-based newspaper, Al Safa, had reported this earlier, but local Kashmir journals are not always considered credible and that report had been ignored. See Praveen Swami, “In Search of the Truth,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 07, March 30-April 12, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 13, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref219" name="_ftn219"&gt;219&lt;/a&gt; “NHRC issues notice to the government of Jammu &amp; Kashmir,” National Human Rights Commission, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=149"&gt;http://www.nhrc.nic.in/disparchive.asp?fno=149&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved March 17, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref220" name="_ftn220"&gt;220&lt;/a&gt;“Farooq Apologizes for DNA fudge,” The Times of India, March 9, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3202180.cms"&gt;http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/3202180.cms&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref221" name="_ftn221"&gt;221&lt;/a&gt; Praveen Swami, “In Search of the Truth,” Frontline, Volume 19, Issue 07, March 30-April 12, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm"&gt;http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1907/19070320.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005); Mukhtar Ahmad et al, “I Don’t Need DNA Tests To Recognize My Son,” The Rediff Special, March 12, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/12spec.htm"&gt;http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/12spec.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref222" name="_ftn222"&gt;222&lt;/a&gt;Nazir Masoodi, “DNA nails Pathribal Lie but Farooq Touches Raw Nerve,” The Indian Express, July 17, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=6156"&gt;http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=6156&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref223" name="_ftn223"&gt;223&lt;/a&gt; Shujaat Bukhari, “Security Forces Killed Civilians,” The Hindu, July 17, 2002, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.thehindu.com/2002/07/17/stories/2002071705451100.htm"&gt;http://www.thehindu.com/2002/07/17/stories/2002071705451100.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 1, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref224" name="_ftn224"&gt;224&lt;/a&gt;National Human Rights Commission, Case Details of File Number: 206/9/1999-2000, [online] http://nhrc.nic.in/display.asp (retrieved July 4, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref225" name="_ftn225"&gt;225&lt;/a&gt; “DNA Case Lands Mufti Government In Trouble,” The Times of India, August 16, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030816d.html"&gt;http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030816d.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 20, 2005); “Pathribal victims get healing touch,” Informative Missive, July 2003, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref226" name="_ftn226"&gt;226&lt;/a&gt; Informative Missive, July 2003, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref227" name="_ftn227"&gt;227&lt;/a&gt; Mukhtar Ahmad, “DNA Test Tamper Stick For Cops,” The Telegraph (Calcutta), July 24, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030724/asp/nation/story_2195233.asp"&gt;http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030724/asp/nation/story_2195233.asp&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref228" name="_ftn228"&gt;228&lt;/a&gt; “Fudging of DNA Samples: Police Official Suspended,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), July 24, 2003, [online] http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030725/j&amp;k.htm#8 (retrieved February 16, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref229" name="_ftn229"&gt;229&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref230" name="_ftn230"&gt;230&lt;/a&gt; “DNA Case Lands Mufti Government In Trouble,” The Times of India, August 13, 2003, [online] &lt;a href="http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030816d.html"&gt;http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030816d.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref231" name="_ftn231"&gt;231&lt;/a&gt; “CAT Quashes Suspension of Former Anantnag SSP,” The Hindustan Times, November 2, 2004, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/2004/Nov/03/5922_1087272,0015002000020002.htm"&gt;http://www.hindustantimes.com/2004/Nov/03/5922_1087272,0015002000020002.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved August 20, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref232" name="_ftn232"&gt;232&lt;/a&gt; See section on Barakpora firing, below.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref233" name="_ftn233"&gt;233&lt;/a&gt;Justice S.R. Pandian, “One Man Commission of Inquiry Report on the Firing Event at Brakpora/Bulbul, Nowgam, (Anantnag) on April 3, 2000,” Srinagar, October 27, 2000, p. 2.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref234" name="_ftn234"&gt;234&lt;/a&gt;Amnesty International, “Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref235" name="_ftn235"&gt;235&lt;/a&gt; “Army Killed Anantnag Vilagers, Ex-SP Tells Panel,” The Times of India, September 1, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000901b.thml"&gt;http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000901b.thml&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref236" name="_ftn236"&gt;236&lt;/a&gt; Justice S. R. Pandian, Report of the Inquiry Commission, October 27, 2000, p. 12.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref237" name="_ftn237"&gt;237&lt;/a&gt; “Army Killed Anantnag Vilagers, Ex-SP Tells Panel,” The Times of India, September 1, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000901b.thml"&gt;http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2000/kashmir20000901b.thml&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref238" name="_ftn238"&gt;238&lt;/a&gt; Justice S. R. Pandian, Report of the Inquiry Commission, October 27, 2000, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref239" name="_ftn239"&gt;239&lt;/a&gt; “Pathirabal Victims Get Healing Touch,” Informative Missive, July 2003, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref240" name="_ftn240"&gt;240&lt;/a&gt; “Fudging of DNA Samples: Police Official Suspended,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), July 24, 2003, [online] http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030725/j&amp;amp;k.htm#8 (retrieved February 16, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref241" name="_ftn241"&gt;241&lt;/a&gt;“SSP Suspended for Pathribal Killings Reinstated,” Press Trust of India, September 15, 2005, [online] http://www.kashmirlive.com/full_story.php?content_id=54737&amp;type=ei (retrieved May 27, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref242" name="_ftn242"&gt;242&lt;/a&gt; “Army in Kashmir, Events in Jammu &amp;amp; Kashmir as on March 25, 2000,” [online] &lt;a href="http://www/armyinkashmir.org/updates/25032000.html"&gt;http://www/armyinkashmir.org/updates/25032000.html&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved July 2, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref243" name="_ftn243"&gt;243&lt;/a&gt; Central Bureau of Investigation, “CBI Files Charges Against Four Commissioned and One JCO of 7 RR In the Pathribal Encounter Case,” May 11, 2006, [online] http://cbi.nic.in/PressReleases/PRelease2006/p11_1May06.htm (retrieved May 17, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref244" name="_ftn244"&gt;244&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref245" name="_ftn245"&gt;245&lt;/a&gt; Riyaz Wani, “CBI Charges 5 Army Officers With Murder in Pathribal Case,” The Indian Express, May 11, 2006, [online] http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=67537 (retrieved May 17, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref246" name="_ftn246"&gt;246&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref247" name="_ftn247"&gt;247&lt;/a&gt; Ritu Sarin, “Blame J-K Cops, Not Us For Pathribal: Brigadier to DGMO,” The Indian Express, May 14, 2006, [online] http://www/indianexpress.com/story/4462.html (retrieved May 17, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref248" name="_ftn248"&gt;248&lt;/a&gt; “Army Seeks to Quash Charges Against Men,” South Asian Media Net, August 10, 2006 [online] http://www.southasianmedia.net/cnn.cfm?id=316392&amp;category=Security&amp;amp;Country=INDIA (retrieved August 22, 2006).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref249" name="_ftn249"&gt;249&lt;/a&gt; Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref250" name="_ftn250"&gt;250&lt;/a&gt; For example Kamal Mitra Chenoy, in “Frameworks for Peace: A Symposium on Efforts to Broker Peace in Kashmir,” said that: “About Chithisingpora, there is a widespread belief that the massacre of 35 Sikhs was carried out by the army itself. The group interviewed several survivors and residents in Chithisingpora, and though the witnesses were extremely wary, their statements clearly indicated that they suspected militants of being responsible. But the very fact that contrary perceptions are widespread, shows how much the security forces have alienated themselves from the very people they are supposed to protect.” Kamal Mitra Chenoy, “Frameworks for Peace: A Symposium on Efforts to Broker Peace in Kashmir,” December 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/496/496%20report.htm"&gt;http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/496/496%20report.htm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved May 25, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref251" name="_ftn251"&gt;251&lt;/a&gt;Amnesty International, “A Trail of Unlawful Killings in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref252" name="_ftn252"&gt;252&lt;/a&gt;“Fresh Probe Into Sikh Massacre,” BBC News, November 1, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1001479.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1001479.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved June 14, 2005).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref253" name="_ftn253"&gt;253&lt;/a&gt; Celia W. Dugger, “7 Villagers in Kashmir Slain During Anti-Police Protest,” The New York Times, April 4, 2000. The Pandian Commission said that there were different accounts of the number of people in the procession. While some estimated it at six hundred to eight hundred, others said that there were over two thousand.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref254" name="_ftn254"&gt;254&lt;/a&gt;Justice S. R. Pandian, Report of the Inquiry Commission, October 27, 2000, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref255" name="_ftn255"&gt;255&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref256" name="_ftn256"&gt;256&lt;/a&gt; “Police Suspended Over Kashmir Deaths,” BBC News, April 4, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/701016.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/701016.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved April 27, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref257" name="_ftn257"&gt;257&lt;/a&gt; Celia W. Dugger, “7 Villagers in Kashmir Slain During Anti-Police Protest,” The New York Times, April 4, 2000. In affidavits filed before the Pandian Commission, security officials claimed that they had initially fired in the air to disperse the crowd. Some people then attempted to snatch weapons from the troops. Shots were also fired by some marchers.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref258" name="_ftn258"&gt;258&lt;/a&gt; In affidavits filed before the Pandian Commission, eyewitnesses said that police and CRPF officials came out of their bunkers outside the camp, blocked off the marchers from three sides and opened fire on the demonstration.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref259" name="_ftn259"&gt;259&lt;/a&gt; “Police Suspended Over Kashmir Deaths,” BBC News, April 4, 2000, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/701016.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/701016.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved April 27, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref260" name="_ftn260"&gt;260&lt;/a&gt;“Fresh Probe into Sikh massacre,” BBC News, [online] &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.uk/1/world/south_asia/1001479.stm"&gt;http://news.bbc.uk/1/world/south_asia/1001479.stm&lt;/a&gt; (retrieved September 19, 2004).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref261" name="_ftn261"&gt;261&lt;/a&gt; Justice S. R. Pandian, Report on the Inquiry Commission, October 27, 2000, p.108.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref262" name="_ftn262"&gt;262&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 103.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref263" name="_ftn263"&gt;263&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref264" name="_ftn264"&gt;264&lt;/a&gt; Ibid. p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref265" name="_ftn265"&gt;265&lt;/a&gt; The CRPF comes under the jurisdiction of the federal government in New Delhi. Complaints are investigated and prosecuted internally by the CRPF. The results are never made public. Criminal prosecution of CRPF personnel requires sanction from New Delhi.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/5.htm#_ftnref266" name="_ftn266"&gt;266&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International, “Impunity Must End in Jammu and Kashmir.”&lt;br /&gt;V. Recent Abuses and Continuing Impunity&lt;br /&gt;“I have not seen any official being punished. And quite frankly, I don’t even try to get them prosecuted. My priority is to get my clients released while they are still alive.”—Mian Abdul Qayoom, president of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Bar Association, Srinagar&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn267" name="_ftnref267"&gt;267&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Since 2002, government officials and senior military officers have made statements instructing the security forces that human rights abuses will not be tolerated. For example, the first statement from the Congress party’s Ghulam Nabi Azad after his appointment as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir on November 2, 2005 (as part of a rotation previously agreed with its coalition partner, the People’s Democratic Party, or PDP), was that his government would not tolerate custodial killings by troops and police.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn268" name="_ftnref268"&gt;268&lt;/a&gt; Perhaps more important, Gen. J.J. Singh, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, reportedly told his troops that such deaths would not be tolerated because they negated all the good work done by the army.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn269" name="_ftnref269"&gt;269&lt;/a&gt; Perhaps most significantly, in May 2006, even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told troops in Jammu and Kashmir, “It is possible and desirable that you should be firm but humane; effective and efficient; in control but unobtrusive.” He added, “You must be steadfast in your commitment to human rights and there should be zero tolerance for custodial deaths.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn270" name="_ftnref270"&gt;270&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;These are important messages that, if translated into action, could make a major difference in the human rights situation and help improve public trust in the government and security forces.&lt;br /&gt;Since the 2002 state elections that threw out the administration of Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference party and brought PDP leader Mufti Mohammad Sayeed to power as chief minister, there have been some improvements on the ground. The number of new “disappearances” has significantly decreased; according to the Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons they have dropped from eighty-one in 2003 to eighteen in 2005. The systematic use of warrantless searches as part of cordon-and-search operations for militants has been reduced. With a reduction in random grenade or sniper attacks by militants upon security posts, and perhaps because of better human rights training, the practice of storming neighborhoods after such attacks, setting fire to buildings, and randomly beating up residents has also decreased. This shows that political commitment can make a difference.&lt;br /&gt;Yet the army and paramilitaries are not under control of the civilian authorities in Srinagar. As the security forces continue to try to crush the insurgency––and without a clear and unqualified commitment to reform from the leadership of the national government, the army, and the paramilitaries––serious abuses such as killings, “disappearances,” torture, and arbitrary and illegal detentions continue.&lt;br /&gt;Alarmingly, the prevalence of impunity continues. Most alleged cases of abuse are not investigated. In the rare instances when they are, Human Rights Watch can find no cases resulting in public prosecutions or convictions of soldiers, paramilitaries, or police.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn271" name="_ftnref271"&gt;271&lt;/a&gt; Disciplinary measures within the Indian army, the CRPF, the BSF, or the police are also rare and lacking in transparency. In March 2006, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad told the Jammu and Kashmir assembly that since the insurgency began disciplinary action had been taken against 134 army personnel, seventy-nine members of the Border Security Force, and sixty policemen.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn272" name="_ftnref272"&gt;272&lt;/a&gt; However, the government has not provided any details, such as the nature of the crime, the name of the victim, the name of the accused, or dates, calling into question whether these cases really exist and, if they do, whether they have anything to do with human rights abuses or are just cases of ordinary crimes such as theft or corruption, or disciplinary problems such as fistfights or breaking of internal rules.&lt;br /&gt;In short, Indian security forces continue to hide behind the shield of immunity provisions in Indian law and the lack of political will in New Delhi to address the critical human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;In this chapter we list only cases after the November 2002 election of a state government that came to power promising improvements in the human rights situation. We believe that these cases require a thorough and independent investigation leading to appropriate prosecutions or disciplinary action. The police and other law enforcement authorities must act on their own to investigate serious abuses, and not simply wait for complaints from family members. Formal complaints are neither required nor often forthcoming because, as many families told Human Rights Watch, they are afraid or believe it is pointless.&lt;br /&gt;These cases illustrate the scope of continuing abuses and the need for the government to fulfill its obligations under international law to fully investigate and prosecute serious violations of human rights.  The government further must provide for the right to a remedy and reparations for the victims and their families, regardless of their status as militants or innocent civilians.  It is also hoped that the human tragedies brought to light by these accounts will provide additional impetus for genuine government action. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc144362292"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075970"&gt;A. Killings&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;“These people are like trained killer dogs. Once unleashed, it is difficult to keep them in check.”—Senior police official speaking to Human Rights Watch about security forces operating in Kashmir&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn273" name="_ftnref273"&gt;273&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The most alarming human rights problem in Jammu and Kashmir remains the high number of unlawful killings by security forces.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn274" name="_ftnref274"&gt;274&lt;/a&gt;  During fighting between government forces and militants, the laws of war—specifically common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary laws of war—apply.  The laws of war prohibit attacks on civilians and attacks that do not discriminate between civilians and valid military targets.  Civilians have been victims of fighting in which they were shot in the crossfire, but they have also been subjected to laws of war violations in which the security forces did not take all feasible precautions to distinguish between civilians and militants.  The security forces have then often sought to claim that those shot were militants or civilians who died in crossfire.&lt;br /&gt;Provoking the greatest local outcry have been cases of faked “encounter killings.” As in 2000 at Pathirabal (see Section IV above), in these cases the security forces are alleged to have fabricated a story about having killed a “militant” in self-defense or in battle when in fact the person was executed in custody.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn275" name="_ftnref275"&gt;275&lt;/a&gt; Common article 3 prohibits at all times murder, torture and other ill-treatment of civilians and captured combatants.  Summary or extrajudicial executions also violate the right to life under international human rights law.  According to Indian officials who spoke to Human Rights Watch on condition of anonymity, faked encounter killings are more likely to happen if a suspected militant is identified as a Pakistani, or as an important militant leader who might be a security risk if kept in jail, either because he might indoctrinate other prisoners or because there is a perceived danger of hostage-taking to secure his release. The case of the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu to Kandahar in 1999 to secure the release of Pakistani militants is often cited.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn276" name="_ftnref276"&gt;276&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 2001, the U.S. government wrote:&lt;br /&gt;Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such “encounters” are faked and that suspected militants offering no resistance are executed summarily by security forces. Statements by senior police and army officials confirm that the security forces are under instructions to kill foreign militants, rather than attempt to capture them alive. Human rights groups allege that this particularly is true in the case of security force encounters with non-Kashmiri militants who cross into Jammu and Kashmir illegally.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn277" name="_ftnref277"&gt;277&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So pervasive is the problem of faked encounters––not just in Jammu and Kashmir, but in other parts of India where security forces are engaged in containing crime or insurgencies—that the National Human Rights Commission has issued guidelines on investigating such incidents and punishing those making false claims.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn278" name="_ftnref278"&gt;278&lt;/a&gt; As Parvez Imroz, president of the Public Commission on Human Rights (a nongovernmental organization), says:&lt;br /&gt;There are a number of cases where we believe disappeared persons have been killed in faked encounters. In fact, there are cases pending in the High Court but the judiciary has not been particularly productive, merely directing the state or police to investigate. Of course, despite court orders, the progress in such investigations is always slow.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn279" name="_ftnref279"&gt;279&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Such fake encounter killings might even be encouraged by the military command structure through decorations, gallantry citations or promotions of personnel credited for the death of militants. Such incentives may lead to abuses.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn280" name="_ftnref280"&gt;280&lt;/a&gt; Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, a retired officer, has written in an essay in Military Law: Then, Now and Beyond:&lt;br /&gt;Units involved in counter insurgency operations may fall to the temptations to show results, which in simple terms, translates into kills. Every dead militant is a feather in the cap of the commanding officer, leading to rewards such as decorations and unit citations. As a result, there is a danger that the Army units may begin to emulate the Police, and start staging “encounters.” It may be recalled that Mr KPS Gill used similar tactics to curb militancy in Punjab, when he was the [director general of police]. The Army was often co-opted in these operations, and learned the techniques at close hand.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn281" name="_ftnref281"&gt;281&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Officials routinely talk publicly about the “elimination of terrorists,” in language that may contribute to a sense among security forces that they have an assurance of not being held accountable for illegal acts of violence.  For instance, in an interview with the Hindu, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad said that “those who come from across the border and indulge in killings of innocent people should not expect any mercy or concession. Our bullet is going to get those who are killing innocent people… and we are not going to budge even an inch from this position.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn282" name="_ftnref282"&gt;282&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The circumstances around allegedly faked encounter killings are often in dispute. For instance, on July 5, 2005, Hizb-ul-Mujahedin commander Ghulam Mohiuddin Dar was, according to the army, ambushed and killed in an armed encounter. The army said it had prior information that he was in the neighborhood. Dar’s supporters, on the other hand, say that he was arrested by members of the Rashtriya Rifles when he was bathing in a stream around noon, taken into custody, and shot about five hours later in what troops falsely claim to have been an armed encounter in a forest.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn283" name="_ftnref283"&gt;283&lt;/a&gt; Human Rights Watch has been unable to verify either version of this incident. This is why credible, independent investigations are needed. Protection of witnesses is critical.&lt;br /&gt;Another recent example of a disputed case is the death of Abdul Wali Khatana, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, and Mohammad Farooq in Batgund Heepora village on January 17, 2006. Villagers told the Public Commission on Human Rights that the three men, who were associated with a local madrassah (Islamic school), were taken into custody four days earlier and later executed.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn284" name="_ftnref284"&gt;284&lt;/a&gt; The army said that the men were members of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin and were killed in an ambush. According to army spokesman Col. V.K. Batra, Khatana had indeed been called for questioning by the 7th Rashtriya Rifles, but he left the army camp and went underground. According to the army the three militants were killed after an exchange of fire; a pistol and two rifles were allegedly recovered from the militants.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn285" name="_ftnref285"&gt;285&lt;/a&gt; The villagers refused to accept this version and held protest demonstrations until district authorities promised an inquiry.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn286" name="_ftnref286"&gt;286&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Two other cases investigated by Human Rights Watch are illustrative. According to an army report filed with the police, Mohammad Ibrahim Dar and Ishfaq Ahmad Rather were killed by the 2nd Rashtriya Rifles in Lawaypora in Srinagar in an armed encounter on September 29, 2005.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn287" name="_ftnref287"&gt;287&lt;/a&gt; Relatives of Mohammad Ibrahim, a Hizb-ul-Mujahedin commander, insisted that he had been arrested and then killed in a faked encounter. &lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn288" name="_ftnref288"&gt;288&lt;/a&gt; So did the brother of Ishfaq Ahmad, another Hizb-ul-Mujahedin commander who was allegedly killed in the same encounter.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn289" name="_ftnref289"&gt;289&lt;/a&gt; It is difficult, as in most such cases, to establish exactly what happened, but Salima Ganai, Mohammad Ibrahim’s sister, said that when his body was handed over to the family, it bore signs of torture.&lt;br /&gt;It was obvious to us that my brother had been tortured and then killed in a faked encounter. He had bullet wounds. But there were also cuts on his hands, between his fingers and on his wrists. There were these marks on his face that looked like cigarette burns. It seems to me that they killed him with great cruelty.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn290" name="_ftnref290"&gt;290&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;While they want to know what happened to their brothers, both Salima Ganai and Ishfaq Ahmad’s brother, Altaf Ahmad, told Human Rights Watch that they did not believe a fair investigation was possible into the deaths.&lt;br /&gt;Protests often occur when a local Kashmiri is killed. The official response usually is to offer an oral assurance of an inquiry, though these rarely happen. If such inquiries do take place, the findings are seldom made public. According to the Public Commission on Human Rights, of the seventy-three inquiries ordered since the new government was elected in November 2002 and up to December 2005, there is information available in only six cases.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn291" name="_ftnref291"&gt;291&lt;/a&gt; If any action is taken against those found responsible, that too is rarely made public. Human Rights Watch could find no instances in which there was a public prosecution leading to a conviction of those alleged to be responsible for faked encounter killings in Jammu and Kashmir.&lt;br /&gt;In some cases the photograph of a missing Kashmiri turns up in the newspaper or police station as that of a dead “foreign militant” killed in an encounter. In such cases (some of which are described below), the family of the deceased may file a complaint or appeal for exhumation of the body to identify the victim and hold proper burial ceremonies. Frequently, however, the victims of extrajudicial execution by the security forces are suspected militants who are genuinely from Pakistan.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn292" name="_ftnref292"&gt;292&lt;/a&gt; When the individual is from Pakistan and has no relatives in Jammu and Kashmir state, complaints are rarely filed. &lt;br /&gt;In this section we also discuss cases in which troops opened fire on people they believed mistakenly to be militants. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, the army spokesman in Srinagar classified these cases as an “error of judgment,” as opposed to deliberate murder, which he said would be an “error of intention.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn293" name="_ftnref293"&gt;293&lt;/a&gt; However, errors of judgment occur too frequently in Jammu and Kashmir, where special laws such as the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act provide troops with extraordinary powers to shoot to kill. For example, on February 23, 2006, even as the prime minister convened a discussion with Kashmiri groups to try and develop a consensus to end the conflict, in Handwara, four boys, one of them just eight years old, were shot dead by the army.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn294" name="_ftnref294"&gt;294&lt;/a&gt; The Kashmir valley erupted in rage, refusing to accept the army’s claim that the boys had died in crossfire. A judicial probe was belatedly ordered, but many Kashmiris have little faith in it. Instead, they fear that impunity will prevail.&lt;br /&gt;International human rights standards call for a "thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions,” including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest death in such circumstances.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn295" name="_ftnref295"&gt;295&lt;/a&gt;  The Indian government’s investigative practices do not meet accepted international standards in alleged extrajudicial killings, including the right of the deceased’s family to be informed and have access to the investigation, and for the publication of a report “within a reasonable period of time” on the scope and findings of the investigation.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn296" name="_ftnref296"&gt;296&lt;/a&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075971"&gt;Killing of three youths in Vilgam, Kupwara, &lt;/a&gt;July 24, 2005&lt;br /&gt;Bilal Ahmed Sheikh, Shabir Ahmed Shah, Wasim Ahmed Wani, and Manzoor Ahmed Shah were attending the wedding festivities of Manzoor Ahmed’s elder brother. Drummers had been brought in and the four teenagers danced all evening. Close to midnight, they slipped out and walked a short distance to the outskirts of the village, where hidden from disapproving adults, they lit a cigarette.&lt;br /&gt;The groom, Farooq Ahmed Shah, remembers the sudden sound of gunfire. Everyone was shocked. Earlier, the groom’s family had gone to the army camp near the village, invited troops to the wedding and informed them formally that the festivities would go on late into the night. He wondered why the army was conducting operations so close to the village.&lt;br /&gt;As soon as the firing stopped, the villagers scurried home to safety. The parents of the youths worried about their sons, but assumed that they had decided to stay with a friend. At about 4 a.m. soldiers arrived at the home of Farooq Ahmed Shah. “They said my brother had been injured and asked my father to come with them to the hospital.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn297" name="_ftnref297"&gt;297&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The villagers began to gather. By then, the other youths had already been discovered as missing. At around 9:30 a.m., the village headman returned with some soldiers and told the villagers that the army had opened fire, claiming to have mistaken the four teenagers for militants. Three of them, Bilal Ahmed, Shabir Ahmed, and Wasim Ahmed, had been killed. Manzoor Ahmed was in hospital with critical injuries.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn298" name="_ftnref298"&gt;298&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The army apologized for the incident and offered 300,000 rupees (U.S.$6,500) in compensation for each of the three deaths. In an interview with Human Rights Watch soon after the incident, the army spokesman in Srinagar said there would be an inquiry: “We have to learn from this incident. We are already in the process of reviewing our operating procedures. We will see who was in charge and if there was scope for the commander to exercise restraint.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn299" name="_ftnref299"&gt;299&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After the inquiry, according to the same spokesman, the soldier who had opened fire received a warning, but the details have not been publicized. The spokesman told us, “But you must try and understand the difficulties of our troops during such operations. We found that there had been two militant ambushes in the area earlier. In both cases, there were army casualties while the militants escaped. The men made an honest mistake when they opened fire this time. They did not expect the boys to be hiding and smoking.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn300" name="_ftnref300"&gt;300&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075972"&gt;The mother of Bilal Ahmad Sheikh, one of the three Kashmiri teenagers mistakenly shot and killed by Indian Army soldiers in Vilgam, weeps days after the shooting. The three boys had stepped outside a wedding reception to smoke cigarettes when Indian Army soldiers mistook them for Islamist militants, even though the soldiers were informed of the village festivities. Villagers are required to carry flashlights or lanterns after sunset when walking outdoors in the &lt;/a&gt;Kashmir valley, but the boys were not carrying either. The Indian Army has apologized and offered compensation to the families.© 2005 Robert Nickelsberg&lt;br /&gt;Killing of Parvez Ahmad Dar, Kangan, Pulwama, July 20, 2005&lt;br /&gt;Just four days before the incident at Vilgam, sixteen-year-old Parvez Ahmad Dar went with his father and uncle to open irrigation channels into their paddy field in Kangan village. Water is in short supply and villagers take turns to use the precious resource. While returning, Parvez Ahmad fell behind his father and uncle, who walked ahead carrying an oil lantern, a rule at night in rural Jammu and Kashmir to distinguish villagers from militants, who tend to use flashlights. According to Kabir Ahmad Dar, the victim’s uncle:&lt;br /&gt;We heard firing and we went into a neighbor’s hut for safety. We did not know where the boy was, but we thought he must have run to the village. At 6 a.m. the army said there was a crackdown and called everyone outside. There was a major with the soldiers and he said there had been crossfiring. We said there was no crossfire. The firing had come from only one side…. We wanted to go search for my nephew who was not in the village. The major refused to let us go…. He said that my nephew was a militant and had been shot while running away. When we started shouting then he finally admitted that a child had been killed by mistake.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn301" name="_ftnref301"&gt;301&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The villagers ran to the field and found Parvez Ahmad lying there. He had been shot in the back. The villagers insist that the troops had opened fire without provocation. But Lt. Gen. S.S. Dhillon, the commanding officer of the 15th Corps, said that Parvez Ahmad was killed in “retaliatory fire” and that there was “a big difference between the July 20 and July 24 incidents.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn302" name="_ftnref302"&gt;302&lt;/a&gt; An inquiry was promised after protests by the villagers, but if it actually took place the results have not been made public.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075973"&gt;Mohammad Ismail Dar describes the death of his brother, Mohammad Ramzan, who was mistaken for a militant and shot in an army ambush. The family received compensation for the killing.© 2005 Robert Nickelsberg &lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Killing of Mohammad Ramzan Dar, Gundipora, Budgam, June 6, 2005&lt;br /&gt;According to his family, Mohammad Ramzan Dar suffered from a psychological disorder and was therefore unfit for regular jobs. The village had appointed him caretaker of the local mosque, to help support his family. Mohammad Ramzan woke as usual at 3:30 a.m. on June 6, 2005, so that he could be in the mosque in time to call to morning prayers. Many of the villagers woke up soon after because they heard gunfire. As is usual, everyone stayed inside as long as the firing continued so that they would not be caught in crossfire.&lt;br /&gt;In the morning there was no call to prayer, but some of the villagers went to the mosque on time. Outside the mosque, they found the body of Mohammad Ramzan. He had been shot in the head and chest. After villagers protested, police and district authorities promised an inquiry.  According to Mohammad Ismail Dar, brother of Mohammad Ramzan, the authorities later said that the killing was a mistake:&lt;br /&gt;We were told that the 34th Rashtriya Rifles had planned an ambush in the area. My brother was not right in the head and he used to talk to himself. The soldiers heard voices and opened fire thinking that there were militants near the mosque.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn303" name="_ftnref303"&gt;303&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The family received compensation. Mohammad Ismail Dar noted the connection between the wide powers of the security forces to use lethal force and the tragedies that ensued:&lt;br /&gt;I am willing to believe that this incident was a mistake. But how can the army go around shooting people like this? These mistakes should not happen. It is because, in Kashmir, the army can shoot whom they like.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn304" name="_ftnref304"&gt;304&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075974"&gt;Killing of Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Mohammad Rafiq Mattal and Feroz Ahmad Bhat, &lt;/a&gt;April 21, 2005&lt;br /&gt;Zulfiqar Ali Khan left his home in Galiban village around noon on April 21, 2005, after walking his daughter to school. He went to Baramulla town, about fifteen kilometers away, to talk to his father’s doctor and run some errands related to his apple trade. Around 4 p.m. he met a neighbor who was also in Baramulla and said that he was soon heading back home. Meanwhile, he had bought vegetables and, meeting a local constable, sent the bag of vegetables back home with him because the constable was going back to the village immediately.&lt;br /&gt;Later that day, according to a report lodged by the army with the police, Zulfiqar Ali Khan crossed the Line of Control into Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and then back again that night into Jammu and Kashmir state with other militants. The report alleged that they were intercepted and killed in an armed encounter near the Choroonda post in Uri, about sixty kilometers from Baramulla town.&lt;br /&gt;Zulfiqar Ali Khan’s family say that the army is lying. His father, Sardar Kabir Ahmed Khan, says that villagers near Choroonda told him that they saw a car with darkened windows drive past at around 7 p.m. Soon afterwards they heard shots. Sardar Kabir Khan believes that the security forces abducted two other men, Mohammad Rafiq Mattal and Feroz Ahmad Bhat, before picking up Zulfiqar Ali from Baramulla, drove to Choroonda, and then made them walk near the border and opened fire, killing them. Sardar Kabir Khan asks some basic questions:&lt;br /&gt;How, between 4 p.m. and midnight can someone go across the border, meet up with militants, and come back? There are so many soldiers in the area. None of them could see him? My son had been injured in a bomb blast attack some weeks before he died. He could not walk very well. Yet, we are supposed to believe he just strolled across a heavily mined border which is fenced and guarded. And lastly, you should have seen my son’s body. His boots were polished. His clothes were ironed. This, even though he had allegedly trekked across the border. Twice. I think it is obvious. My son was murdered.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn305" name="_ftnref305"&gt;305&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zulfiqar Ali Khan had been arrested for militancy in 1994, detained for four years, and released in 1998. Since then, his father says, Zulfiqar Ali Khan had stopped his association with militants. According to Zulfiqar Ali Khan’s brother in law, Fayaz Ahmad: “[Zulfiqar] was not really interested in militancy even earlier. But his father was a politician associated with the Congress and National Conference. Militants wanted to kill him. At that time, the militants were here all the time. His sons used to associate with the militants so that they would not kill their father.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn306" name="_ftnref306"&gt;306&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Zulfiqar Ali’s younger brother, Firdaus Ali Khan, was killed by the army in 1993. Their father said sadly:&lt;br /&gt;The army came to his shop and said, “You have been feeding militants.” Then they walked him down the hill, shot him and walked away. At that time, there was no choice but to feed militants. They had guns. Also, they used to threaten to kill me. But the army brutally killed my boy. Now, they have killed my older son. My home is now empty.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn307" name="_ftnref307"&gt;307&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the army, Zulfiqar Ali was a guide who helped militants cross the Line of Control. The army claims that on April 21, 2005, he deliberately sent vegetables home with the village constable to establish his presence in Baramulla town. Then he quickly drove up to the village near the border and crept across. At night, he was coming back with a group of militants when he was killed in an armed exchange.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn308" name="_ftnref308"&gt;308&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Disputing this version of events, Sardar Kabir Ahmad Khan demands to know why his son died:&lt;br /&gt;I want them to tell me why they killed him. Why they lied and said he had come from Pakistan. Why do they have to kill?… I think they took my son into custody in Baramulla and then killed him in a faked encounter in the border. I don’t understand this. If they really thought my son was a militant, they could have jailed him. Why kill him? His killers should be punished.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn309" name="_ftnref309"&gt;309&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Three other men were killed in the same encounter in which Zulfiqar Ali was killed. Their relatives also insisted to Human Rights Watch that the men had been killed in a faked encounter. One of the men, Feroz Ahmad Bhat, had been identified by the army as a Pakistani militant and buried. His father, Habibullah Bhat, recognized his son from a police photograph of the corpse and sought an exhumation. He said that, “At the police station, they said that the army had delivered the bodies of militants killed at the border. They said that only one was a Kashmiri. The others were Pakistani and had already been buried. They showed us the picture of the dead Pakistani militants. I identified my son from the picture.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn310" name="_ftnref310"&gt;310&lt;/a&gt; Habibullah Bhat said he tried to file a police complaint so that these deaths could be properly investigated, but was refused. “At the police station they say they cannot file a report because my son was a militant and killed in an encounter. They say that I have no case for complaint.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn311" name="_ftnref311"&gt;311&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075975"&gt;Killing of Nazir Ahmad Dar, &lt;/a&gt;December 29, 2004&lt;br /&gt;The Border Security Force stopped a bus at a checkpost in Kharpora village on the morning of December 29, 2004. As is usual, the passengers were asked to disembark for routine checking. Two militants traveling in the bus opened fire. One soldier was injured. Other soldiers at the checkpost opened fire in response. In the exchange of fire one militant was killed while the other escaped.&lt;br /&gt;According to Nazir Ahmad Dar’s brother-in-law, also called Nazir Ahmad Dar, when villagers heard the gunshots, they ran away in fright. Nazir Ahmad and his neighbors began to run as well. As they passed the road where the bus had been stopped, a stray bullet hit Nazir Ahmad in the leg. He still continued to limp to safety. He was stopped by BSF guards who were checking identity cards to ensure that the escaped militant was not hiding among the villagers. When Nazir Ahmad arrived, he too pulled out his identity card. His brother-in-law said there were some neighbors present who saw what happened next:&lt;br /&gt;Nazir Ahmad was walking slowly. The BSF men asked him why he was limping. He told the soldiers that he had been hit by a bullet as he was running past the bus. But the soldiers must have thought that he was the escaped militant because they immediately pointed their guns at him. Our neighbor, who was standing there, heard Nazir Ahmad say, “I am not a militant. You can arrest me and check.” Instead, they opened fire and killed him.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn312" name="_ftnref312"&gt;312&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The villagers went to the local police station. According to the brother-in-law, several eyewitnesses said that they had heard Nazir Ahmad offer to surrender. That night, members of the BSF came to the village. They met the eyewitnesses and the family. They visited the victim’s sister and brother-in-law as well:&lt;br /&gt;They said, “We will settle with you. Change your statement to say that he was asked to surrender but did not stop.” They offered money. But I said that my brother-in-law has small children. If we take your money, tomorrow the militants will come and ask why we settled. They will kill the children.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn313" name="_ftnref313"&gt;313&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The BSF soldiers repeatedly returned to the village. Nazir Ahmad’s relatives were summoned to their camp. So were the eyewitnesses. Soldiers pressured them to change their statements. Finally, the villagers complained to the local police. That appeared to have some effect. The summons and visits by the BSF stopped. About two weeks later, according to the brother-in-law, that unit of the BSF was shifted out of the neighborhood. However, he does not know whether those responsible for Nazir Ahmad’s death were ever punished.  No eyewitness or relative was ever called to testify in any court of inquiry about the incident. The district authorities paid the routine 100,000 rupee (roughly U.S.$2,300) compensation handed out in cases of death due to crossfire.  As far as anyone knows, the case is now closed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a name="_Toc143075976"&gt;Killing of Abdul Rashid, &lt;/a&gt;October 17, 2004&lt;br /&gt;Around midnight on October 16-17, 2004, security forces arrived at the home of thirty-six-year-old Abdul Rashid. His wife, Taja Bano, told Human Rights Watch:&lt;br /&gt;They knocked on the doors and then asked for some tea. Four men walked inside. They were in uniform and carrying weapons. But they had black cloths tied around their faces. There were others outside&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The family does not know whether the security forces belonged to the army, the paramilitaries, or the police (they were told by neighbors that the men belonged to the Special Operations Group, SOG, a counter-insurgency unit of the state police). The next day, villagers found a body lying near the road and some of them identified it as Abdul Rashid. He had been shot.&lt;br /&gt;The local police station handed Abdul Rashid’s body to his relatives. His father filed a police complaint alleging that he had been murdered by security forces. The local police certified that Abdul Rashid, a laborer and father of seven, had no links with the militants. The family was then paid compensation of 100,000 rupees.&lt;br /&gt;Abdul Rashid’s family believes that the security forces killed him because his wife’s brother, Mohammad Yusuf Sheikh, was a militant. Taja Bano said that Mohammad Yusuf did not keep in touch with his family, but the security forces were unwilling to believe this:&lt;br /&gt;The army and police had come to the house many times before this. They wanted us to tell Mohammad Yusuf to surrender. How could we do anything? My brother did not meet us.&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn315" name="_ftnref315"&gt;315&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The family had initially wanted to file a lawsuit against the police, so that Abdul Rashid’s murderers could be prosecuted. But then they decided against it. Says Abdul Rashid’s mother, Saja Bano: “We are poor. My son is dead. I was scared that they would come and kill my grandson as well.”&lt;a href="http://hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/6.htm#_ftn316" name="_ftnref316
